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Abstract
While RFID systems are one of the key enablers helping the prototype of pervasive
computer applications, the deployment of RFID technologies also comes with
new privacy and security concerns ranging from people tracking and industrial
espionage to product cloning and denial of service. Cryptographic solutions to
tackle these issues were in general challenged by the limited resources of RFID
tags, and by the formalizations of RFID privacy that are believed to be too strong
for such constrained devices. It follows that most of the existing RFID-based
cryptographic schemes failed at ensuring tag privacy without sacrificing RFID
scalability or RFID cost effectiveness.
In this thesis, we therefore relax the existing definitions of tag privacy to bridge the
gap between RFID privacy in theory and RFID privacy in practice, by assuming
that an adversary cannot continuously monitor tags. Under this assumption, we
are able to design secure and privacy preserving multi-party protocols for RFID-
enabled supply chains. Namely, we propose a protocol for tag ownership transfer
that features constant-time authentication while tags are only required to compute
hash functions. Then, we tackle the problem of product genuineness verification
by introducing two protocols for product tracking in the supply chain that rely
on storage only tags. Finally, we present a solution for item matching that uses
storage only tags and aims at the automation of safety inspections in the supply
chain.
The protocols presented in this manuscript rely on operations performed in sub-
groups of elliptic curves that allow for the construction of short encryptions and
signatures, resulting in minimal storage requirements for RFID tags. Moreover,
the privacy and the security of these protocols are proven under well defined formal
models that take into account the computational limitations of RFID technology
and the stringent privacy and security requirements of each targeted supply chain
application.
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Re´sume´
Vu que les tags RFID sont actuellement en phase de large de´ploiement dans le
cadre de plusieurs applications (comme les paiements automatiques, le controˆle
d’acce`s a` distance, et la gestion des chaˆınes d’approvisionnement), il est important
de concevoir des protocoles de se´curite´ garantissant la protection de la vie prive´e
des de´tenteurs de tags RFID. Or, la conception de ces protocoles est re´gie par
les limitations en termes de puissance et de calcul de la technologie RFID, et par
les mode`les de se´curite´ qui sont a` notre avis trop forts pour des syste`mes aussi
contraints que les tags RFID.
De ce fait, on limite dans cette the`se le mode`le de se´curite´; en particulier, un
adversaire ne peut pas observer toutes les interactions entre tags et lecteurs.
Cette restriction est re´aliste notamment dans le contexte de la gestion des chaˆınes
d’approvisionnement qui est l’application cible de ce travail. Sous cette hypothe`se,
on pre´sente quatre protocoles cryptographiques assurant une meilleure collabora-
tion entre les diffe´rents partenaires de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. D’abord,
on propose un protocole de transfert de proprie´te´ des tags RFID, qui garantit
l’authentification des tags en temps constant alors que les tags imple´mentent
uniquement des algorithmes syme´triques, et qui permet de ve´rifier l’authenticite´
de l’origine des tags. Ensuite, on aborde le proble`me d’authenticite´ des produits
en introduisant deux protocoles de se´curite´ qui permettent a` un ensemble de
ve´rificateurs de ve´rifier que des tags “sans capacite´ de calcul” ont emprunte´ des
chemins valides dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. Le dernier re´sultat pre´sente´
dans cette the`se est un protocole d’appariement d’objets utilisant des tags “sans
capacite´ de calcul”, qui vise l’automatisation des inspections de se´curite´ dans la
chaˆıne d’approvisionnement lors du transport des produits dangereux.
Les protocoles introduits dans cette the`se utilisent les courbes elliptiques et les
couplages biline´aires qui permettent la construction d’algorithmes de signature
et de chiffrement efficaces, et qui minimisent donc le stockage et le calcul dans
les syste`mes RFID. De plus, la se´curite´ de ces protocoles est de´montre´e sous
des mode`les formels bien de´finis qui prennent en compte les limitations et les
contraintes des tags RFID, et les exigences strictes en termes de se´curite´ et de la
protection de la vie prive´e des chaˆınes d’approvisionnement.
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1Introduction
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID for short) is a part of auto-identification technologies
that comprise barcodes, biometrics, smart cards ... etc. An RFID tag is a wireless device that
is equipped with a unique and unreusable 96 bit identifier, which contrary to optical barcodes,
allows the identification of individual objects without line of sight or human intervention.
At first, RFID technology was envisioned to replace barcodes to automate data collection
when handling products traveling in the supply chain. Current applications of RFID technol-
ogy are not aimed exclusively at supply chains, but for a plethora of other areas that range
from biometric passports and pet tracking to access control through car immobilizers.
What makes RFID technology attractive is its relatively low cost. An RFID tag can be
sold for about US$0.15 without a volume discount (85). Although currently prohibitive for
supply chain applications, the price of an RFID tag is expected to get lower after the stan-
dardization of RFID technology to reach commercially viable levels that may accommodate
a wide adoption of RFID tags not only in supply chains, but in every other aspect of our life.
Nonetheless, the cost effectiveness of RFID tags comes at a price, which is the privacy of
individuals holding RFID tags and the privacy of partners in the supply chain. It is important
to note that RFID technology by its design is not privacy friendly, since the original goal of
RFID was to enable fast and automated individual object identification and tracking. RFID
tags are thus designed to send their identifiers without the consent of their owners whenever
queried by a compatible RFID reader. This implies that privacy attacks such as tracking of
individuals and industrial espionage can be mounted easily by merely querying RFID tags.
To address these privacy concerns two approaches have emerged. The first one relies
on physical measures to limit the scope of these attacks. For instance: Faraday cages are
now used to manufacture passport cases to prevent un-authorized scanning of RFID-enabled
passports. The second approach which is of interest aims at protecting the privacy of RFID
tags using cryptographic solutions.
Designing cryptographic protocols for RFID turned out to be a very difficult task for two
reasons: first, it is of utmost importance to keep the cost of RFID technology low to favor
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its wide deployment. Therefore, any cryptographic solution for RFID has to fit the limited
resources of tags. Second, it is crucial to design time-efficient protocols that do not slack off
the performances of RFID applications, especially in time-sensitive contexts such as supply
chains.
These challenges raised by cryptographic approaches to solve the privacy issues in RFID
systems have spurred an active research area, that dealt primarily with the design of privacy
preserving authentication protocols that suit the computational capabilities of RFID tags.
The aim of these protocols is to allow authorized RFID readers to authenticate and iden-
tify tags, while a non-authorized reader must not be able to learn the identity of a tag by
eavesdropping on its communications or querying it. The cryptographic RFID authentication
protocols proposed in the literature can be classified into three categories as follows:
• Lightweight authentication: Relying on bitwise operations (18, 66, 91), albeit effi-
cient, these protocols were prone to key recovery attacks, see (14, 64, 128).
• Symmetric authentication: Protocols in this category use symmetric primitives,
see (48, 50, 58, 122, 153). Although efficient on the tag side, Damg˚ard and Pedersen
(42) showed that there is a tradeoff between RFID privacy and the scalability of such
protocols: to ensure privacy, a symmetric RFID authentication protocol has to run in
linear time in the number of tags.
• Public key authentication: Contrary to symmetric authentication, solutions based
on public key techniques (103, 113, 126) offer the possibility to perform constant time
and privacy preserving authentication.
The diversity and the heterogeneity of RFID authentication protocols have stirred interest
in formalizing definitions of RFID privacy (5, 92, 129, 159) that aspire to first capture the
capabilities of a real world adversary against RFID tags, and second to measure information
leakage through the wireless channel between RFID tags and RFID readers. These formal
definitions paved the way for further analysis of existing protocols and for understanding the
limitations of RFID privacy in terms of what can actually be achieved in reality.
Unfortunately, it has been shown that most of current RFID authentication protocols fell
short of ensuring privacy against an adversary who tampers with RFID tags and eavesdrops on
all of their interactions. In fact, Vaudenay (159) showed the intuitive result that states that
privacy cannot be achieved against such an adversary. While a more positive result shows
that in order to ensure privacy against a slightly weaker variant of this adversary, tags have
to implement key agreement protocols, which mandates the use of public key cryptography
in tags (159). Nonetheless, public key cryptography is impracticable for devices that are as
constrained as RFID tags. As a result, we conclude that 1.) cryptographic protocols using
RFID tags can at best be built using symmetric primitives, and that 2.) privacy models have
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to be relaxed to bridge the gap between what is desirable and what is actually achievable in
terms of tag privacy.
For these reasons, this thesis aims to:
• Formalize suitable privacy and security definitions that take into account the stringent
constraints akin to RFID tags and the potential actions that an adversary can perform
to jeopardize tag privacy. We emphasize that the computational limitations of RFID
tags do not favor the implementation of public key primitives.
• Propose secure and privacy preserving solutions for supply chain applications that suit
the computational limitations of RFID tags and improve collaboration between sup-
ply chain partners by reaching beyond the basic tag-reader authentication scenario. In
particular, we focus on three applications which are: tag ownership transfer, genuine-
ness verification and enforcing safety regulations in the supply chain. We stress that
cryptographic solutions for supply chain applications have to be financially cheap and
computationally efficient to assure wide deployment.
Along these lines, we consider in this thesis a relaxed privacy model in which an adversary
is assumed to tamper with RFID tags and eavesdrop on their communications, with the only
restriction that he cannot monitor all of their interactions.
We believe that in the supply chain setting the above assumption is realistic for two
reasons: 1.) RFID tags are not tamper-resistant. This means that any adversary who has
access to tags at some point of their lifetime, can easily read and sometimes re-write their
contents. 2.) RFID tags in the supply chain often change location. As a matter of fact,
RFID tags travel between different partners that usually reside in different countries or even
different continents. This makes it difficult for an adversary to continuously eavesdrop on
tags’ communications.
Under this assumption, we are able to first, formalize privacy definitions that suit the
requirements of RFID-enabled supply chains. Second, design cryptographic multi-party
protocols that transcend the classical two party tag-reader authentication to offer privacy
preserving solutions for supply chain applications, some of which can be implemented using
storage only tags, as will be shown in Part II.
Structure and contributions
The sequel of this thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we provide a comprehensive background on cryptography that on the one
hand, reviews the concepts related to provable security and the cryptographic primitives
that we will refer to in the rest of this thesis either to help us in the discussion of previous
work or in the construction of our cryptographic protocols, and on the other hand,
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explains the assumptions underlying elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear pairing
based cryptography which allow us to design efficient, provably secure and privacy
preserving protocols for the supply chain.
The reader then can either move on to Part I of this thesis which surveys the most
prominent work regarding RFID security and privacy, or to Part II which introduces
our cryptographic protocols.
• In Chapter 3, we discuss some of the relevant work on RFID security and privacy.
The chapter deals with three independent but complementary points. We describe
first the privacy and security threats that may be caused by the proliferation of RFID
tags. Then, we introduce the existing formalizations of RFID security and privacy
while explaining their shortcomings. Finally, we analyze some of the relevant privacy
preserving RFID authentication protocols. This summary of related work allows us to
point out what we believe to be the limitation of RFID privacy which is: “adversary
models for computationally limited RFID tags assume a strong adversary against which
privacy cannot be ensured”.
• In Chapter 4, we address the problem of efficient and privacy preserving RFID tag
ownership transfer in the supply chain. We identify and formalize the security and
the privacy requirements of this type of application, and we propose a tag ownership
protocol that features:
– Constant-time authentication while tags are only required to evaluate hash func-
tions.
– Issuer verification that grants each partner in the supply chain the ability to verify
the origin of tags present in his site, in order to prevent the injection of fake
products that do not meet quality standards.
– Provable security and privacy.
• In Chapter 5, we present two protocols that address the issue of product genuineness
verification in the supply chain using RFID tags. The first one is product traceability by
a trusted third party and the second one is on-site checking by different supply chain
partners. Both protocols rely on the idea of checking product genuineness by verifying
the paths that the products went through in the supply chain. The main contributions
of this chapter are as follows:
– Formal definitions that capture the security and the privacy requirements of RFID-
based genuineness verification applications.
– Efficient encoding of paths in the supply chain that does not depend on the number
of steps composing the path.
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– Tags are not required to perform any computation. Both protocols target storage
only tags and can be implemented using current off-the-shelf RFID tags.
– Provable security and privacy.
• In Chapter 6, we propose a protocol that aims at enforcing safety regulations in RFID-
enabled supply chains. The idea is to allow a reader in the supply chain to verify
whether two items can be stored in close proximity or not while these items are labeled
with storage only tags. The challenge in such an application scenario is to prevent the
reader from getting access to the cleartext content of attributes stored in tags. Like in
previous chapters, we first formalize the security and the privacy definitions that meet
the requirements of item matching applications in the supply chain. Then, we show
that our protocol is secure and privacy preserving while tags are not required to execute
any computation.
The research work conducted by the author led to a number of scientific publications that
overlap with the contributions presented in this thesis, see (14, 19, 53, 54, 55).
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2Cryptography Fundamentals
Our main goal in this thesis is to design provably secure and privacy preserving multi-party
protocols for RFID environment. It is therefore natural to provide the reader with a quick
overview of the concepts underlying provable security, and to survey the security definitions
of the cryptographic primitives that we employ to devise our cryptographic schemes. Also,
since most of our protocols take place in elliptic curves that support bilinear pairings, we
review the different notions and the mathematical assumptions that laid the basis for elliptic
curve cryptography and bilinear pairings.
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.1, we briefly describe two paradigms
of provable security which are: game-based security and simulation-based security. The aim
of this section is to introduce the notational conventions that will be used in subsequent
chapters. In Section 2.2, we present the cryptographic primitives that either will be used
to help the exposition of previous work in Part I or to implement our protocols in Part II.
Finally, in Section 2.3, we give a background on elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear
pairings, namely, the hardness assumptions that ensure the security and the privacy of our
RFID protocols.
2.1 Provable Security
For many years, a cryptographic protocol was considered secure as long as it withstood the
attacks that the designer of the protocol had envisioned. However, this method of validation
had fallen short as adversaries most of the time design their attacks by taking advantage of
vulnerabilities in the protocol specification. This has resulted in the development of a more
convincing method for security validation which is called “provable security”. This approach
consists of proving the security of cryptographic schemes in the context of complexity theory.
That is, when designing a cryptographic scheme, we do not make assumptions regarding the
strategy that an adversary may use, but instead we make assumptions with regard to his
computational capabilities.
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Provable security consists of two major activities (69), and these are:
• Definitional activities: The formulation, identification and the definition of security
models that capture the security requirements that cryptographic schemes have to fulfill.
• Constructive activities: Design of efficient cryptographic schemes that answer to the
security definitions.
Note that the approach of provable security is concerned with the design of efficient crypto-
graphic schemes for which it is computationally infeasible to violate the security. This means
that legitimate users can execute the scheme in polynomial-time in the security parameter τ
(typically, τ is the size in bits of the key used in the cryptographic scheme), while adversaries
cannot break the security of the scheme in polynomial-time.
Definition 2.1. A polynomial-time algorithm is an algorithm whose worst-case running time
function is O(p(τ)) for some polynomial function p, and where τ is the input length.
To measure the success of an adversary in breaking a cryptographic scheme, we compute
his “advantage”. The advantage of an adversary is defined as the difference between the
probability that the adversary breaks the scheme and the probability of breaking the scheme
by a random guess. A scheme is said to be secure if the advantage of any polynomial-time
adversary is a negligible function in the security parameter τ .
Definition 2.2. A function ǫ : N → R is a negligible function if for every c ≥ 0, there exists
Nc ∈ N such that for all n > Nc, ǫ(n) ≤ 1
nc
.
When proving the security of a cryptographic scheme, one has to define first a security
model against which the scheme is going to be shown secure. Roughly speaking, a security
model specifies the security property that a scheme has to satisfy together with the set of
actions that the adversary is allowed to take when mounting his attack.
In what follows, we present two paradigms of provable security that were extensively
used in the literature to define security models, and these are: game-based security and
simulation-based security.
2.1.1 Game-based Security
The security model is defined in terms of an adversarial goal that specifies the security require-
ments, and an attack model that defines the adversary’s capabilities. The security model is
then formalized using an interactive security game that is played between a polynomial-time
adversary A and a challenger C. The challenger C controls a set of oracles that simulate all
the computation required by the adversary A during the security game. In general, a security
game consists of two main phases:
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• Learning phase: Adversary A is allowed to make a polynomial number of queries to
the oracles controlled by C.
• Challenge phase: Adversary A is asked to perform a particular action determined by
an adversarial goal that is specified beforehand. The adversary is said to win the game,
if he achieves his adversarial goal.
Proving that some cryptographic scheme is secure is done by showing that if there is an
adversary A who wins the security game, then this adversary A can be transformed in
polynomial-time into an adversary B that solves some known hard problem. The trans-
formation is performed by simulating the attack environment of adversary A using the input
of the hard problem to be solved, with the restriction that it should be computationally in-
feasible for adversary A to distinguish between the simulated environment and the real world
environment.
2.1.2 Simulation-based Security
Simulation-based security (69, 70) deals with formulating the intuitive requirement that an
adversaryAmust“gain nothing”when he is maliciously executing some cryptographic scheme.
This paradigm states that an adversary “gains nothing” if whatever he learns by deviating
from the prescribed honest behavior can also be learned in an “ideal model” (69), in which
the cryptographic scheme is replaced with an ideal scheme. The ideal model in this paradigm
captures the security requirements that the cryptographic scheme has to fulfill. Now, to prove
that a scheme is secure with respect to the simulation-based security paradigm, one shows
that there exists a polynomial transformation of any adversary A against the scheme in the
real model into an adversary B against the ideal scheme.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
we describe herein the cryptographic primitives – and their related security definitions – that
we will refer to in this thesis either to review previous work or to build our cryptographic
protocols.
2.2.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic algorithm that maps a variable-length input
string called preimage into a fixed length output string called hash, such that any slight
change to the input results in a different output. Thus, if two input strings have the same
hash, then this implies that they are identical with an overwhelming probability. A property
holds with an overwhelming probability, if it holds with a probability larger than 1 − ǫ(τ),
where ǫ is a negligible function and τ is the security parameter.
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Definition 2.3. A cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n is an efficiently com-
putable function that satisfies the following properties:
• Preimage resistance: For all y ∈ {0, 1}n, it is computationally infeasible to find an
element x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that y = H(x).
• 2nd preimage resistance: For all x ∈ {0, 1}∗, it is computationally infeasible to find
x′ 6= x such that H(x) = H(x′).
• Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find x 6= x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ such
that H(x) = H(x′).
For a more comprehensive security definitions of cryptographic hash functions, we refer
to the work of Rogaway and Shrimpton (137).
A cryptographic hash function can model a random function. This property have paved
the way for the random oracle model that was shown to be very practical when validating
cryptographic protocols.
2.2.1.1 Hash Functions and The Random Oracle Model
A popular approach to design secure protocols is the random oracle model. This model was
proposed by Bellare and Rogaway (10) to bridge the gap between inefficient provable security
and efficient practical security. The idea of the random oracle model is to first prove the
security of protocols in an ideal setting in which all the parties including adversaries can
make oracle queries to a truly random function (ideal hash function) R : {0, 1}∞ → {0, 1}∞.
Then, replace the random oracle with a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
A proof of security in the random oracle model assures that the the overall design of a
given protocol is sound. However, a secure implementation of that protocol relies on the
security of the cryptographic hash function that will be used to replace the random oracle.
Although the random oracle model has been proven to be practical in the design of heuris-
tically secure protocols, Canetti et al. (34) showed that it is possible to construct unnatural
protocols that are secure in the random oracle model, but have no secure implementation
in the real world. Yet, Canetti et al. (34) noted that the random oracle model is still a
useful tool for designing and analyzing protocols, and can be regarded as a first step towards
devising more efficient and secure ones.
2.2.2 Pseudo-random Generators
A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a deterministic algorithm that maps a seed to a longer
pseudorandom string such that no polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish the output of
the pseudo-random generator and the output of the uniform distribution.
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Definition 2.4. A pseudo-random generator G : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n, where n ≥ k, is a
deterministic algorithm which on input of a random k-bit seed outputs a n-bit string which is
computationally indistinguishable from uniformly chosen n-bit string.
Here k is called the seed length of generator G and n− k is called the stretch of G.
Now we give the formal definition of computational indistinguishability of two random
variables.
Definition 2.5. Let U = {Un}n∈N and V = {Vn}n∈N be two sequences of random variables
such that each Un and Vn ranges over strings of length n. U and V are said to be compu-
tationally indistinguishable if for every (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithm A the
difference:
δA(n) = |Pr(A(Un) = 1)− Pr(A(Vn) = 1)|
is a negligible function in n.
2.2.3 Pseudo-random Function Family
A pseudo-random function family, abbreviated PRF, is a collection of efficiently-computable
functions such that it is computationally infeasible to distinguish a function selected at ran-
dom from the PRF family and a truly random function.
Goldreich et al. (71) proposed a security game to validate the security of pseudo-random
function family. We denote this security game PRF-D.
Definition 2.6. Let F = {fK : D → R | K ∈ K} be a function family. Here D is the domain
of F , R is the range of F , and K is the set of keys, and let A(rf , ǫ) be an adversary against
the family function F .
The PRF-D game consists of three phases:
• Learning: Adversary A calls the oracle OfK (controlled by challenger C) for a poly-
nomial number of queries rf with messages {m1,m2, ...,mrf }. When queried with a
message mi ∈ D, OfK returns y = fK(mi) ∈ R.
• Challenge: Adversary A outputs a challenge message mc 6∈ {m1,m2, ...,mrf }. Chal-
lenger C flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1, then challenger C returns yc = fK(mc);
otherwise, he picks randomly yc from the range R.
• Guess: Adversary A outputs his guess b′ for bit b.
Adversary A is said to win the game if b′ = b.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the PRF-D game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− 1
2
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Definition 2.7. Let F = {fK : D → R | K ∈ K} be a function family. F is called a family
of pseudo random functions (PRF for short) if:
• ∀K ∈ K, fK is computable in polynomial-time.
• F is pseudorandom: no adversary A can distinguish a function fK in F from a function
f drawn at random from the set of all possible functions F : D → R. That is, for any
adversary A(rf , ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the PRF-D game is negligible.
For more details on how to construct pseudo-random function family from pseudorandom
generators, we refer to the work of Goldreich et al. (71).
2.2.4 Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code (MAC for short) is a cryptographic primitive that allows any
party to compute a keyed hash σ of a message m using a secret key K, while any party
possessing the secret key K can verify that σ is a valid MAC of m.
Definition 2.8. A Message authentication code MAC consists of four algorithms: Setup,
KeyGen, MAC and Verify.
• Setup: On input of a security parameter τ , this algorithm outputs a set P of public
parameters that will be used by following algorithms, together with a key space K, a
message space M and a MAC space S.
• KeyGen: On input of the public parameters P and the key space K, this algorithm
outputs a random key K ∈ K. K is the MAC’s secret key
• MAC: On input of a message m ∈ M and secret key K, this algorithm outputs σ =
MACK(m) ∈ S.
• Verify: On input of a message m, a MAC σ and secret key K, this algorithm outputs a
bit b = VerifyK(m,σ). b = 1, if σ = MACK(m); otherwise b = 0.
A message authentication code scheme has to satisfy the following:
σ = MACK(m)⇔ VerifyK(m,σ) = 1
A message authentication code has to ensure sender authenticity and message integrity.
Particularly, it must be computationally infeasible for an adversary A who does not possess
the secret key K to forge a valid MAC. The security of a message authentication code is
usually measured by the inability of an adversary A to forge a new valid MAC of a message
m of his choice under chosen plaintext attack. This is called resistance to existential forgery.
The resistance to existential forgery of message authentication codes under chosen plain-
text attack is defined by an interactive game MAC-REF between an adversary A and a
challenger C that we are going to present next.
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Definition 2.9. Let MAC = (Setup,KeyGen,MAC,Verify) be a message authentication code,
and let A(rs, ǫ) be an adversary against the resistance of existential forgery of MAC.
The MAC-REF game consists of two phases:
• Learning: Adversary A performs a polynomial number of queries rs to a MAC oracle
OMAC which is controlled by the challenger C. When queried with a message m, OMAC
returns σ = MACK(m).
• Challenge: Adversary A outputs a challenge message mc and a MAC σc.
Adversary A is said to win the MAC-REF game if VerifyK(mc, σc) = 1, and if he did not
query the oracle OMAC with message mc.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the MAC-REF game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 2.10. A message authentication code MAC = (Setup,KeyGen,MAC,Verify) is said
to be resistant to existential forgery, iff for any adversary A(rs, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning
the MAC-REF game is negligible.
2.2.5 Encryption
An encryption scheme consists of four efficient algorithms: Setup Setup, key generation
KeyGen, encryption Enc and decryption Dec.
Definition 2.11. An encryption ENC scheme is determined by four algorithms:
• Setup: On input of a security parameter τ , this algorithm outputs a set P of public
parameters that will be used by following algorithms, together with a key space K, a
message space M and a ciphertext space C.
• KeyGen: On input of the public parameters P and the key space K, this algorithm
outputs a pair of random keys (Ke,Kd) ∈ K, where Ke is the encryption key and Kd is
the corresponding decryption key.
• Enc: On input of a message m ∈M and the encryption key Ke, this algorithm outputs
a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• Dec: On input of a ciphertext c ∈ C and the decryption key Kd, this algorithm outputs
a message m ∈M if the decryption succeeds; otherwise it outputs ⊥.
An encryption has to satisfy the following:
c = EncKe(m)⇔ m = DecKd(c)
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Definition 2.12. A symmetric-key encryption scheme ENCsym is an encryption scheme where
Ke = Kd.
Definition 2.13. A public-key encryption scheme ENCpub is an encryption scheme where
Ke 6= Kd. Ke is called public key and usually denoted pk and Kd is called secret key and
usually denoted sk.
Note that public key encryption schemes enable any party A to send encrypted messages
to another party B that only B can decrypt, without any prior agreement. Contrary to
symmetric key encryption schemes where the parties A and B have to agree beforehand on
an encryption key.
Next, we review the definitions of secure encryption that will be referenced in the remain-
der of this manuscript.
As proposed by Bellare et al. (11), we organize definitions by considering first the adver-
sarial goal and then the attack model. As a result, security definitions are obtained as “a
pairing of a particular adversarial goal and a particular attack model” (11).
Given an encryption scheme ENC and a challenge ciphertext c encrypted using the en-
cryption key Ke, we consider two adversarial goals:
• One-wayness OW : The goal of an adversary A is to decrypt c without having access to
the decryption key Kd.
• Indistinguishability IND : The goal of an adversary A is to tell whether a challenge
ciphertext c encrypts a message m0 or whether it encrypts a message m1 with a proba-
bility significantly larger than one half, where m0 and m1 are two messages in M that
were chosen by A. Indistinguishability formalizes the inability of adversary A to learn
any information about the plaintext m underlying the ciphertext c.
In addition to the adversarial goals, we consider two attack models depending on the
information provided to the adversary A. In order of increasing strength, these are: chosen
plaintext attack and chosen ciphertext attack.
• Chosen plaintext attack CPA: An adversary A can encrypt any message of his choice.
To this effect, A has access to an encryption oracle OEnc, that when given a plaintext
m and an encryption key Ke returns c = EncKe(m).
• Chosen ciphertext attack CCA: Besides being able to query the encryption oracle OEnc
with messages of his choice, adversary A has access to a decryption oracle ODec, that
when given a ciphertext c and a decryption key Kd returnsm = DecKd(c). Adversary A
is allowed to queryODec with ciphertexts of his choice except for the challenge ciphertext
c.
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If adversary A uses the decryption oracle only before obtaining the challenge cipher-
text c, then the attack model is called non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1).
Otherwise, the attack model is called adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2).
Consequently, we obtain six security models: OW-CPA, OW-CCA1, OW-CCA2, IND-
CPA, IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2. These security models are defined using interactive games
in accordance with the work of Bellare et al. (11):
Definition 2.14. Let ENC = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme, and let
A(re, rd, se, sd, ǫ) be an adversary against the one wayness of ENC.
The OW-ATK ∈ {OW-CPA, OW-CCA1, OW-CCA2} game consists of four phases:
• Learning-1: Adversary A makes a polynomial number of queries re to the encryption
oracle OEnc and rd queries to the decryption oracle ODec.
• Challenge: Challenger C picks at random a message m ∈M and returns the challenge
ciphertext c = EncKe(m) to adversary A.
• Learning-2: Adversary A makes a polynomial number of queries se to the encryption
oracle OEnc and sd queries to the decryption oracle ODec, with the restriction that he
cannot query the decryption oracle ODec with the challenge ciphertext c.
• Guess: Adversary A outputs a guess m′.
Adversary A is said to win the OW-ATK game if m = m′, where
OW-ATK = OW-CPA, if rd = sd = 0.
OW-ATK = OW-CCA1, if rd 6= 0 and sd = 0.
OW-ATK = OW-CCA2, if sd 6= 0.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the OW-ATK game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 2.15. An encryption ENC = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is said to be OW-ATK
secure, iff for any adversary A(re, se, rd, sd, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the OW-ATK
game is negligible.
Definition 2.16. Let ENC = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme, and let A
(re, rd, se, sd, ǫ) be an adversary against the indistinguishability of ENC.
The IND-ATK ∈ {IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2} game consists of four phases:
• Learning-1: Adversary A makes a polynomial number of queries re to the encryption
oracle OEnc and rd queries to the decryption oracle ODec.
• Challenge: Adversary A provides challenger C with two messages m0 and m1 in M.
Challenger C flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}, then returns the challenge ciphertext cb =
EncKe(mb) to adversary A.
15
2. CRYPTOGRAPHY FUNDAMENTALS
• Learning-2: Adversary A makes a polynomial number of queries se to the encryption
oracle OEnc and sd queries to the decryption oracle ODec, with the restriction that he
cannot query the decryption oracle ODec with the challenge ciphertext cb.
• Guess: Adversary A outputs a guess b′.
Adversary A is said to win the IND-ATK game if b = b′, where
IND-ATK = IND-CPA, if rd = sd = 0.
IND-ATK = IND-CCA1, if rd 6= 0 and sd = 0.
IND-ATK = IND-CCA2, if sd 6= 0.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the IND-ATK game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− 1
2
Definition 2.17. An encryption ENC = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is said to be IND-ATK
secure, iff for any adversary A(re, se, rd, sd, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the IND-ATK
game is negligible.
IND-CPA ⇐ IND-CCA1 ⇐ IND-CCA2
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
OW-CPA ⇐ OW-CCA1 ⇐ OW-CCA2
Figure 2.1: Relations between security notions for encryption schemes (11)
2.2.6 Digital Signatures
A signature scheme is the alternative of MAC in the public key setting. A party can generate
a signature S on a message m using its secret key sk, while anyone can verify the validity of
the signature by using the public key pk corresponding to the secret key sk.
Definition 2.18. A digital signature scheme denoted DS, is determined by four algorithms:
• Setup: On input of a security parameter τ , this algorithm outputs a set P of public
parameters that will be used by following algorithms, together with a key space K, a
message space M and a signature space S.
• KeyGen: On input of the public parameters P and the key space K, this algorithm
outputs a pair of random keys (sk, pk) ∈ K, where sk is the secret key and pk is the
corresponding public key.
• Sign: On input of a message m ∈ M and secret key sk, this algorithm outputs S =
Signsk(m) ∈ S.
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• Verify: On input of a message m, a signature S and public key pk, this algorithm outputs
a bit b = Verifypk(m,S). b = 1, if the signature is valid; otherwise b = 0.
A digital signature scheme has to satisfy the following:
S = Signsk(m)⇔ Verifypk(m,S) = 1
Digital signatures have to ensure the authenticity and the integrity of the message signed.
For this, it must be computationally infeasible for an adversary A who does not have access to
the secret key sk to forge a valid pair (m,S = Signsk(m)). Contrary to message authentication
codes, digital signatures have to ensure as well the non-repudiation of signer. That is, it must
be computationally infeasible for a signer to claim that a signature verifiable by his public
key is forged.
Similar to message authentication codes, the security of digital signatures is measured by
using an interactive game DS-REF that captures the capabilities of an adversary A against
resistance to existential forgery under chosen plaintext attack.
Definition 2.19. Let DS = (Setup,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) be a digital signature scheme, and
let A(rs, ǫ) be an adversary against the resistance to existential forgery of DS.
The DS-REF game consists of two phases:
• Learning: Adversary A makes a polynomial number of queries rs to a signing oracle
Osign which is controlled by the challenger C. When queried with a message m, Osign
returns S = Signsk(m).
• Challenge: Adversary A outputs a challenge message mc and a signature Sc.
Adversary A is said to win the DS-REF game if Verifypk(mc,S) = 1 and if he did not
query the oracle Osign with message mc.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the DS-REF game is defined as
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 2.20. A digital signature scheme DS = (Setup,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is said to be
resistant to existential forgery, iff for any adversary A(rs, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the
DS-REF game is negligible.
We refer the reader to the work of Goldwasser et al. (72) for a more detailed discussion
on the security notions of digital signatures.
2.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
In 1985, Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller suggested independently the use of elliptic curves
to devise public key schemes, and since then, elliptic curve cryptography (abbreviated ECC)
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has emerged as a viable alternative to cryptography in finite fields. The main advantage of
elliptic curve based schemes over the other public key schemes is their short key size, which
results in more efficient and faster schemes. For example, the typical key size for EC schemes
that provide the same level of security as 1024-bits public key schemes in finite fields is 160
bits, cf. (78, 124). In fact, ECC has short keys because the index calculus algorithm cannot
be executed in elliptic curves to solve the discrete logarithm problem, while it can be used
successfully in finite fields.
For more details on elliptic curve cryptography, we refer to (15, 16, 78, 162).
2.3.1 Elliptic curves
Definition 2.21. An elliptic curve E(K) over a field K consists of a special point  E called
point at infinity and a set of points g = (x, y) ∈ K2 that satisfy theWeierstrass equation:
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (2.1)
where ai ∈ K for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.
An elliptic curve has to be nonsingular, i.e., the polynomial P (x) = x3+a2x
2+a4x+a6
must have single roots.
Remark 2.1. Equation 2.1 is useful when the characteristic of K char(K) ∈ {2, 3}. However,
when char(K) 6∈ {2, 3}, equation 2.1 can be simplified by applying the following transformation:
x1 ← x+ 4a2 + a
2
1
12
y1 ← y + a1x+ a3
2
Hereby, we obtain:
y21 = x
3
1 +Ax1 +B
where A,B ∈ K.
For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of this section we assume that char(K) 6= 2, 3.
Remark 2.2. Let r1, r2 and r3 denote the roots of polynomial P (x).
The discriminant of P (x) is defined as:
∆ = (r1 − r2)2(r1 − r3)2(r2 − r3)2
= −(4A3 + 27B2)
Consequently, to check whether an elliptic curve E(K) over field K is nonsingular, it suffices
to compute ∆ and to check whether ∆ 6=  K.
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Figure 2.2: Adding points on an elliptic curve
The Group Law
Let E(K) be an elliptic curve over the field K defined by y2 = x3 +Ax+B, A,B ∈ K.
Let g1 = (x1, y1) and g2 = (x2, y2) be points on E with g1, g2 6=  E . We define g3 =
g1 × g2 = g1g2 = (x3, y3) as follows:
1. If x1 6= x2, then
x3 = s
2 − x1 − x2, y3 = s(x1 − x3)− y1, where s = y2 − y1
x2 − x1
2. If x1 = x2 and y1 = −y2, then g3 =  E
3. If x1 = x2 and y1 = y2 6=  K, then
x3 = s
2 − 2x1, y3 = s(x1 − x3)− y1, where s = 3x
2
1 +A
2y1
Moreover,
∀ g ∈ E(K), g ×  E =  E × g = g
Theorem 2.1. The points on an elliptic curve E(K) form an abelian group with respect to
the × operation defined above, where the identity element is the point at infinity  E , and
the inverse of a point g = (x, y) on E(K) is defined as g−1 = (x,−y).
Definition 2.22. For all g ∈ E(K) and k ∈ Z, point multiplication of g by k (denoted gk) is
defined as:
1. If k ≥ 1, then gk = g × g × ...× g︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
;
19
2. CRYPTOGRAPHY FUNDAMENTALS
2. if k = 0, then g0 =  E ;
3. if k ≤ −1, then gk = (g−1)−k.
Definition 2.23. A point g ∈ E(K) is called a torsion point, iff g is a point of finite order.
More precisely, g is said to be a q-torsion point (q ∈ N), iff gq =  E .
2.3.2 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields
Let Fp be a finite field of order p and let E(Fp) be an elliptic curve over Fp. Given that there
is finitely many pairs (x, y) ∈ F2p, it follows that the abelian group E(Fp) is also finite.
Theorem 2.2 (Hasse (162)). Let E(Fp) be an elliptic curve over the finite field Fp. The order
#E(Fp) satisfies the following inequality:
|p+ 1−#E(Fp)| ≤ 2√p
Remark 2.3. Let E(Fp) be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fp, then any point
g ∈ E(Fp) is a torsion point of some order q that divides #E(Fp).
The finite order of elliptic curves over finite fields was the starting point for elliptic curve
cryptography, which relies on a set of mathematical problems that are believed to be hard
in elliptic curves over finite fields. Namely, the discrete logarithm problem and the Diffie-
Hellman problems.
2.3.2.1 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
Definition 2.24 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)). Let E(Fp) be an elliptic
curve over a finite field Fp, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is:
Given a q-torsion point g ∈ E(Fp) and g˜ ∈ 〈g〉, find the integer x ∈ Zq such that g˜ = gx.
The integer x is called the discrete logarithm of g˜ to the base g, denoted x = logg(g˜).
The advantage ǫ of an algorithm A in solving the DL problem is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A(E , g, g˜) computes x)
Definition 2.25 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DL)). We say that the dis-
crete logarithm assumption holds in E(Fp), if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
A, the advantage ǫ in solving DLP in E(Fp) is negligible.
Note that the elliptic curve parameters for cryptographic schemes should be carefully
chosen so as to resist known attacks on the DL problem. The best known algorithm to solve
DLP is a combination of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm and the Pollard’s rho algorithm, which
runs in O(
√
qi) where qi is the largest divisor of q. In order to withstand this attack, the
elliptic curve E(Fp) and the point g should be chosen so that the order q of point g is divisible
by a sufficiently large prime number qi. Typically |qi| = 160 bits.
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2.3.2.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problems
The Diffie-Hellman problems (DHP) are mathematical problems that were first introduced
in the seminal work of Diffie and Hellman (49) to solve the issue of secure key exchange
over public (insecure) channels. It is noteworthy that the Diffie-Hellman problems, like the
discrete logarithm problem, were proposed initially in the context of finite fields, however in
this manuscript, we only focus on their elliptic curve variants.
Definition 2.26 (Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)). Let G be
a cyclic subgroup of order q in E(Fp), and g be a generator of G, the computational Diffie-
Hellman problem is:
Given g, gx, gy in G for randomly chosen x, y ∈ Zq, compute gxy.
The advantage ǫ of an algorithm A in solving the CDH problem is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A(G, g, gx, gy) computes gxy)
Definition 2.27 (Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH)). We
say that the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G, if for every probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A, the advantage ǫ in solving CDHP in G is negligible.
Remark 2.4. If there is a polynomial-time algorithm that can solve DLP in E(Fp), then this
algorithm can use g and gx to compute x. Then, it can compute gxy = (gy)x to solve CDHP
in E(Fp).
Definition 2.28 (Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP)). Let G be a
cyclic subgroup of order q in E(Fp), and g be a generator of G, the decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem is:
Given g, gx, gy, gz in G, decide whether z = xy.
Let U be the distribution (G, g, gx, gy, gxy), and V be the distribution (G, g, gx, gy , gz),
where x, y, z are randomly selected in Zq.
The advantage ǫ of an algorithm A in solving the DDH problem is defined as:
ǫ = |Pr(A(U) = 1)− Pr(A(V ) = 1)|
Definition 2.29 (Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDH)). We say that
the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G, if for every probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm A, the advantage ǫ in solving DDHP in G is negligible. This means that it
is computationally infeasible for any polynomial-time algorithm A to distinguish between the
distribution U = (G, g, gx, gy, gxy) and the distribution V = (G, g, gx, gy, gz) for randomly
selected x, y, z ∈ Zq.
Note that if there is a polynomial-time algorithm A that solves CDHP in E(Fp), then
this algorithm can be used to solve DDHP in E(Fp). Using g, gx and gy, A computes gxy
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and checks whether gxy = gz . Nonetheless, the reverse is not true. Joux and Nguyen (87)
showed that there exist cyclic subgroups of elliptic curves over finite fields where DDHP is
easy and CDHP is hard. These subgroups are known as the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH for
short) groups.
The algorithm proposed in (87) solves DDHP by using symmetric bilinear pairings. A
symmetric bilinear pairing e is a bilinear function that maps a pair of points (g, h) ∈ E(Fp)
to an element of an extension Fpr of the finite field Fp. Since the function e is bilinear, i.e.,
e(gx, gy) = e(g, g)xy , the DDH problem can be solved by checking whether e(gx, gy) = e(g, gz)
or not.
Now, we present some of the definitions related to bilinear pairings on elliptic curves over
finite fields that will be used in the sequel of this thesis.
2.3.3 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1, G2 and GT be cyclic groups of the same finite order q.
Definition 2.30. A bilinear pairing is a map e: G1×G2 → GT , with the following properties:
1. e is bilinear: ∀x, y ∈ Zq, g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2, e(gx, hy) = e(g, h)xy ;
2. e is computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h) for any (g, h) ∈
G1 ×G2;
3. e is non-degenerate: if g is a generator of G1 and h is a generator of G2, then e(g, h)
is a generator of GT .
Typically, the groups G1 and G2 are subgroups of some elliptic curve E over a finite field
Fp, while GT is a multiplicative subgroup of an extension Fpr of the finite field Fp. In this
context, r is called the embedding degree of the curve E . Verheul (161) proposed computing
bilinear pairings by modifying the Weil and the Tate pairings 1. By definition, the Tate and
the Weil pairings map a pair of points (g, h) ∈ G1 ×G2 to a qth root of unity in GT .
Remark 2.5. Let e : G1 ×G2 → GT be a bilinear pairing.
• If G1 = G2, then the pairing e is said to be symmetric (or of Type 1). Otherwise, it is
said to be asymmetric.
• If the pairing e is asymmetric and if there is an efficiently computable homomorphism
from G2 to G1 and no efficiently computable homomorphism from G1 to G2, then e
is said to be of Type 2. If there are efficiently computable homomorphisms in both
directions, then e can be reinterpreted as a Type 1 pairing.
1Bilinear pairings can be defined for all elliptic curves, however, they are efficiently computable only when
the embedding degree r is small (87).
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• If the pairing e is asymmetric and if there is no efficiently computable homomorphism
between G1 and G2, then e is said to be of Type 3
2.
• If e is a pairing of Type 1, then the DDH problem is easy in G1. If e is a pairing of
Type 2, then the DDH problem is easy in G2.
Remark 2.6. Pairing-based cryptographic schemes usually employ Type 1 and Type 2 pair-
ings, however, Chatterjee and Menezes (38), Galbraith et al. (63) showed that Type 3 pairings
offer better performances and better security.
Type 1 pairings are generally computed in supersingular curves, while Type 2 and Type 3
pairings are computed in ordinary (non-supersingular) curves such as MNT curves proposed
by Miyaji et al. (116). We refer to the work of Freeman et al. (61) for more comprehensive
overview on the construction of pairing friendly curves.
Although, bilinear pairings were first introduced in cryptography to construct fast algo-
rithms to solve the DL problem (114) and the DDH problem (87) in elliptic curves, they paved
the way for practical cryptographic solutions to long standing problems such as: one-round
key agreement (86), identity-based encryption (22), short signatures (23, 25), group signa-
tures (26), secret handshake (9), ... etc. The fast development of pairing-based cryptography
has led to the establishment of new hardness assumptions that we present next.
2.3.4 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problems
Definition 2.31 (Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (BCDHP)). Let e : G1 ×
G2 → GT be a bilinear pairing. Let g be a generator of G1 and h be a generator of G2.
The bilinear computational Diffie-Hellman problem is:
Given g, gx, gy, gz ∈ G1 and h, hx, hy ∈ G2 for random x, y, z ∈ Zq, compute e(g, h)xyz .
We denote U = (G1, g, g
x, gy, gz) and V = (G2, h, h
x, hy).
The advantage ǫ of an algorithm A in solving the BCDH problem is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A(U, V ) computes e(g, h)xyz)
Definition 2.32 (Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (BCDH)). We say
that the BCDH assumption holds, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, the
advantage ǫ in solving BCDHP is negligible.
Definition 2.33 (Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDDHP)). Let e : G1×G2 →
GT be a bilinear pairing. Let g be a generator of G1 and h be a generator of G2.
The bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is:
Given g, gx, gy , gz ∈ G1, h, hx, hy ∈ G2 for random x, y, z ∈ Zq and e(g, h)z′ ∈ GT , decide
whether z′ = xyz or not.
2A homomorphism between G1 and G2 can always be defined, however, the computation of such a homo-
morphism is supposed to be as hard as the discrete logarithms in G1 and in G2 (63).
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We denote U the distribution (G1,G2, g, g
x, gy , gz , h, hx, hy, e(g, g)xyz), and V the distri-
bution (G1,G2, g, g
x, gy , gz, h, hx, hy, e(g, g)z
′
), where x, y, z and z′ are selected randomly in
Zq.
The advantage ǫ of an algorithm A in solving the BDDH problem is defined as:
ǫ = |Pr(A(U) = 1)− Pr(A(V ) = 1)|
Definition 2.34 (Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (BDDH)). We say that the
BDDH assumption holds, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, the advantage
ǫ in solving BDDHP is negligible. This means that it is computationally infeasible for any
polynomial-time algorithm A to distinguish between the two distributions U and V .
Although a symmetric bilinear pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT enables solving the DDH
problem in G1 and in G2, it is believed that if e is a Type 2 (Type 3 resp.) bilinear pairing,
then the DDH assumption still holds in G1 (in both G1 and G2 resp.). To that effect, Scott
(144) introduced two related hardness assumptions which are: the external Diffie-Hellman
assumption and the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Definition 2.35 (External Diffie-Hellman Assumption (XDH)). We say that the external
Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G1 and G2, if G1 and G2 are two groups with the following
properties:
1. There exists a bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT ;
2. the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G1.
Definition 2.36 (Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SXDH)). We say that
the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G1 and G2, if G1 and G2 are two
groups with the following properties:
1. There exists a bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT ;
2. the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in both G1 and G2.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we surveyed some of the concepts of provable security, together with the
cryptographic primitives that will be referenced in the remainder of this thesis. We also
provided an overview of elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear pairings which are used to
design our security protocols. Now, the reader can either move on to Part I where we present
previous work on RFID security and privacy, or to Part II, where we introduce our secure
multi-party protocols for the RFID setting.
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From RFID Authentication to
Privacy Preserving Supply Chain
Management
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3RFID Security and Privacy
The proliferation of RFID tags comes with new threats to the security and the privacy of
companies/individuals owning tags. These potential threats have given rise to an active
research area that deals primarily with the formalization of security and privacy models, and
with the design of secure and privacy preserving RFID authentication protocols. The main
challenges in this area are the definition of formal models that comprehensively capture the
capabilities of a real world adversary, and the design of authentication protocols 1.) that are
provably secure and privacy preserving with respect to the formal models, and 2.) that fit
the stringent computational resources of RFID tags.
The purpose of this chapter therefore is to introduce the existing privacy and security
models and to survey some of the proposed RFID authentication protocols. To this end,
we start with a quick overview, in Section 3.1, of RFID technology and the main privacy
and security threats related to the potential deployment of this technology. We then present
the formal security and privacy definitions while explaining how they capture the adversarial
behavior in the RFID environment. In Section 4.2, we analyze some of the prominent au-
thentication protocols in the literature which we classify depending on their computational
requirements on RFID tags. Finally in Section 3.4, we wrap up the chapter by highlighting
some of the limitations of RFID privacy and the need for a more realistic adversary model.
The latter allows us to design secure and privacy preserving RFID protocols that go beyond
simple tag-reader authentication to propose secure and efficient solutions for supply chain
management. These protocols will be presented in Part II.
3.1 RFID Fundamentals
RFID is a technology that primarily identifies and tracks objects with neither direct line of
sight nor human intervention. An RFID tag is a low cost wireless device which labels the
object to which it is attached by having a unique and unreusable identifier. The tag’s unique
identifier acts as a pointer to a database entry that contains the history of the tagged object.
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Figure 3.1: RFID environment
Consequently, RFID technology was envisioned to replace barcodes in the supply chain as it
favors fast and automated product identification and tracking, together with the possibility
of recording and tracing the history of tagged products from production, to distribution, to
finally end users.
An RFID system involves more components than the already mentioned RFID tags. A
typical RFID system consists of:
• RFID tags;
• RFID readers;
• backend systems.
Tags and readers communicate over a shared insecure wireless channel, whereas the channel
between RFID readers and backend systems is generally assumed to be secure.
In the sequel of this chapter, we discuss in more details the components and the applica-
tions of RFID technology. Then, we list some of the security and the privacy challenges that
hinder the deployment of this technology.
For a more thorough description of RFID systems, we refer to (59).
3.1.1 RFID Tags
An RFID tag consists of a small microchip that features limited data storage, limited logical
functionalities, and an antenna. Tags can be classified based on their operating frequency.
High frequency HF tags operate at 13.56 MHz frequency and their maximum read range
is 1 m. Ultra-high frequency UHF tags operate in the 858 to 930 MHz frequency band
and their average read range is 3 m. UHF tags are the dominant technology for supply
chain applications, whereas HF tags are more suitable for RFID-based ticketing or near field
applications. Tags can also be distinguished based on the underlying powering method (135).
A passive tag is a tag which does not have any power supply (i.e., battery) of its own, and
therefore, relies on the the signal sent by readers nearby to harvest the necessary energy it
needs to reply to readers’ queries. An active tag on the other hand, has its own power supply
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and can initiate communication with readers. A semi-active tag is a hybrid tag which has
its own power supply but never initiates communication with readers.
Passive tags are much cheaper than active ones and therefore, more suitable to replace
optical barcodes in supply chains. The advantages of passive tags are their low cost, their
small size and their lifetime which is not restricted by battery life. However, passive tags come
with little resources and few computational capabilities which turn the design of RFID-based
applications into a real challenge.
We thus primarily focus on passive tags.
3.1.2 RFID Readers and Backend Systems
RFID readers are transceivers which are able to communicate with tags using a radio fre-
quency channel. A reader may be able to read or write data into tags. A reader consists
of an antenna, a microprocessor, a power supply, and possibly an interface that enables the
reader to forward the data received from tags to a backend system.
The backend system is typically a database that collects information forwarded by readers
for various purposes that depend on the application for which RFID technology is used.
There are two categories of readers (59):
• Stationary readers: Readers are placed at a fixed location and permanently connected
to a network so as to communicate with the backend system, e.g., RFID-based access
control systems where readers are located at the entry point of some secured area.
• Portable readers: Readers can be handheld and not be required to communicate per-
manently with a backend system. They are mostly used for querying prices of products
at a supermarket or for inventorying.
3.1.3 RFID Applications
RFID technology can be embedded into various applications depending on the purpose of tag
identification. The most prominent applications for RFID are automated payment, access
control, tracking and supply chain management.
The largest area of RFID applications is supply chain management whereby tags store
application specific data in addition to tag identifiers. This additional data is used to auto-
mate and to regulate the processes of production and distribution in the supply chain, while
minimizing errors and human intervention. By attaching RFID tags to products, managers of
supply chains can automatically identify counterfeits, production bottlenecks, stock shortage
and the origin of defective products. This type of applications is of a great business value
as it reduces both time and errors when managing products, while decreasing the number of
people involved in the supply chain.
Sometimes a tag is not only required to identify itself but it is also required to prove that
the proclaimed identity is legitimate through authentication. Such a functionality is needed
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in applications such as automated payment, anti-counterfeiting, car immobilizers and access
control to secured areas.
Another field of application is tracking the location of tagged objects. Since readers are
placed in fixed and known locations, the location of a tagged object can be easily traced
with a certain accuracy. Such an application is useful for example to track pets, to detect
the presence of assets or products in a factory or a warehouse, or to locate people inside a
building.
Moreover, the advocates of RFID tags believe that the potential ubiquity of RFID will
lead to applications that assist people with daily tasks. One of these applications is “intelli-
gent homes” with smart appliances such as washing machines that “automatically select the
appropriate wash cycles to prevent damaging delicate fabrics, or refrigerators that detect food
expiration or shortage”(89). Along the same lines, RFID technology could be used to facil-
itate home navigation and medication compliance for the elderly, for e.g. an RFID enabled
medicine cabinet could verify whether a patient complies with his medication intakes or not
(89).
3.1.4 Security and Privacy Threats
In this section, we describe some of the security and privacy threats related to the deployment
of RFID technology.
3.1.4.1 Security Threats
RFID technology faces various security threats such as denial of service, relay attacks, and
cloning.
• Denial of service: Such an attack can be performed by creating a signal in the same
frequency band as legitimate readers, and causing therefore electromagnetic jamming
that prevents legitimate tags from communicating with legitimate readers.
• Relay attacks: These attacks are implemented by placing an adversarial device be-
tween a legitimate RFID tag and a legitimate reader. This device relays information
exchanged between the two legitimate parties which are fooled into thinking that they
are physically close to each other.
• Cloning: This attack can be executed by eavesdropping on tags’ communication with
readers to retrieve the tags’ unique identifiers, then writing these identifiers into new
rewritable and reprogrammable tags. Cloning attacks could be for instance used to re-
place the content of tags attached to expensive objects with the content of tags attached
to cheaper ones at a retail store.
To safeguard RFID systems against the above attacks, Karygiannis et al. (95) suggested
some security countermeasures that can be taken. For example, cloning can be mitigated by
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using challenge-response authentication protocols. However, the scarcity of computational
resources in RFID tags makes the design of secure protocols withstanding attacks by powerful
adversaries very challenging. Moreover, RFID distance bounding protocols (8, 27, 77, 99)
have been proposed to protect against relay attacks. The idea behind distance bounding
protocols is to estimate the physical distance separating readers and tags during tag-reader
communication, detecting thus relay attacks.
Finally, jamming attacks can be tackled by increasing physical security near RFID readers
through guards, fences, cameras, and shielding walls to block external electromagnetic signals
to limit both accidental and malicious radio interferences (95).
3.1.4.2 Privacy Threats
As RFID tags respond to any reader without the consent of their owners or holders, the pro-
liferation of RFID also brings up new exposures that can lead to potential privacy violations
such as industrial espionage, consumer profiling and tracking of individuals.
• Industrial espionage: By eavesdropping on tagged objects traveling along the supply
chain, a company can gather confidential and sensitive information about the internal
business processes of an industrial competitor. Such information could be used to infer
production and distribution schedules, daily rate of production, availability or shortage
of stock, and the identity of suppliers and partners.
• Consumer profiling: A person carrying objects tagged with RFID is prone to surrep-
titious inventorying. By reading tags attached to products that a person carries when
entering a shop, the shop owner can learn what type of products interest that person,
and he may then adjust his offers based on the information he just has gathered.
• Tracking: As most RFID tags transmit static unique identifiers, they can be used to
track the position and trace the activity of individuals holding RFID tagged objects.
In the following, we list some of the proposed approaches to mitigate the privacy threats
related to RFID technology.
• Tag deactivation: RFID tags can be deactivated by using a “KILL” command sent by
readers. When a tag receives the KILL command from a reader, it becomes permanently
out of service. Now, to prevent denial of service attacks through tags’ deactivation, the
KILL command is protected with a secret PIN that only authorized readers know. Even
though killing tags is a very effective measure to protect the privacy of individuals, this
technique precludes the potential post-purchase applications of RFID technology.
• Proxying: This approach aims at protecting tag privacy by using privacy enforcing
devices that act as RFID firewalls (94, 136). These devices relay reader requests while
implementing sophisticated privacy policies. A reader’s request is forwarded to a tag
only when it meets the privacy policies specified by the tag holder.
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• Tag blocking: This approach protects tag privacy by relying on physical measures.
For instance, a Faraday cage can be used to protect tags from unauthorized reading
by blocking external radio signals. It is also possible to prevent an unauthorized tag
reading by using a blocker tag (93). A blocker tag exploits the properties of the anti-
collision protocols that readers use to communicate with tags to disrupt tag singulation.
When a reader starts a tag singulation protocol, the blocker tag simulates all tags in the
universe in order to cause continuous collisions, and to eventually stall the interrogating
reader.
• Pseudonyms: Instead of having a unique permanent identifier, Inoue and Yasuura (82)
proposed using tag pseudonyms that change over time to prevent tracking. A reader
is required to periodically rewrite the pseudonym (identifier) of tags that it is reading
while keeping a record of tags’ old pseudonyms.
• Re-encryption: While encrypting tags’ identifiers may protect identifier confidentiality,
it cannot prevent the tracking of tags. When the identifier of a tag is encrypted, the
tag sends the encryption of its identifier when queried, instead of sending its identifier
in cleartext. However, this encryption can serve as a “new identifier” to trace and track
the tag. To tackle this limitation, Ateniese et al. (3), Golle et al. (73), Juels and Pappu
(90) suggest using re-encryption techniques. A tag in this approach stores an IND-CPA
encryption (cf. Definition 2.17) of its identifier. When a reader reads the encryption c
stored into a given tag T , it re-encrypts the ciphertext c to obtain a new ciphertext c′
and then it writes c′ into T . Consequently, an adversary cannot track tags over a long
period of time.
• Privacy preserving authentication: This approach allows tags to authenticate them-
selves to legitimate readers in a privacy preserving manner. That is, after tag authenti-
cation, adversaries only learn whether the tag authentication was successful, while only
legitimate readers can identify tags.
Most of previous work on RFID security and privacy has focused on
• Privacy preserving authentication protocols that suit the resource constraints of RFID
tags. These protocols range from lightweight authentication protocols that rely on
bitwise operations (18, 66, 91), to symmetric authentication protocols (48, 50, 58, 122,
153), to finally public key authentication protocols (103, 113, 126).
• Formal security and privacy models that provide a comprehensive description of the
adversary’s capabilities and goals (5, 92, 129, 159).
We present the prominent formal RFID security and privacy definitions in Section 3.2, then
in Section 3.3, we discuss in more details some of the state of the art of RFID authentication.
32
3.2 RFID Security and Privacy
3.2 RFID Security and Privacy
As highlighted in the previous section, the widespread deployment of RFID technology poses
threats to the security and the privacy of individuals and companies. To mitigate these issues,
a myriad of RFID authentication protocols have been proposed in the literature (6, 48, 50,
66, 91, 103, 122, 126, 153). The emphasis on these protocols has spurred attempts by Avoine
(5), Juels and Weis (92), Vaudenay (159) to formalize both RFID security and privacy.
Before presenting the security and the privacy definitions regarding RFID authentication,
we introduce the conventions and the notations that will be used throughout this section.
3.2.1 Definitions
In line with previous work on RFID security and privacy, we assume that the RFID system
involves one reader R and that reader R and the backend system form one single entity.
Definition 3.1. An RFID system is composed of
• InitReader(τ) is a probabilistic algorithm which on input of a security parameter τ gen-
erates a pair of secret key and public key (sk, pk) for reader R. It also creates a database
DBR which will contain the identifiers and the keys of legitimate tags in the system.
• InitTag(τ, ID, pk) is a probabilistic algorithm which on input of security parameter τ , tag
identifier ID and reader R’s public key pk returns first, a pair (KT , ST ), where KT is
the secret key of tag T corresponding to identifier ID, and ST is the initial state of tag
T . Then, it stores the pair (ID,KT ) into database DBR. Let T denote the set of tags
that were initialized by InitTag.
• π(R,T ) is a polynomial-time interactive protocol between reader R and tag T . At the
end of the protocol execution, reader R either identifies tag T and outputs b = 1, or
rejects tag T and outputs b = 0.
We have now to define the capabilities of an adversary A against such a system. It is
assumed that reader R cannot be corrupted by adversary A. However, adversary A may
1.) play the role of dishonest readers and interact with tags. He may as well 2.) intercept
messages exchanged between tags and reader R, and also 3.) access the internal states of
tags. Finally, he may 4.) access the output of reader R at the end of a protocol execution.
To capture formally the above capabilities, adversary A is given access to the following
oracles that are controlled by some challenger C.
• OTag(param): When queried, the oracle OTag returns a tag T from the set T to adversary
A that satisfies the parameters param specified by adversary A. A parameter could be
for instance the probability distribution according to which the oracle OTag samples
tags.
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• ORead(T ): When queried with tag T , the oracle ORead(T ) returns the current state ST
of tag T . When A calls the oracle ORead with tag T , we say that A corrupts tag T in
accordance with previous work of Vaudenay (159) and Paise and Vaudenay (129).
• OWrite(T, S′T ): When called with tag T and state S′T , the oracle OWrite rewrites the
current state of tag T with the state S′T .
• OLaunch(T,m): When called, the oracle OLaunch invokes reader R to start a new session
of the RFID protocol π. Reader R then generates a session identifier sid and sends m
and sid to tag T .
• OResult(sid): When the session sid of the RFID protocol π is complete, the oracle OResult
returns a bit b, such that b = 1, if reader R outputs 1, and b = 0 otherwise.
• OSendR(m, sid): When queried with message m and session identifier sid, the oracle
OSendR sends message m to reader R for the protocol session sid, and outputs the
response r of reader R.
• OSendT(m,T ): When queried with message m and tag T , the oracle OSendT sends mes-
sage m to tag T , and outputs the response r of tag T .
• OExecute(T ): When called with tag T , the oracle OExecute executes a complete session of
protocol π between reader R and tag T , by querying first the oracle OLaunch, and then
by making successive calls to the oracles OSendR and OSendT. At the end of the protocol
execution, the oracle OExecute returns the transcript tran = (sid,m1, r1,m2, r2, ...) of the
protocol execution together with the session identifier sid.
3.2.2 Security
We note first that a legitimate tag T is defined to be a tag T whose current state ST corre-
sponds to some pair (ID,KT ) in DBR.
Now, an RFID scheme is said to be secure if it ensures both completeness and soundness.
3.2.2.1 Completeness
Roughly speaking, completeness ensures that when a legitimate tag T ∈ T engages in an
execution of the RFID protocol with reader R, then the protocol outputs b = 1, meaning
that reader R accepts tag T .
Definition 3.2. An RFID scheme is complete ⇔ If T is a legitimate tag, then π(R,T ) = 1.
Deng et al. (46) defined adaptive completeness which says that after any attack strategy
followed by adversary A, the protocol execution between reader R and any legitimate tag T
should still be complete, i.e., π(R,T ) = 1. Adaptive completeness captures particularly the
ability of an RFID scheme to recover from desynchronizing attacks.
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Adaptive completeness is defined using a game as depicted in Algorithm 3.2.1 and Al-
gorithm 3.2.2. In the learning phase, adversary A is allowed to execute the RFID protocol
for any tag in the RFID system by calling the oracle OExecute, and to access the output of
the protocol execution by querying the oracle OResult. He is also allowed to corrupt tags by
querying the oracles ORead and OWrite.
Algorithm 3.2.1: Learning phase of adaptive completeness (46)
// A may call the following oracles in any interleaved order for a polynomial number of
// times
Ti ← OTag(paramTi);
(trani, sidi)← OExecute(Ti);
bi ← OResult(sidi);
STi ← ORead(Ti);
OWrite(Ti, S′Ti);
Algorithm 3.2.2: Challenge phase of adaptive completeness (46)
// A selects a challenge tag Tc which he did not corrupt in the learning phase
Tc ← OTag(paramTc);
// Challenger C executes the RFID protocol for tag Tc
(tranc, sidc)← OExecute(Tc);
b← OResult(sidc);
In the challenge phase, adversary A selects a challenge tag Tc which he did not corrupt
in the learning phase. The challenger then invokes the RFID protocol between the challenge
tag Tc and reader R, and returns a bit b which is the output of the protocol execution.
A is said to win the adaptive completeness game, if b = 0. The advantage ǫ of adversary
A in breaking adaptive completeness is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 3.3. An RFID scheme is said to ensure adaptive completeness, iff for any ad-
versary A, the advantage ǫ in winning the adaptive completeness game is negligible.
3.2.2.2 Soundness
Soundness ensures that when a tag T and reader R engages in an execution of the RFID
protocol that ends with reader R outputting b = 1, then this implies that T is a legitimate
tag with an overwhelming probability.
Soundness is formalized in (159) using a security game as described in Algorithm 3.2.3
and Algorithm 3.2.4. In the learning phase, adversary A can execute the RFID protocol for
any tag in the RFID system, access the output of the protocol execution, and corrupt tags.
35
3. RFID SECURITY AND PRIVACY
Algorithm 3.2.3: Learning phase of soundness (159)
// A may call the following oracles in any interleaved order for a polynomial number of
// times
Ti ← OTag(paramTi);
(trani, sidi)← OExecute(Ti);
bi ← OResult(sidi);
STi ← ORead(Ti);
OWrite(Ti, S′Ti);
Algorithm 3.2.4: Challenge phase of soundness (159)
(tranc, sidc)← OExecute(Tc);
b← OResult(sidc);
In the challenge phase, adversary A engages in an execution of the RFID protocol with
reader R by sending messages through the oracle OSendR. That is, adversary A impersonates
some legitimate tag Tc to reader R. At the end of the challenge phase, the challenger C
returns a bit b which is the output of the protocol execution between reader R and adversary
A.
Adversary A wins the soundness game,
• if b = 1, meaning that the RFID protocol identified some legitimate tag Tc; and if
• tag Tc is not corrupted by adversary A; and if
• tag Tc and reader R did not engage in a protocol execution that has the same tran-
script tranc = (sidc,m1, r1,m2, r2, ...) as the protocol execution between reader R and
adversary A. That is, adversary A did not perform a relay attack between reader R
and legitimate tag Tc.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the soundness game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 3.4. An RFID scheme is said to be sound, iff for any adversary A, the advantage
ǫ in winning the soundness game is negligible.
We note that the soundness game above does not grasp the soundness of mutual authen-
tication in the RFID setting (i.e., also reader R is authenticated by tags). We point out
however, that the difference between soundness as defined above and soundness of mutual
authentication lies in that adversary A wins the soundness game not only if he successfully
impersonates a legitimate tag Tc when interacting with reader R, but also if he successfully
impersonates reader R during a mutual authentication with some legitimate tag Tc.
Next, we introduce the prominent privacy definitions in the RFID literature.
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Algorithm 3.2.5: Learning phase of strong privacy (92)
// A may call the following oracles in any interleaved order for a polynomial number of
// times
Ti ← OTag(paramTi);
(trani, sidi)← OExecute(Ti);
bi ← OResult(sidi);
STi ← ORead(Ti);
OWrite(Ti, S′Ti);
3.2.3 Privacy
Formalizing RFID privacy has been a challenging task that resulted in several privacy defini-
tions (5, 92, 129, 159). These definitions can be classified into three categories: indistinguish-
ability-based privacy, unpredictability-based privacy and simulator-based privacy, that differ
mainly in the approach used to measure information leakage during the execution of an RFID
protocol.
3.2.3.1 Indistinguishability-based Privacy
One of the first attempts to formalize RFID privacy was presented in (5). Avoine (5) intro-
duced the notion of tag untraceability (also known as tag unlinkability) which is formalized
by the ability of an adversary A to distinguish between two challenge tags T0 and T1 based
on their protocol executions. Avoine (5) discriminated between universal untraceability and
existential untraceability. Universal untraceability captures the ability of adversary A to
distinguish between the challenge tags T0 and T1 at any point of time, whereas existential
untraceability grasps the ability of adversary A to distinguish between the challenge tags
T0 and T1 at some specific time window chosen by adversary A. Extending the work by
Ohkubo et al. (122), Avoine (5) formally defined tag forward privacy or forward untraceabil-
ity. Forward privacy ensures that even if adversary A corrupts some tag T (i.e., reveals its
internal state), he still cannot link T to its past protocol executions that took place before
T ’s corruption.
However, this privacy definition does not allow adversary A to select the challenge tags,
neither does it take into account the availability of reader R’s output (i.e., the protocol
output) to the adversary A. Actually, adversary A can always learn whether an RFID
protocol execution succeeded on the reader by only observing the reader’s behavior, for e.g.
a gate that opens or not at a subway station.
Juels and Weis (92) extended the definition of tag unlinkability and introduced the notion
of strong privacy. As in (5), strong privacy is formalized using a game that captures the ability
of an adversary A to tell two challenge tags T0 and T1 apart as depicted in Algorithm 3.2.5
and Algorithm 3.2.6. An adversary A against strong privacy has access to tags in two phases.
In the learning phase, A is allowed to execute the RFID protocol while accessing its output.
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Algorithm 3.2.6: Challenge phase of strong privacy (92)
// A selects two tags T0 and T1 which he did not corrupt in the learning phase
T0 ← OTag(paramT0);
T1 ← OTag(paramT1);
b← {0, 1}; // challenger C flips a fair coin b in {0, 1}
A ← Tb; // challenger C provides A with access to tag Tb
// A may call the following oracles in any interleaved order for a polynomial number of
// times
Ti ← OTag(paramTi);
(trani, sidi)← OExecute(Ti);
bi ← OResult(sidi);
STi ← ORead(Ti); // Ti 6= Tb
OWrite(Ti, S′Ti); // Ti 6= Tb
// A outputs his guess for bit b
Output b′;
He is also allowed to corrupt tags. Contrary to (5), adversary A is allowed to select two
challenge tags T0 and T1 in the challenge phase, under the restriction that these two tags
should not be corrupted by A in the learning phase. Then, challenger C gives adversary A
access to tag Tb selected randomly from {T0,T1}. Adversary A then can execute the RFID
protocol while accessing its output, and corrupt any tag in the RFID system except for tag
Tb. The challenge phase of strong privacy ends with adversary A outputting a guess bit b′
for the bit b.
Adversary A wins the strong privacy game if b′ = b. The advantage ǫ of adversary A in
winning the strong privacy game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− 1
2
Definition 3.5. An RFID scheme is said to ensure strong privacy, iff for any adversary A,
the advantage ǫ in winning the strong privacy game is negligible.
3.2.3.2 Unpredictability-based Privacy
Ha et al. (75) introduced the notion of unp-privacy (short for unpredictability-based privacy)
which defines privacy by the ability of an adversary A to predict the output of a tag or a
reader when engaging in an RFID protocol. The unp-privacy is defined with respect to 3-
round canonical RFID protocol. The RFID protocol starts when reader R sends a challenge
message m1 ∈ {0, 1}k1 to some tag T , then tag T replies with a response message r ∈ {0, 1}k ,
the protocol ends with reader R sending a third message m2 ∈ {0, 1}k2 (in the case of mutual
authentication).
The unp-privacy is formalized using a privacy game where adversary A accesses the RFID
system in two phases. In the learning phase, cf. in Algorithm 3.2.7, adversary A is allowed
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to execute the RFID protocol, to access the result of the protocol execution and to corrupt
tags in the RFID system.
Algorithm 3.2.7: Learning phase of unp-privacy (75)
// A may call the following oracles in any interleaved order for a polynomial number of
// times
Ti ← OTag(paramTi);
(trani, sidi)← OExecute(Ti);
bi ← OResult(sidi);
STi ← ORead(Ti);
OWrite(Ti, S′Ti);
In the challenge phase, cf. Algorithm 3.2.8, adversary A selects a challenge tag Tc that
he did not corrupt and a challenge message m1. The challenger C flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}.
If b = 1, then challenger C executes the RFID protocol with tag Tc and sends message m1
in the first round of the protocol. Finally, challenger C returns to adversary A the transcript
tranTc = (m1, r
∗,m∗2) of the protocol execution. If b = 0, then challenger C returns to A a
transcript tranTc = (m1, r
∗,m∗2) where r
∗ and m∗2 are random strings.
As in the learning phase, adversaryA is allowed to corrupt and execute the RFID protocol
while accessing its output for any tag except for the challenge tag Tc. At the end of the
challenge phase, adversary A outputs his guess bit b′ for the bit b.
Adversary A is said to win the unp-privacy game, if b′ = b. The advantage ǫ of adversary
A in winning the unp-privacy game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− 1
2
Definition 3.6. An RFID scheme is said to ensure unp-privacy, iff for any adversary A,
the advantage ǫ in winning the unp-privacy game is negligible.
Ma et al. (112) showed that the minimal condition for RFID tags to achieve unp-privacy
is to implement a pseudo-random function family (PRF). However, Deng et al. (46) identified
two limitations to the unp-privacy formalization:
• Unp-privacy requires messages (r,m2) to be pseudorandom. Nonetheless, any privacy
preserving RFID protocol π = (m1, r,m2) can be transformed into an RFID protocol
π′ = (m1, r||1,m2), where || denotes string concatenation operation, that is not privacy
preserving according to the unp-privacy definition, since the message r||1 is not pseu-
dorandom. Yet intuitively, the protocol π′ is privacy preserving as all tags in the RFID
system appends the same bit 1 to their reply r.
• Adversary A is not allowed to access the output of the protocol for tag Tc in the
challenge phase. As pointed by Deng et al. (46), adversary A can break unp-privacy by
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Algorithm 3.2.8: Challenge phase of unp-privacy (75)
// A selects a tag Tc that is not corrupted and returns a challenge message c
Tc ← OTag(paramTc);
m1 ← A;
// Challenger C executes the protocol with tag Tc
(m1, r,m2)← C;
b← {0, 1}; // challenger C flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}
if b = 1 then
(m1, r
∗,m∗2) = (m1, r,m2);
end
else
r∗ ← {0, 1}k ; // Challenger C picks r∗ randomly
m∗2 ← {0, 1}k2 ; // Challenger C picks m∗2 randomly
end
tranTc = (m1, r
∗,m∗2);
A ← tranTc ;
// A may call the following oracles in any interleaved order for a polynomial number of
// times for any tag Ti 6= Tc
Ti ← OTag(paramTi);
(trani, sidi)← OExecute(Ti);
bi ← OResult(sidi);
STi ← ORead(Ti);
OWrite(Ti, S′Ti);
// A outputs his guess for bit b
Output b′;
forwarding the message r received from challenger C to reader R. If reader R accepts the
message r, then this implies that r was generated by tag Tc and adversary A outputs
b = 1. Otherwise, r is a random string and adversary A outputs b = 0.
3.2.3.3 Simulator-based Privacy
Vaudenay (159) introduced a comprehensive privacy model where privacy is defined as the
ability of an adversary A to infer non-trivial information about tags’ ID from protocol mes-
sages exchanged between tags in the RFID system and reader R. According to (159), an
RFID scheme is said to be privacy preserving, if the messages exchanged between a tag T
and reader R leak no information about tag T to adversary A. That is, the interaction be-
tween tag T and reader R can be successfully simulated to adversary A without the secret
information of tag T or the reader.
This privacy definition is formalized by considering two adversaries A and AS, as illus-
trated in Algorithm 3.2.9 and Algorithm 3.2.10. In the learning phase, both adversaries have
access to the RFID system through the set of oracles presented in Section 3.2.1. The differ-
ence between the two adversaries lies in the fact that adversary A is provided access to the
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oracle OExecute and the oracle OResult, while adversary AS has access instead to the simulated
oracles OSExecute and OSResult controlled by some simulator S, which does not know the secrets
of tags or the secrets of reader R. Hence, adversary AS is said to be a blinded adversary.
Algorithm 3.2.9: Learning phase of the privacy game as defined in (159)
Adversary AS
// AS may call the following oracles in an interleaving order for a polynomial number of
// times
Ti ← OTag(paramTi);
(trani, sidi)← OSExecute(Ti); // simulator S simulates OExecute
bi ← OSResult(sid); // simulator S simulates OResult
STi ← ORead(Ti);
OWrite(T ′i , S′Ti);
Adversary A
// A may call the following oracles in an interleaving order for a polynomial number of
// times
Ti ← OTag(paramTi);
(trani, sidi)← OExecute(Ti);
bi ← OResult(sid);
STi ← ORead(Ti);
OWrite(T ′i , S′Ti);
In the challenge phase, adversary A and adversary AS are provided with tables T and TS
respectively that contain the identifiers of tags that A and AS accessed in the learning phase.
At the end of the challenge phase, adversary A and blinded adversary AS are required to
output a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and a bit bS ∈ {0, 1} respectively.
Now, the advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the privacy game is defined as:
ǫ = |Pr(A outputs b = 1)− Pr(AS outputs bS = 1)|
Definition 3.7. An RFID scheme is said to ensure privacy according to the definition of
Vaudenay (159), iff for any adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that the advantage
ǫ defined above is negligible.
As indicated in (159), the privacy definition above captures information leakage through
the wireless channel between tags and reader R in the RFID system but not through tag
corruption, since queries to the oracles ORead and OWrite are not simulated. In other words,
tag corruption is assumed to always compromise tag privacy.
Within the Vaudenay’s model, adversaries against RFID schemes are categorized into the
following classes:
• Weak adversary : Adversary A is not allowed to corrupt tags, i.e., adversary A cannot
call the oracle ORead nor can he call the oracle OWrite.
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Algorithm 3.2.10: Challenge phase of the privacy game as defined in (159)
Adversary AS
// Let TS be the table of the identifiers of tags that were accessed by AS in the learning
// phase
T
S ← C; // challenger C returns table TS to AS
Output bS;
Adversary A
// Let T be the table of the identifiers of tags that were accessed by A in the learning
// phase
T ← C; // Challenger C returns table T to A
Output b;
• Forward adversary : Adversary A is allowed to corrupt tags. However, once adversary A
corrupts a tag, he cannot do anything except for corrupting more tags. A protocol that
ensures privacy against forward adversaries is said to be forward privacy preserving.
• Destructive adversary : AdversaryA is allowed to do anything after corrupting a tag, but
under the restriction that adversary A cannot reuse a tag after corrupting it. Adversary
A can neither interact with a corrupted tag nor impersonate a corrupted tag to reader
R.
• Strong adversary : Adversary A can corrupt tags without any restrictions.
Furthermore, for each class of adversary A, Vaudenay (159) defined two variants. 1.)
Narrow, where adversary A is not allowed to access the output of the protocol by reader R,
i.e., adversary A cannot call the oracle OResult. 2.) Wide or non-narrow, where adversary
A can call the oracle OResult. We note that a non-narrow strong adversary corresponds to
adversary A described in Algorithm 3.2.9 and Algorithm 3.2.10.
In (159), Vaudenay established that privacy against a non-narrow strong adversary is
impossible, and that narrow strong privacy can be achieved if the tags and the reader in the
RFID system implement a key agreement protocol. Moreover, Paise and Vaudenay (129)
extended the above privacy definition to take into account mutual authentication protocols,
and showed that an RFID scheme that ensures secure mutual authentication, can ensure
narrow forward privacy only if tags feature erasable temporary memory.
As it is impossible to have an RFID scheme that is privacy preserving against strong
adversaries, several adaptations of the model of Vaudenay (159) have been proposed to for-
malize a weaker, yet a realistic privacy definition. For example, Ng et al. (120) introduced the
notion of wise adversary, who is an adversary that cannot query the same oracle twice with
the same input nor can he call oracles with queries to which he already knows the answer.
Under these restrictions, Ng et al. (120) showed that privacy under tag corruption can be
achieved, however, their privacy model prohibits adversaries from accessing the oracle OResult.
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Also, Deng et al. (46) introduced a new definition for RFID privacy called zero-knowledge
privacy (zk-privacy for short). Similar to the definition of Vaudenay (159), information
leakage is measured by comparing the view of an adversary A who has access to the RFID
system through oracles and the view of a blinded adversary AS who has access to a simulated
RFID system. However, the definition of Deng et al. (46) focuses on deriving information
about a specific challenge tag, contrary to the definition of Vaudenay (159) where privacy is
defined as the inability of an adversary A to learn information about any tag in the RFID
system.
3.3 RFID Authentication Protocols
Designing RFID authentication protocols proved to be a very challenging research topic,
since these protocols must not only be secure and privacy preserving, but must also fit the
stringent characteristics of RFID tags in terms of gate equivalents (G.E. for short) and power
consumption; a tag is assumed to provide 10000 G.E. in average and operates at 1 mW.
These strict requirements have led to several proposals in the literature that can be cate-
gorized into four main classes: lightweight authentication, symmetric authentication, public
key authentication and physical authentication. These classes of authentication protocols
differ in the computational requirements on the tags and on the reader. Lightweight authen-
tication relies on lightweight binary operations, while symmetric authentication requires that
tags compute symmetric cryptographic operations. We note that both lightweight authenti-
cation and symmetric authentication require the backend server to perform a linear amount
of computation in the number of tags in the RFID system. In order to allow constant time
authentication while ensuring both tag privacy and security, some protocols use public key
primitives. Namely, elliptic curve cryptography that uses relatively short keys and which can
be efficiently implemented in hardware (102, 104). Finally, RFID protocols based on physical
approaches exploit the physical properties of the RFID environment to enforce tag privacy
and security.
3.3.1 Lightweight Authentication
Lightweight primitives require RFID tags to only compute bit-wise operations such as “⊕”,
“∨”and“∧”, and to store relatively short keying material, which suit perfectly the constrained
computational resources of RFID tags. As a result, the design of secure lightweight primitives
was the focus of a lot of work on secure and privacy preserving RFID authentication, cf.
(18, 29, 66, 91, 130, 131, 157). However, most of these protocols were shown to be vulnerable
to key recovery attacks see, (14, 64, 108, 109, 128).
In this section, we first survey the HB+ protocol (91) and some of its variants (29, 66).
Then, we describe the Ff protocol (18) which we were able to break using an attack of 2
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steps.
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Figure 3.2: The HB+ protocol
3.3.1.1 The HB Protocols
Among the well-investigated lightweight RFID authentication protocols there are the HB
protocols (HB+ (91), HB++ (29) , HB# (66)), whose security and privacy rely on the learning
parity with noise (LPN for short) problem.
Definition 3.8. Let U be a random q × k binary matrix, let x be a random k-bit vector, let
η ∈ ]0, 1
2
[ be a constant noise parameter, and let ν be a random q-bit vector whose hamming
weight hamm(ν) ≤ ηq.
The learning parity with noise (LPN) problem is defined as:
Given U, η, and z = Ux⊕ ν, find a k-bit vector x′ such that: hamm(Ux′ ⊕ z) ≤ ηq.
The LPN problem is known to be NP-complete (13). The best known algorithms to solve
the LPN problem have a complexity of 2
O( k
log(k)
)
. The first algorithm to reach this complexity
was proposed by Blum et al. (20), further optimizations were introduced later by Levieil and
Fouque (107), but they only led to slight improvements to the above complexity of solving
the LPN problem.
The first protocol in the HB family is HB+ (91), see Fig. 3.2. This protocol is a mod-
ification of the HB protocol (80) which is a protocol that addresses the problem of secure
identification by humans without the assistance of trusted hardware or software. A tag T in
the HB+ protocol shares a secret key KT = (x,y) ∈ {0, 1}k × {0, 1}k with reader R. In each
round of the protocol execution, tag T generates a random k-bit vector b ∈ {0, 1}k and sends
b to reader R. Reader R then sends a challenge vector a ∈ {0, 1}k to tag T . Tag T generates
a bit ν according to the Bernoulli distribution Berη, where η ∈ ]0, 1
2
[, and computes a reply
z = (a · x) ⊕ (b · y) ⊕ ν, where “·” denotes the inner product. Reader R accepts T ’s reply,
only if z = (a · x)⊕ (b · y), i.e., ν = 0. Finally, reader R authenticates tag T after q rounds
only if T ’s reply was rejected in less than ηq rounds (i.e., ν = 1 in less than ηq rounds).
Assuming the hardness of the LPN problem, the HB+ protocol is provably secure against
passive adversaries (i.e., “eavesdroppers”). Additionally, Katz et al. (98) proved that HB+
remains secure under concurrent executions, meaning that the HB+ can be parallelized to run
in fewer rounds. However, Gilbert et al. (64) showed a man in the middle attack that allows an
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Figure 3.3: The Ff protocol
active adversary A to recover the secret KT = (x,y). To thwart this attack, several protocols
based on HB+ have been proposed such as: HB++ (29) and HB-MP (119). Nonetheless,
Gilbert et al. (65) showed again that these variants are not secure against man in the middle
attacks. Furthermore, HB protocols are not complete. For 80-bit security, the probability
of the reader rejecting a legitimate tag attains 44% as shown in (66). Consequently, Gilbert
et al. (66) proposed a new variant called HB# that aims to have a lower rate of false negatives
and to withstand active attacks. The main idea of HB# is to use kx × p and ky × p-binary
matrices X and Y as the tag ’s secrets instead of k-bit binary vectors. The HB# protocol
proceeds similarly to HB+, except that the tag is required to send a p-bit message at the
end of each round instead of one bit. Now, to optimize storage requirements on tags, Gilbert
et al. (66) use Toeplitz matrices that can be entirely defined by the first row and the first
column, and it follows that a k × p matrix can be stored in k + p − 1 bits rather than in
kp bits. However, Ouafi et al. (128) designed a man in the middle attack against HB# that
enables an adversary A to recover the secret matrices (X,Y).
3.3.1.2 The Ff Protocol
Inspired by the work of Di Pietro and Molva (48), Blass et al. (18) proposed Ff , a lightweight
protocol for RFID tag authentication whose implementation fits in less than 2000 G.E. The
main idea behind Ff is instead of relying on a secure hash function to authenticate tags, Ff
uses a lightweight function called Ff whose output size is very small. The small output size of
the Ff function results in a large number of collisions (i.e., for different keys, Ff outputs the
same value) which is mitigated by executing the Ff protocol in q rounds (typically q = 60).
In each round, the Ff function is computed, and its output is used by reader R to filter the
secret keys that do not match. In the qth round, only one secret key is left, and it corresponds
to the authenticated tag.
Before detailing the Ff protocol, we describe first the Ff function. The Ff function is
built upon a small fan-in function f : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l , and it is defined as:
Ff : {0, 1}lt × {0, 1}lt → {0, 1}l, Ff (x, y) =
t⊕
i=1
f(x[i], y[i])
Where x[i] respectively y[i] denote the ith l-bit block of x, respectively y.
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Now, we turn to the detailed description of the Ff protocol. Each tag T in the system
stores a secret key KT = (K,K
′) that it shares with reader R. An execution of the protocol
is as follows:
• Reader R sends a nonce N0 ∈ {0, 1}lt to tag T ;
• tag T replies with a random number R0 and the following q values vi:
v1 = Ff (K,R
a1
1 )⊕ Ff (K ′, N1)
v2 = Ff (K,R
a2
2 )⊕ Ff (K ′, N2)
vq = Ff (K,R
aq
q )⊕ Ff (K ′, Nq).
We recall that in the Ff protocol, each tag is equipped with two LFSRs. One LFSR computes
q random number Ni from the nonce N0 sent by reader R, and the other generates a random
number R0 and q sets of d random numbers {R1i , R2i , ..., Rdi }, as shown in the following
equations.
Ni = LFSR(Ni−1) 1 ≤ i ≤ q
R11 = LFSR(R0)
R1i = LFSR(R
d
i−1) 2 ≤ i ≤ q
Rji = LFSR(R
j−1
i ) 1 ≤ i ≤ q, 2 ≤ j ≤ d
To compute the ith value vi sent to the reader, tag T first secretly selects a number ai ∈
{1, 2, ..., d}, then outputs:
vi = Ff (K,R
ai
i )⊕ Ff (K ′, Ni)
After receiving the response of tag T , reader R first derives the q random numbers Ni, then
the q sets of the d random numbers {R1i , R2i , ..., Rdi }. Next, for each vi, the reader discards
from its database every pair of keys (Kj ,K
′
j) that verifies the following:
∀ a ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, Ff (Kj , Rai )⊕ Ff (K ′j , Ni) 6= vi
Contrary to the HB protocols, the Ff protocol is complete, i.e., a valid tag is never
rejected. Also, if the function f is balanced, the parameters d, l and q can be chosen in
such a way that minimizes the probability of breaking the soundness of Ff , see (18) for more
details.
To implement Ff , Blass et al. (18) proposed a practical set of parameters as depicted in
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Table 3.1: Values of Ff ’s parameters
lt l t
256 4 64
d q
8 60
Table 3.1, and defined the function f : {0, 1}4 × {0, 1}4 → {0, 1}4, f(x, y) = z such that:
z1 = x4y1 ⊕ x1y2 ⊕ x2y3 ⊕ x3y4 ⊕ x1x2y1y2 ⊕ x2x3y2y3 ⊕ x3x4y3y4
z2 = x1y1 ⊕ x2y2 ⊕ x3y3 ⊕ x4y4 ⊕ x1x3y1y3 ⊕ x2x4y2y4 ⊕ x1x4y1y4
z3 = x3y1 ⊕ x4y2 ⊕ x1y3 ⊕ x2y4 ⊕ x1x2y1y4 ⊕ x2x3y2y4 ⊕ x3x4y1y3
z4 = x2y1 ⊕ x3y2 ⊕ x4y3 ⊕ x1y4 ⊕ x1x3y3y4 ⊕ x2x4y2y3 ⊕ x1x4y1y2
Where (x1, x2, x3, x4), (y1, y2, y3, y4) and (z1, z2, z3, z4) stand for the binary representation of
x, y and z respectively.
However, we showed in (14) two attacks that allow an adversary A to recover the secret
key KT = (K,K
′) in 252 and 239 steps respectively. The first attack relies on the properties
of the f function and transforms the problem of extracting KT into the LPN problem. The
second attack exploits the relatively short length (64 bits) of the LFSR’s internal state. In
the following, we only describe the second attack as it has better performances, and it does
not depend on the properties of the f function.
The starting point of this attack is to find two protocol executions that involve the same
tag T and which use the same random seed R0. As the LFSR used to generate R0 has an
internal state of 64 bits, a tag uses the same seed R0 after 2
32 protocol executions.
First, adversary A picks two nonces N(0,1) and N(0,2), and challenges tag T with each
of these nonces for 232 times. Eventually, adversary A will find at least two protocol ex-
ecutions involving nonce N(0,1) and nonce N(0,2) respectively that use the same seed R0.
Therefore, adversary A is able to collect values v(i,1) = Ff (K,Ra(i,1)i ) ⊕ Ff (K ′, N(i,1)) and
v(i,2) = Ff (K,R
a(i,2)
i ) ⊕ Ff (K ′, N(i,2)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q. Now, if Ff (K,R
a(i,1)
i ) = Ff (K,R
a(i,2)
i ),
then adversary A obtains the following equation:
v(i,1) ⊕ v(i,2) = Ff (K ′, N(i,1))⊕ Ff (K ′, N(i,2))
• Let πj denote the projection from {0, 1}l to {0, 1} that sends any element of {0, 1}l to
its jth bits, i.e., for all x = (x1, x2, ..., xl) ∈ {0, 1}l πj(x) = xj.
• Let E(i,j) denote the event that πj(v(i,1) ⊕ v(i,2)) = πj(Ff (K ′, N(i,1))⊕ Ff (K ′, N(i,2))).
Event E(i,j) occurs either when a(i,1) = a(i,2) or when a(i,1) 6= a(i,2) but πj(Ff (K,Ra(i,1)i )) =
πj(Ff (K,R
a(i,2)
i )) over {0, 1}. Since Ff is well balanced and Rji is randomly chosen from the
set {R1i , R2i , ..., Rdi }, the first case occurs with probability
1
d
, whereas the second case occurs
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with probability
1
2
(1− 1
d
). Therefore, event E(i,j) happens with probability
1
8
+
1
2
(1− 1
8
) =
1
2
+
1
16
for d = 8.
Since Pr(E(i,j)) >
1
2
, adversary A can repeat his attack several times to obtain N samples
of the same equation πj(v(i,1) ⊕ v(i,2)), and if N is large enough, adversary A can decide the
correct value of πj(Ff (K
′, N(i,1))⊕ Ff (K ′, N(i,2))) by using a majority vote.
Using Chernoff bounds, we deduce that the probability of adversary A obtaining the
correct value of πj(Ff (K
′, N(i,1))⊕ Ff (K ′, N(i,2))) in more than
N
2
samples is larger than
1− exp(−2Nǫ
2
1 + 2ǫ
)
Where ǫ =
1
16
.
Finally, the linearized set of equations πj(Ff (K
′, N(i,1))⊕ Ff (K ′, N(i,2))) contain exactly
4 × 64 linear monomials and 6 × 64 monomials of degree 2. As a consequence, adversary
A must get 640 correct equations πj(v(i,1) ⊕ v(i,2)) = πj(Ff (K ′, N(i,1)) ⊕ Ff (K ′, N(i,2))) to
recover the key K ′. This happens with probability greater than
(1− exp(−2Nǫ
2
1 + 2ǫ
))640
Since there are q = 60 rounds in one execution of the protocol, it follows that adversary
A needs N˜ = 233N
q
(1 − exp(−2Nǫ
2
1 + 2ǫ
))640 interactions with tag T to get a correct linearized
system in the 640 monomials. Setting N = 4096, we obtain N˜ = 239.09.
3.3.2 Authentication based on Symmetric Primitives
Contrary to lightweight primitives, symmetric cryptography provides the means for provable
RFID security and privacy. Additionally, it can be put into practice without requiring tags
to store a large amount of keying material or to perform very expensive computations, see
(58, 147, 163).
Along these lines, Feldhofer et al. (58) proposed a mutual authentication protocol that
relies on AES, cf. Fig. 3.4. A tag T in this protocol stores an internal state ST that consists of
a secret key KT that it shares with the reader. To start the authentication, the reader sends a
random number NR. The tag then returns the encryption cT = EncKT (NR||NT ) where NT is
a random number generated by the tag. The reader decrypts cT using the secret key KT , gets
the plaintext a||b, then checks whether a = NR. If so, the reader accepts the tag and completes
the mutual authentication by sending a second ciphertext cR = EncKT (b||NR) to the tag. The
authors showed that 128-bit AES can be implemented in 3628 G.E., while requiring 992 clock
cycles at 100 KHz frequency. This result was among the first to confirm that real RFID tags
can perform symmetric challenge response protocols. However, this protocol assumes that
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Figure 3.4: AES-based protocol
tags in the system share the same secret key KT . As a result, the protocol only enables tag
authentication but not tag identification, and if one tag is compromised, so is the other tags
in the system. Also, the protocol is not forward privacy preserving, i.e., if a tag is corrupted
by some adversary A, A can easily link this tag to its previous interactions. Despite the
fact that the first two problems can be solved by allowing tags to have different secrets, the
problem of forward privacy is more difficult to mitigate.
One of the first protocols to address the problem of forward privacy was proposed by
Ohkubo et al. (122). The authors designed a scheme called OSK that ensures forward privacy
by equipping tags in the RFID system with two one-way hash functions H and G, where
H is used to authenticate tags and G is used to update their secret keys. At initialization,
each tag stores some secret key K0 which is updated after each reading. Upon the i
th reader
query, the tag computes first a reply r = H(Ki−1), then updates its secret key by evaluating
Ki = G(Ki−1), and finally sends the reply r to the reader, as depicted in Fig. 3.5. When
receiving the tag reply, the reader parses its database until it finds a match. If so, the reader
updates the corresponding secret key using the one-way hash function G. It was shown
in (122) that the OSK scheme is forward privacy preserving in the random oracle model.
However, this protocol is not scalable and it is vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks.
An adversary A can query a tag T for l consecutive times, forcing the reader to perform
a database search of complexity O(ln) to identify T , where n is the number of tags in the
system. Now, if l is too large, the reader may stall, hindering thus, the overall performance
and availability of the RFID system. To tackle theses concerns, Avoine and Oechslin (6)
presented a time-memory trade-off to reduce the computation load on the reader side. Still,
OSK is not only prone to DoS but also to replay attacks. An adversary A can query a tag,
then replay the tag’s response to authenticate himself to the reader.
In the vein of OSK scheme, Berbain et al. (12) proposed a challenge response protocol
that provides provable security and forward privacy. This protocol uses a hash function H
and a random number generator G. A Tag in this scheme uses the hash function H to
authenticate, and the random number generator G to update its internal state (i.e., secret
key Ki). To improve the protocol performances, the hash function H is implemented as
a family of universal hash functions which can be efficiently implemented in hardware, see
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Figure 3.5: The OSK protocol
(35, 100). At initialization, each tag stores an initial key K0 which is updated after each
protocol invocation. The reader starts the protocol with some tag by sending a challenge
message m. When receiving the reader query, the tag first generates a k1 + k2-bit random
number G(Ki−1) = K(i,1)||K(i,2), where |K(i,1)| = k1 and |K(i,2)| = k2, and sets its new key to
Ki = K(i,1). Then, it picks a hash function HK(i,2) from its family of universal hash functions
using K(i,2) as index, and computes its reply r = HK(i,2)(m), which it sends to the reader.
This protocol can be efficiently implemented in 4000 G.E. as demonstrated by Berbain et al.
(12), nonetheless, it is not scalable and it is susceptible to denial of service attacks just like
OSK.
In an attempt to prevent DoS attacks, some schemes (33, 51) proposed that the reader
authenticates itself at the end of the protocol execution, and that the tag updates its internal
state only when the reader’s authentication is successful. Despite the efficiency of such a
counter-measure against DoS attacks, it fails at assuring forward privacy between two suc-
cessful mutual authentications. As noted in (12), it is impossible to assure simultaneously
forward privacy and resistance to denial of service using only symmetric key cryptography;
either tags do not always refresh their states after each query and the scheme is then not
forward privacy preserving, or they refresh their states after each query and the scheme is
then vulnerable to DoS attacks. Yet, being prone to DoS attacks compromises privacy; an
adversary can always recognize a tag which it queries too many times by observing whether
the reader stall or not.
The above issues have led to work on efficient linear/sublinear protocols that still assure
some level of privacy and security, cf. (42, 48, 50, 117). For instance, Dimitriou (50) presented
a constant-time protocol for RFID mutual authentication, see Figure 3.6. Each tag stores
a secret key Ki−1 and computes a hash function H. The reader invokes the protocol by
sending a nonce NR to the tag. The tag computes first H(Ki−1), generates a random nonce
NT and evaluates MACKi−1(NT , NR) using its secret key Ki−1. Finally, the tag replies with
message r = (NT ,H(Ki−1),MACKi−1(NT , NR)). The reader identifies the tag using H(Ki−1)
in constant time, then retrieves Ki−1 and verifies the MAC. If the authentication succeeds,
the reader computes the tag’s new key Ki which it uses to evaluate MACKi(NT , NR). The tag
authenticates the reader, and if the authentication is successful, the tag updates its key. Since
the tag sends the hash of its key H(Ki−1) in every protocol invocation, the tag is traceable
until the next successful protocol execution.
50
3.3 RFID Authentication Protocols
Tag
Ki−1 NR
NT , H(Ki−1),MACKi−1(NT , NR)
Reader
MACKi(NT , NR)
Ki−1 → Ki
Figure 3.6: Dimitriou’s protocol
Also, Molnar et al. (117) presented a scheme that achieves authentication in logarithmic
time by organizing tags’ secrets in a tree where each node is mapped to some secret key. Each
tag in this scheme is associated with a leaf in the tree, and it is assumed to store all the keys
K1,K2, ...,Kd along the path from the root of the tree to its corresponding leaf. When a tag
is queried with a nonce NR, it replies with NT , FK1(NT , NR), FK2(NT , NR), ..., FKd(NT , NR),
where NT is a random number generated by the tag and F is a pseudorandom function.
Using the values transmitted by the tag, the reader identifies the path leading to the tag in
logarithmic time3. In spite of the apparent efficiency of (117), the reliance on correlated keys
to speed up the authentication procedure affects the privacy of tags; if an adversary A learns
the secrets of one tag, he also learns the secrets of other tags.
Furthermore, Damg˚ard and Pedersen (42) proved the intuitive result that was already
indicated in (92) which states that “any complete, sound and strongly privacy preserving
(according to (92)) symmetric RFID system requires the reader to perform a linear search in
its database, in order to identify and authenticate tags”. Thus, the authors suggested limiting
the number of tags that an adversary can corrupt in order to assure soundness, privacy and
efficiency.
Finally, Di Pietro and Molva (48) proposed an RFID protocol called DPM that combines
lightweight identification with symmetric authentication. The idea is to use a lightweight
primitive (bitwise operations) to identify the tag first, then to use a keyed hash function
for authentication. Consequently, the overall computational performances of the reader are
improved. In each protocol execution, the reader is only required to perform binary operations
and to compute one keyed hash function. However, Soos (150) found a key-recovery attack
against the lightweight primitive of DPM.
The efficiency limitations of symmetric cryptography spurred interest in the use of public
key cryptography in RFID environment, particularly elliptic curve cryptography so as to
achieve constant time RFID authentication while protecting tag security and privacy. The
challenges in using public key cryptography are keeping the computation load and the storage
requirements on tags reasonable. Hence, most of the work on RFID public key authentication
3It is noteworthy that this protocol is very similar in principle to the tree walking algorithm used for tag
singulation.
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Figure 3.7: The GPS protocol
focused not only on proving privacy and security but also on implementation feasibility.
3.3.3 Authentication based on Asymmetric Primitives
One of the first public key solutions for RFID authentication was introduced by McLoone
and Robshaw (113). This scheme relies on an elliptic curve variant of the GPS identification
protocol proposed in (67, 68), cf. Fig. 3.7. Elliptic curve GPS is a three round protocol
between a prover P and a verifier V . First, prover P and verifier V agree on an elliptic curve
E , and on a base point g in E of order q. Then, the identity of prover P is mapped to a pair
of secret and public keys (sk, pk) = (s, g−s), where s is picked randomly in Zq. In the first
round of the protocol, prover P chooses a random number r ∈ Zq, computes gr, then outputs
its reply x = H(gr), where H is a cryptographic hash function. Verifier V picks randomly a
challenge message e that it sends back to P , who responds with y = r + se. Finally, verifier
V checks P ’s identity by verifying whether H(gypke) = x. Now, RFID tag authentication
(“identification”) proceeds in the same manner, where a tag plays the role of the prover P
and the reader plays the role of the verifier V . The tag however does not compute x, but
rather it stores a set of pre-computed coupons (ri, xi = H(g
ri)) which are used only once.
When queried, the tag sends xi, and upon receiving the challenge message ei, it computes
yi = ri + sei. As a result, the tag is only required to execute arithmetic operations in Z.
Moreover, the authors showed that for |q| = 160 bits and |ei| = 32 bits, their protocol can fit
an area of 1642 G.E. while requiring 401 clock cycles, at 100 Khz. The GPS protocol however
suffers from the following limitations. 1.) It requires the reader to perform a search of a
linear complexity in the number of tags, 2.) it is not forward privacy preserving, and 3.) it
is prone to DoS attacks: if tags store l coupons, then tags can only respond to l queries and
an adversary A can easily render a tag inoperative by querying it l times.
Notice that the last limitation of GPS can be tackled if tags are assumed to be able to
execute elliptic curve operations. To validate this assumption, Kumar and Paar (102) and
Lee et al. (104) investigated the feasibility of elliptic curve cryptography in low cost tags, and
showed encouraging implementation results of elliptic curve processors. In fact, Kumar and
Paar (102) implemented elliptic curve operations over a finite field of size 193 bits in an area
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Figure 3.8: The EC-RAC protocol
of 18K G.E., whereas Lee et al. (104) implemented elliptic curve operations over a finite field
of size 163 bits within an area of 15K G.E.
In line with these results, Lee et al. (103) proposed EC-RAC, a public key authentication
protocol that is inspired from Schnorr’s (143) and Okamoto’s (123) identification schemes.
Contrary to (143) and (123), EC-RAC is claimed to be secure and privacy preserving against
active adversaries under the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Each tag T in this
scheme is associated with a secret key skT = (s1, s2) and a “public key”
4 pkT = (g˜1, g˜2) =
(gs1 , gs2), as illustrated in Fig. 3.8. Whereas, the reader is associated with a pair of keys
(skR, pkR) = (y, g˜ = g
y). The reader starts the protocol by sending a challenge message
e1 to tag T , the tag picks a random number e2 and computes u1 = g
e2 , u2 = g˜
e2+s2 and
v = e1s1 + e2s2. When receiving (u1, u2, v), the reader identifies the tag by computing
g˜2 = g
s2 =
(u2)
1
y
u1
, then accepts the tag if g˜1 = (
gv
us21
)
1
e1 . The EC-RAC protocol has been
implemented in 17K G.E., and executed within 500 ms at 500 KHz. Nevertheless, Bringer
et al. (30) presented two attacks against EC-RAC. The first attack enables an adversary A to
compute the value of g
1
s2 from two protocol transcripts of the same tag, i.e., if adversary A
eavesdrops on other protocol executions of this tag, he can easily track it by using the value
g
1
s2 . The second attack allows an adversary A who eavesdrops on the same tag three times, to
impersonate this tag as many times as he wants. To circumvent the above attacks, Lee et al.
(105) proposed a revision of EC-RAC, yet van Deursen and Radomirovic (158) presented a
man in the middle attack that allows a non-narrow adversary in the sense of (159) to track
tags. In another attempt to resist man in the middle attacks, Lee et al. (106) proposed a
third protocol which is EC-RACIII. Still, Fan et al. (57) demonstrated that EC-RACIII is as
well vulnerable to tracking attacks that are conducted by a non-narrow adversary.
While most of the work on RFID public key authentication relies on elliptic curve cryp-
tography as the underpinning technique, other approaches were proposed which are based
on finite field cryptography. We mention namely the work by Oren and Feldhofer (126) that
builds upon a variant of the Rabin cryptosystem (133) which was introduced by Shamir (146).
As depicted in Fig. 3.9, the reader sends a random nonce NR to the tag. The tag then gener-
ates two random numbers N(T,1) and N(T,2), together with a plaintext m = f(NR, N(T,1), ID),
4The public keys of tags in both GPS and EC-RAC are only known to authorized readers.
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c = m2 +N(T,2)N
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m = f(NR, N(T,1), ID)
Figure 3.9: RFID authentication protocol based on Rabin cryptosystem
where f is a simple byte interleaving function, and ID is the tag’s identifier. Finally, the
tag computes the ciphertext c = m2 + N(T,2)N , where N is the reader’s public key. When
receiving the tag’s reply c, the reader uses its Rabin’s secret key (i.e., N ’s factorization)
to decrypt c. There are 4 possible decryptions mi for ciphertext c. As a consequence, the
reader verifies first whether one of the resulted mi contains the string NR, if so the reader
retrieves the identifier ID, and authenticates the tag by checking whether there is an entry in
its database that corresponds to the identifier ID. The authors showed that this protocol can
be implemented in 5K G.E.; this efficiency is due to the fact that the tag is only required to
perform arithmetic operations in Z. Note that on the one hand, the privacy of this protocol
relies on the non-disclosure of public key N . On the other hand, if an adversary A corrupts a
tag, he can easily retrieve the public key N . After the disclosure of public key N , adversary
A still cannot compute the tag ID which is encrypted using the Rabin scheme. Nevertheless,
the ciphertext c sent in the last round of the protocol can leak information about the tag,
since the Rabin encryption is not IND-CPA.
Also, Paise and Vaudenay (129) presented a mutual authentication protocol, see Fig.
3.10 based on public key encryption, and showed that if the underlying encryption is IND-
CPA, then the authentication protocol is narrow strong privacy preserving according to (129,
159). They also proved that if the encryption is IND-CCA (cf. Definition 2.17) then, the
authentication protocol is also forward privacy preserving.
Among the known IND-CPA encryption schemes that could serve as the encryption in the
Paise and Vaudenay’s protocol, there is elliptic curve Elgamal (52). As EC-RAC, Elgamal
only requires two exponentiations which was proven to be feasible in RFID environment, see
(103). However, when using elliptic curve Elgamal, the tag has to first map the plaintext
m to be encrypted into a point g˜ in the elliptic curve, and then encrypts the point g˜ to
get a ciphertext c, whereas the reader has to decrypt c and invert the point mapping to
get the plaintext m. As for now, there are few efficient invertible point mapping schemes,
see (3), and it is still unknown if they are feasible in RFID tags. Moreover, the other IND-
CPA encryptions that operate in ZN are unsuitable for RFID tags. The same problem of
point mapping arises when using Elliptic curve variants of IND-CCA encryptions such as
Cramer-Shoup (41) to ensure forward privacy.
Although public key cryptography may allow for scalable RFID authentication protocols,
the question of constructing efficient and provably secure and privacy preserving public key
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Figure 3.10: RFID authentication protocol based on public key cryptography
protocols remains open. As shown in this section, the provably secure and privacy preserving
protocols require RFID tags to perform expensive computations that slacken the overall
system, while the practical schemes have been proven to be vulnerable to tracking attacks.
3.3.4 Physical Layer Techniques
RFID authentication protocols that build upon the physical characteristics of the RFID
environment can be classified into two categories. The first category exploits the properties
of the wireless channel called channel impairments to secure the RFID communication against
eavesdroppers. While the second category exploits the physical characteristics of RFID tags
themselves to implement an alternative to tamper-resistance. The idea is to use the inherent
variability of the wire and gate delays – which are unique to every single integrated circuit (IC)
– to evaluate a pseudo-random function called physically unclonable function (abbreviated
PUF), which is then used to securely identify tags.
3.3.4.1 Channel Impairment-based Protocols
Channel impairments are the physical factors such as interference, fading, shadowing ... etc,
that result in the degradation of the quality of transmission. Schemes such as (36, 37, 93)
take advantage of interference for instance, to make the reader’s channel far better than the
eavesdroppers’ channel. In fact, Juels et al. (93) introduced the concept of the blocker tag
which as discussed in Section 3.1.4 prevents unauthorized scanning by jamming the wireless
channel. Whereas, Castelluccia and Avoine (36) introduced the concept of noisy tag which
contrary to the blocker tag does not aim to block unauthorized tag scanning, but rather, aims
to allow the reader to securely share a secret key with any tag in its vicinity in the presence
of eavesdroppers. The protocol by Castelluccia and Avoine (36) relies on two assumptions:
1.) the noisy tag and the tag T in question reply simultaneously, 2.) the channel is additive,
i.e., when several tags reply simultaneously, the amplitude of the different bits get added.
Now, to enable secure key exchange between tag T and the reader, the authors divide time
into slots ti, and in each time slot ti, tag T and the noisy tag – which is controlled by the
reader– have to send a single bit simultaneously. If the noisy tag and tag T send the same bit
b = 1 (b = 0 resp.), then the reader and eavesdroppers get a symbol S11 (S00 resp.), and they
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both know that tag T sent bit b = 1 (b = 0 resp.). Consequently, the reader discards such
symbols. If the noisy tag and tag T send different bits, then the reader and the eavesdroppers
observe a symbol S01, however only the reader can retrieve the bit sent by tag T , as it knows
the bit that was sent by the noisy tag. The protocol ends with a reconciliation phase, where
the reader provides tag T with the relevant time slots, i.e., the slots where the reader got
the symbol S01. Hence, at the end of the protocol, tag T and the reader are able to share
some secret key K that could be used either to establish a secure channel to authenticate the
tag or to refresh the tag’s identifier. Chabanne and Fumaroli (37) improved (36) by taking
into account possible transmission errors, and they augmented the protocol with a feature
for integrity verification. They also suggested enhancing the randomness of the shared secret
key by applying a universal hash function to the string that the reader and the tag agreed on
in the reconciliation phase. Despite the fact that such schemes offer a good solution against
eavesdroppers, their latency increases with the rate of transmission errors. That is to say,
in the presence of a high transmission error rate, the reconciliation phase may require many
interactions between the tag and the reader before both parties agree on the same secret
string.
3.3.4.2 Protocols based on PUF
A PUF is a challenge response circuit which on an input a returns an output σ which depends
heavily on the physical parameters of the circuit. The main advantage of PUF is that the
PUFs of two circuits that execute the same logical functionality produce different outputs
when queried with the same challenge, which implies that a PUF’s output can uniquely
identify and authenticate a tag. Another advantage of PUFs is that any physical attack on
the tag’s circuitry cannot be carried out without changing the physical properties of the tag,
and therewith, the output of the PUF. As a result, a PUF is suited for tamper detection
applications. Moreover, it is believed that the output of the PUF is unpredictable which
may enable tags to generate good randomness that is not expensive in hardware. It follows
that the application scenarios of physically unclonable functions can be classified into three
categories:
• Source of randomness (79): In this case, the challenge a is used as a seed to produce a
“true” random number.
• Tamper resistance enforcement (79): In this scenario, the PUF is treated as a physical
fingerprint of the tag. This is achieved by querying the PUF of a tag T with some
challenge a, then storing the output σ of T ’s PUF in the reader’s database. When the
reader is presented with tag T , it sends the challenge a and records T ’s answer σ′. The
reader accepts tag T only if σ = σ′.
• Privacy preserving tag authentication (21, 47, 76, 154): The basic idea of such protocols
is that instead of storing one pair of PUF challenge and response per tag as in the
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previous application scenario, the reader stores several pairs to avoid querying tags
with the same challenge twice. This results in a trade-off between tag privacy and the
size of the reader’s database. For instance, the reader in (21, 154) is required to store
a large database, which may not be always practical in the presence of a large number
of RFID tags.
We note that in practice, the output of the PUF matches only probabilistically its expected
value, and it varies considerably depending on the physical parameters of the environment
surrounding the PUF’s circuit. This in reality allows for PUF-based authentication only in a
controlled environment whose physical conditions do not vary drastically from the conditions
in which tag initialization occurred. In addition, Ru¨hrmair et al. (138) presented several
modeling attacks on the current implemented PUFs that enable an adversary A to spoof a
PUF, breaking thus the widely admitted assumption that PUFs cannot be “cloned”.
3.4 On the Limitations of Tag Privacy
Most of the protocols that we presented so far aim at ensuring tag privacy at the application
layer, however, Avoine and Oechslin (7) pointed out that the unlinkability of tags (i.e.,
resistance to tracking attacks) cannot be assured only by relying on cryptographic protocols
at the application layer. Namely, a privacy preserving RFID authentication protocol does not
prevent an adversary A from tracking tags by inferring information from the communication
or the physical layer. For instance, Danev et al. (43) and Zanetti et al. (164) exploited the
spectral features of the responses emitted by tags when subjected to reader signals to extract
RFID physical-layer fingerprints that enable a reader to accurately identify individual tags
of the same manufacturer and model. The authors suggested thereby to use these physical
fingerprints to detect cloned products in the supply chain and to check the genuineness of
RFID-enabled identity documents. It is evident that accurate physical fingerprints jeopardize
tag privacy even if tag-reader communication is protected using cryptographic protocols, and
thereby voids all the counter-measures that were suggested to ensure tag privacy at the
application layer. Fortunately, an accurate physical layer identification requires a controlled
environment where tags are in close proximity and at a fixed position (43) with respect to the
reader, which is not always feasible by an adversary A aiming to track a tag. Consequently, it
is still useful to ensure tag privacy at the application layer through cryptographic protocols.
Still, assuring privacy at the application layer in the constrained RFID setting turned
out to be a very difficult task. The problem lies in the fact that the existing formalizations
of tag privacy generally assume a strong adversary against which privacy cannot be achieved
using the limited resources on RFID tags. As a result, we believe that designing privacy
preserving RFID protocols calls for a weaker, but realistic adversarial model that captures
the capabilities of a real world adversary and fits the computational limitations of RFID
technology.
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In the remainder of this manuscript, we consider an adversary A who can interact and
tamper with tags’ internal states, yet cannot monitor all of their interactions. This assumption
can also be stated as follows: that there is at least one protocol execution between tags and
legitimate readers that is unobserved by adversary A . This is in fact compliant with the work
of Ateniese et al. (3), Dimitriou (51), Lim and Kwon (111) and Sadeghi et al. (139). We
argue that such an assumption is valid, given that in the real world, an adversary A cannot
always monitor devices that are as ubiquitous and mobile as RFID tags.
Furthermore, we turn to multiparty protocols that involve more than one reader, extend-
ing thus the focus of our research beyond simple tag-reader authentication to implement
privacy preserving applications for the supply chain, as will be shown in Part II.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have investigated the privacy and the security challenges raised by RFID
systems. We surveyed the most prominent security and privacy models and analyzed some
of the solutions proposed for security and privacy in an RFID-enabled environment, while
describing a key recovery attack on an RFID authentication protocol called Ff .
Throughout this survey of the state of the art, we have identified a gap between the
formal privacy models and the proposed RFID protocols whose main purpose is to fit the
stringent computational requirements of RFID tags. In order to bridge the gap between the
theoretical privacy models and practical considerations, we suggest a more realistic adversary
who does not monitor all of the tags’ interactions. Under this assumption, we are able to
propose secure and privacy preserving solutions for supply chain management that will be
presented in subsequent chapters.
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Multi-party Protocols for
RFID-enabled Supply Chains
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RFID-enabled Supply Chains
Applications, Privacy and Security
Introduction
A supply chain is defined as a network of partners, who can be “retailers, distributors, trans-
porters, storage facilities and suppliers that participate in the sale, delivery and production of
a particular product” (1). Whereas supply chain management is defined as “the management
and the control of all materials and information in the logistic process from the acquisition
of raw materials to the delivery to end users” (115). Thus, supply chain management aims
primarily to trace the movement of products to circumvent production bottlenecks, reduce
product shrinkage, and to improve supply chain responsiveness to product recalls.
However when products are only equipped with optical barcodes, this renders the simplest
task such as inventory labor intensive and prone to human errors. On this ground, leading
retailers such as Wal-Mart and the US DoD (115, 152) endorsed the adoption of RFID
technology at the pallet level to improve supply chain performances. The main advantage of
RFID technology is the possibility to identify individual products without line of sight. This
property enables supply chain partners to track individual products and log their history in
a timely fashion without human intervention. Accordingly, it is admitted that the use of
RFID tags in the supply chain is of a paramount business value as it enhances supply chain
visibility which favors the regulation of production rate, counterfeit detection, enforcement
of safety regulations, and targeted product recalls.
Yet, the pervasiveness of RFID technology facilitates denial of service attacks and in-
dustrial espionage as explained in Section 3.1.4. While denial of service can be tackled by
increasing the physical security near RFID tags, privacy concerns are more challenging to
address. Actually, tag privacy should not only be ensured against eavesdroppers (outsiders)
but also against partners in the supply chain. That is, a supply chain partner must not be
able to track tags that are not in his site. This privacy requirement calls for innovative solu-
tions that rely on cryptography while taking into account the limited resources of RFID tags.
Namely, any privacy preserving solution for supply chain applications has to be 1.) efficient,
so it does not slacken the overall performances of the supply chain, and 2.) implementable in
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passive tags (ideally, storage (read/write) only tags), in order not to burden the supply chain
financially. Now to design supply chain applications that are cheap, efficient and privacy
preserving, we relax the existing privacy models and we assume that an adversary A cannot
continuously monitor all of the tags’ interactions in the supply chain, as discussed in Section
3.4. We believe that such an assumption is fair given the distributed and the heterogeneous
nature of supply chains.
By assuming a weaker yet a realistic adversary, we are able to design 1.) a privacy
preserving ownership transfer protocol that takes constant time while tags only compute
hash functions, cf. Chapter 4, 2.) two protocols for storage only tags that address the
problem of genuineness verification of products traveling in the supply chain, see Chapter 5,
and finally 3.) a protocol for the automation of safety inspection using again storage only
tags, cf. Chapter 6.
Supply Chain Requirements
Let π denote a protocol that implements a supply chain application. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that π outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} after its execution. b = 1, if π’s execution
was successful; otherwise b = 0.
• Security: Loosely speaking, a protocol π is said to be secure if it is:
– Complete: If protocol π is executed by legitimate parties, then π will output
b = 1, meaning that the protocol execution was successful.
– Sound: This property ensures that if an execution of protocol π outputs b = 1,
then this implies that π was executed by legitimate parties with an overwhelming
probability.
• Privacy: To ensure the privacy of tags, and hereby the privacy of partners in the
supply chain, the protocol π has to fulfill the following two requirements.
– Content privacy: An adversary must not be able to learn the confidential con-
tent of tags by querying them.
– Location privacy: This property corresponds to the resistance to tracking at-
tacks. Namely, a partner in the supply chain must not be able to trace tags that
are not in his site. In this thesis, location privacy is captured by the ability of an
adversary to tell tags apart based on their protocol executions.
We note that location privacy is a stronger requirement than content privacy. In fact,
if an adversary is able to disclose the private content of a tag, then he can easily track
tags and violate the requirement of location privacy. Therefore, in the remainder of this
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thesis, we focus on location privacy that we call hereafter tag unlinkability, and which
we formalize using an indistinguishability-based definition as in (5, 92).
Target Applications
In this manuscript, we target the following supply chain applications for which we propose
efficient, secure and privacy preserving solutions.
• Tag ownership transfer: For privacy reasons, each partner in the supply chain re-
quires to own tags that are present in his site, i.e., to be the only entity that identifies
and authenticates tags in his vicinity. When passing tags on to the next partner in the
supply chain, ownership of tags has to be transferred to the new owner. Hence, tag
ownership transfer is defined as the action of providing a new tag owner with the nec-
essary information that enables him to authenticate a tag later on. The real challenge
when devising tag ownership transfer protocols is to assure the privacy of tags against
their previous owners and their new owners. Roughly speaking, when the ownership
of some tag T is transferred from one partner Pi to another partner Pi+1, it must be
computationally infeasible for Pi to trace T ’s future interactions, whereas partners Pi+1
must not be able to link tag T to its past interactions, cf. Chapter 4.
• Genuineness verification: To verify the genuineness of products in the supply chain,
one solution consists of verifying the path that a product took. The idea is to label
each product in the supply chain with a tag that encodes the path that the product
took so far. However, using RFID tags to detect counterfeits raises two challenges. The
first is with respect to security, partners in the supply chain should be able to update
the states of RFID tags but they must not be able to inject fake products. The second
challenge regards privacy, a partner in the supply chain must not be able to trace tags
once they leave his site, cf. Chapter 5.
• Item matching: One of the prominent applications of RFID technology is the au-
tomation of safety inspection when transporting hazardous items such as chemicals.
The idea is to equip each chemical container with an RFID tag that encodes the type
of the chemical. Now when two chemical containers Ci and Cj are in the range of some
reader R in the supply chain, reader R reads the tags attached to Ci and Cj , and de-
cides whether Ci and Cj can be stored close to one another or not. For safety reasons,
RFID-based item matching has to be performed without revealing the private content
of tags to readers in the supply chain. The only information that a reader learns after
the execution of the protocol is whether a pair of tags match or not, cf. Chapter 6.
63
64
4RFID-based Ownership Transfer
with Issuer Verification
4.1 Introduction
As products travel in the supply chain, their ownership is transferred from one supply chain
partner to another, and so is the ownership of their corresponding tags. Tag ownership in
this setting is the capability that enables a partner in the supply chain to authenticate, access
and transfer the ownership of tags that are present in his site, whereas tag ownership transfer
is the action of transferring the necessary private information of some tag from one partner
to another.
In order to protect the security and the privacy of tags and partners in the supply chain,
a protocol for tag ownership transfer must ensure the following:
• Secure mutual authentication between tags and their owners (supply chain partners).
• Exclusive ownership: Non-authorized parties must not be able to transfer the ownership
of a tag without the consent of the tag’s owner.
• Backward unlinkability: A previous owner of a tag must not be able to trace a tag once
he releases its ownership.
• Forward unlinkability: A new owner of a tag must not be able to link the tag to its past
interactions.
Moreover, tag ownership transfer protocols are required to be efficient so as not to slacken
the performances of the supply chain. Thus, a tag ownership transfer protocol must be built
upon an efficient authentication protocol that takes into account the constrained computa-
tional resources of RFID tags: as discussed earlier, it is assumed that RFID tags can at best
implement symmetric primitives such as hash functions. Yet, most symmetric authentication
schemes require a linear search in the number of tags in the supply chain. We remind the
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reader however that previously proposed symmetric authentication protocols are designed to
be privacy preserving against a strong adversary who can continuously eavesdrop on tags’
communications. As discussed in Section 3.4, we believe that such an adversary is unrealistic
as it does not fit the limitations of RFID tags and the distributed and heterogeneous settings
of supply chains. As a result, we believe that in order to design efficient tag ownership trans-
fer protocols, we have to relax the privacy requirements by assuming that there is at least
one interaction between a tag and its owner that is unobserved by the adversary.
To answer to the above privacy and security requirements, we introduce ROTIV, which
in addition to the basic features of tag ownership transfer offers issuer verification. That
is, any partner in the supply chain can verify the “issuer” (origin) of tags he owns. Such a
feature impedes partners in the supply chain from injecting fake products that do not meet
quality standards.
The main idea of ROTIV is to store in each tag T in the supply chain a symmetric key
and an Elgamal encryption of its identifier signed by some trusted issuer. The public key
encryption enables the owner to identify tags in constant time, while symmetric keys are
used to mutually authenticate tags and owners. Also, each tag T in ROTIV is associated
with a set of ownership references. T ’s ownership references allow T ’s owner to authenticate
T and to transfer T ’s ownership. After each successful mutual authentication, the state of
tag T and its ownership references must be updated in order to ensure both tag privacy and
security. Finally, issuer verification of tag T is executed by checking whether the encrypted
signature stored into tag T is a valid signature or not.
In summary, ROTIV’s contributions are:
• Constant time mutual authentication while tags are only required to compute a hash
function.
• Issuer verification that enables prospective owners of a tag T to check the identity of
T ’s origin.
• Contrary to related work (60, 101, 117, 142), ROTIV does not require a trusted third
party to perform tag ownership transfer.
• Formal definitions of privacy and security requirements of tag ownership transfer.
• Formal proofs of ROTIV security and privacy.
The sequel of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2, we introduce the no-
tations that will be employed throughout this chapter, together with ROTIV’s problem
statement. In Section 4.3, we present the formal definitions that capture the security and
the privacy requirements of tag ownership transfer. We move on to the protocol detailed
description in Section 4.4, followed by a privacy and a security analysis in Section 4.5 and
Section 4.6 respectively. Finally, we wrap-up the chapter by surveying some the previous
work on tag ownership transfer in Section 4.7.
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4.2 Background
An ownership transfer protocol involves the following entities:
4.2.1 Entities
• Tags Ti: Each tag is attached to a single product. A tag Ti has a re-writable memory
representing Ti’s current state S
j
Ti
at time j.
In the remainder of this chapter, we denote T the set of tags Ti in the supply chain,
and n = |T |.
• Issuer I: The issuer I initializes tags and attaches each tag Ti to a product. At
initialization I creates a set of ownership references denoted refTi and writes an initial
state S0Ti into Ti. Finally, tag Ti and its ownership references are given to Ti’s first
owner denoted O(Ti,1).
• Owner O(Ti,k): Is the kth owner of tag Ti. Owner O(Ti,k) stores a set of ownership
references refTi that enables him to authenticate and transfer Ti’s ownership.
We denote O the set of all owners O(Ti,k) in the supply chain and η = |O|. Without
loss of generality, we assume that an owner O(Ti,k) consists of a database DBk and an
RFID reader Rk.
4.2.2 RFID Ownership Transfer with Issuer Verification
An ownership transfer protocol raises four major requirements:
• During daily operations, the owner O(T,k) of some tag T in the supply chain has to be
able to perform a number of mutual authentications with tag T .
• Eventually, O(T,k) has to pass T to the next owner O(T,k+1) in the supply chain. There-
fore, the owner O(T,k) and O(T,k+1) must securely exchange the ownership references of
tag T .
• Before accepting tag T , it is preferable that the prospective owner O(T,k+1) verifies the
origin of tag T , i.e., given the ownership references of tag T , the owner O(T,k+1) checks
whether tag T was originally initialized by the trusted issuer I or not.
• Once the ownership of tag T is transferred, the new owner O(T,k+1) must securely update
any secrets stored in T and the corresponding ownership references. In this manner,
O(T,k+1) is the only entity that can authenticate tag T and transfer its ownership.
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Figure 4.1: Ownership transfer protocol
4.2.3 Problem Statement
Recently proposed protocols on RFID tag ownership transfer (60, 111, 149) rely on symmetric
primitives to perform privacy preserving mutual authentication and secure ownership transfer.
As depicted in Figure 4.1, a tag T in these protocols:
• stores a state SjT = KjT . This state corresponds to a secret key which is shared between
T and T ’s current owner O(T,k);
• computes a secure symmetric primitive H that is used to mutually authenticate T and
O(T,k) using the secret key K
j
T ;
• computes an update function G to refresh the secret key of T after a protocol execution.
However, such protocols suffer from inherent limitations:
• Linear complexity: As already explained in Section 3.3.2, a privacy preserving (in
the sense of (92)) and secure symmetric tag authentication requires the owner of the
tag to perform a linear search in his database to identify tags in his vicinity.
• Denial of service: To ensure forward unlinkability of tags, a tag is required to update
its secret key using an update function G after each authentication. However such a
mechanism makes the protocol prone to DoS attacks as explained in Section 3.3.2.
• No tag issuer verification: Without tag issuer verification, owners and therewith
partners in the supply chain may be able to inject tags that were not issued by trusted
parties. We claim that in the real world, the prospective owner of some tag T will
require verifying the origin of T before accepting it.
We note that the previous ownership transfer protocols (60, 111, 149) are designed to
be forward privacy preserving against a strong adversary that continuously monitors tags
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in the supply chain(92, 129, 159). However, we show that by considering a more realistic
adversary model, we can devise an ownership transfer protocol that achieves both constant
time authentication and denial of service resistance while tags are only required to compute
hash functions. As proposed in Section 3.4, we assume that an adversary cannot continuously
monitor a tag, i.e., there is at least one communication between the tag and its owner that
is unobserved by the adversary.
4.3 Adversary Model
We assume that the communication channel between owners in the supply chain is secure.
Accordingly, an adversary A has only access to the wireless channel between tags and
their owners in the supply chain.
Now, to capture the capabilities of an adversary A against ROTIV, we assume that there
is a challenger C who provides A with access to the following oracles:
• OTag(param): When queried with parameter param, the oracle OTag returns a tag T ∈ T
that satisfies parameter param (if there is any).
We indicate that adversary A can query the oracle OTag with any combination of
disjunctions or conjunctions of parameters.
• OOwner(OID): When queried with owner identifier OID, the oracle OOwner returns the
owner O ∈ O whose identifier is OID (if there is any).
• OExecute(T ): When called with tag T , the oracle OExecute starts a complete authentica-
tion session between tag T and its current owner O(T,k). During this authentication,
adversary A is allowed to eavesdrop and alter the messages exchanged between tag T
and owner O(T,k).
At the end of the protocol execution, oracle OExecute returns a session identifier sid, a
protocol transcript tran, and two bits bT and bO such that bT = 1 (bO = 1 resp.) if tag
T (owner O(T,k) resp.) successfully authenticates owner O(T,k) (tag T resp.); otherwise
bT = 0 (bO = 0 resp.)
• OTransfer(T, from, to): When called with tag T , the oracle OTransfer invokes an ownership
transfer protocol of tag T between the parties from and to.
At the end of the protocol execution, the oracle OTransfer returns a bit b such that b = 1,
if the ownership transfer protocol was successful, and b = 0 otherwise.
• OFlip(T0,T1): When queried with a pair of tags T0 and T1, the oracle OFlip randomly
chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and returns tag Tb.
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4.3.1 Privacy
Inspired by previous work on ownership transfer(51, 111), we formally define using games the
two major privacy requirements of ownership transfer which are: forward unlinkability and
backward unlinkability.
In the setting of tag ownership transfer, forward unlinkability ensures that when a new
owner O(T,k+1) acquires T ’s secrets after a successful ownership transfer at time tk+1, he still
cannot tell whether T has participated in protocol runs at time t < tk+1. On the other hand,
backward unlinkability, ensures that when a previous owner O(T,k) releases the ownership of
tag T at time tk+1, he still cannot tell whether T is involved in interactions that occurred at
time t > tk+1 or not.
4.3.1.1 Forward Unlinkability
The forward unlinkability game captures the capabilities of an owner of some tag T who has
to decide whether T was already involved in previous protocol executions.
We recall that in scenarios where authentication is implemented using symmetric prim-
itives, the notion of forward unlinkability as defined by Avoine (5), Juels and Weis (92) is
achievable but at the expense of the resistance to denial of service attacks, see Section 3.3.2.
Consequently, we assume that there is at least one communication between a tag T and
its previous owner that was unobserved by T ’s current owner. This assumption enables us
to achieve relaxed forward privacy, constant-time authentication and resistance to denial of
service attacks.
Algorithm 4.3.1: Learning phase of the forward unlinkability game
T0 ← OTag(param0);
T1 ← OTag(param1);
for i := 1 to r do
OExecute(T0);
OExecute(T1);
for i := 1 to s do
Ti ← OTag(param′i);
for j := 1 to t do
OExecute(Ti);
OTransfer(Ti, O(Ti,ki),A);
for j := 1 to t do
OExecute(Ti);
Our forward unlinkability game is indistinguishability based, see Section 3.2.3.1. An
adversary A(r, s, t, ǫ) has access to tags in two phases. In the learning phase, as depicted in
Algorithm 4.3.1, adversary A queries the oracle OTag to get two challenge tags T0 and T1 for
70
4.3 Adversary Model
which he can call the oracle OExecute for a maximum of r times.
In addition to T0 and T1, adversary A is provided with s tags Ti, for which he can run
mutual authentications and acquire the ownership by calling the oracles OExecute and OTransfer
respectively.
Algorithm 4.3.2: Challenge phase of the forward unlinkability game
// Challenger C runs a mutual authentication for T0 and T1 outside the range of A
OExecute(T0);
OExecute(T1);
Tb ← OFlip{T0,T1};
// Ownership of tag Tb is transferred to A
OTransfer(Tb, O(Tb,k),A);
for j := 1 to r do
OExecute(Tb);
Output b′;
In the challenge phase as depicted in Algorithm 4.3.2, challenger C runs a mutual authen-
tication for tags T0 and T1 outside the range of the adversary A. Then, challenger C calls
the oracle OFlip with the tags T0 and T1. OFlip selects randomly b ∈ {0, 1} and returns the
tag Tb to A, who then acquires the ownership of tag Tb by calling the oracle OTransfer.
After the ownership transfer, adversary A runs up to r mutual authentications with tag
Tb and outputs his guess b
′ for the bit b.
Adversary A(r, s, t, ǫ) is said to win the forward unlinkability game if b = b′.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the forward unlinkability game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− 1
2
Definition 4.1 (Forward Unlinkability). ROTIV is said to ensure forward unlinkability, iff
for any adversary A(r, s, t, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the forward unlinkability game is
negligible.
4.3.1.2 Backward Unlinkability
Vaudenay (159) showed that it is impossible to achieve backward unlinkability without public
key cryptography on tags5. As a result, in order to achieve at least a slightly weaker notion of
backward unlinkability, we add the assumption that a previous owner O(T,k) of tag T cannot
continuously monitor T after releasing T ’s ownership. This has been previously suggested
by, e.g., Dimitriou (51), Lim and Kwon (111).
The backward unlinkability game captures the capabilities of an adversary A who releases
the ownership of a tag T during his attack and has to tell whether tag T is involved in future
5Vaudenay (159) has shown that narrow strong privacy implies key agreement.
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Algorithm 4.3.3: Learning phase of the backward unlinkability game
T0 ← OTag(param0);
T1 ← OTag(param1);
// Ownership of tags T0 and T1 is transferred to A
OTransfer(T0, O(T0,k0),A);
OTransfer(T1, O(T1,k1),A);
for i := 1 to r do
OExecute(T0);
OExecute(T1);
for i := 1 to s do
Ti ← OTag(param′i);
OTransfer(Ti, O(Ti,ki),A);
for j := 1 to t do
OExecute(Ti);
O(Ti,ki+2) ← OOwner(OIDi);
OTransfer(Ti,A, O(Ti,ki+2));
for j := 1 to t do
OExecute(Ti);
protocol transactions or not.
In the learning phase, cf. Algorithm 4.3.3, oracle OTag selects randomly two tags T0 and
T1. The ownership of these two tags is transferred to A. A is allowed to run up to r mutual
authentications with tags T0 and T1.
Oracle OTag gives A also an additional s tags Ti. The ownership of tags Ti is transferred
to A, who can then perform up to t mutual authentications with these tags. Again, the
ownership of each tag Ti is transferred to an owner O(Ti,ki+2) chosen by adversary A through
the oracle OOwner. Now, adversary A can execute another t mutual authentications for tags
Ti.
In the challenge phase as depicted in Algorithm 4.3.4, adversary A transfers the ownership
of the challenge tags T0 and T1 to owners of his choice. Then, T0 and T1 run a mutual
authentication with their respective owners outside the range of the adversary A. The oracle
OFlip queried with tags T0 and T1, chooses randomly b ∈ {0, 1} and returns tag Tb to A.
Adversary A is allowed to execute r mutual authentications with tag Tb.
Finally, adversary A outputs his guess b′ for the bit b. A is said to win the backward
unlinkability game if b = b′.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the backward unlinkability game is defined
as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− 1
2
Definition 4.2 (Backward Unlinkability). ROTIV is said to ensure backward unlinkability,
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Algorithm 4.3.4: Challenge phase of the backward unlinkability game
// Ownership of tag T0 is transferred from A to new owner O(T0,k0+2)
O(T0,k0+2) ← OOwner(OID0);
OTransfer(T0,A, O(T0,k0+2));
// Ownership of tag T1 is transferred from A to new owner O(T1,k1+2)
O(T1,k1+2) ← OOwner(OID1);
OTransfer(T1,A, O(T1,k1+2));
// Challenger C runs a mutual authentication for T0 and T1 outside the range of A
OExecute(T0);
OExecute(T1);
Tb ← OFlip{T0,T1};
for j := 1 to r do
OExecute(Tb);
Output b′;
iff for any adversary A(r, s, t, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the backward unlinkability game
is negligible.
4.3.2 Security
A secure ownership transfer with issuer verification has to fulfill the following security re-
quirements.
4.3.2.1 Mutual Authentication
A secure ownership transfer protocol must ensure that when a tag T runs a successful mutual
authentication with an owner O, then this implies that O is T ’s current owner. Also, when
an owner O runs a successful mutual authentication with some tag T in his vicinity, it yields
that T is a legitimate tag.
Algorithm 4.3.5: Learning phase of the mutual authentication game
for i = 1 to r do
Ti ← OTag(parami);
for i = 1 to s do
OExecute(Ti);
for i = 1 to r do
T ′i ← OTag(param′i);
for i = 1 to s do
OExecute(T ′i );
Read(T ′i );
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Algorithm 4.3.6: Challenge phase of the mutual authentication game
Tc ← OTag(paramc);
(tran, bT , bO)← OExecute(Tc);
We define a mutual authentication game in accordance with Lim and Kwon (111), Vau-
denay (159) and Paise and Vaudenay (129). This game proceeds in two phases. During the
learning phase as depicted in Algorithm 4.3.5, an adversary A(r, s, ǫ) queries the oracle OTag
to get r tags Ti. Adversary A is allowed to execute s mutual authentications for tags Ti.
Also, adversary A is allowed to query the oracle OTag to get r additional tags T ′i . Adversary
A can execute s mutual authentications with tags T ′i and to read their internal states by
calling the function Read.
In the challenge phase as depicted in Algorithm 4.3.6, adversary A first queries the oracle
OTag to get a challenge tag Tc. Then, he interacts with tag Tc by calling the oracle OExecute,
which returns the tuple (tran, bT , bO) at the end of the mutual authentication.
Adversary A is said to win the mutual authentication game if:
i.) bT = 1 or bO = 1;
ii.) the internal state of tag Tc was not read by adversary A in the learning phase;
iii.) adversary A is not the current owner of tag Tc;
iv.) the owner of tag Tc and Tc did not engage in a mutual authentication with the same
transcript tran.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the mutual authentication game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 4.3 (Mutual Authentication). ROTIV is secure with respect to mutual authenti-
cation, iff for any adversary A(r, s, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the mutual authentication
game is negligible.
4.3.2.2 Exclusive Ownership
Exclusive ownership ensures that an adversary A who does not have the ownership references
refT of some tag T cannot transfer the ownership of T , even if he reads the internal state of
tag T .
In the learning phase as shown in Algorithm 4.3.7, the oracle OTag supplies A(r, s, ǫ) with
r tags Ti, then the ownership of tags Ti is transferred to adversary A. A can run up to s
mutual authentications with Ti by calling the oracle OExecute. He can as well transfer the
ownership of tags Ti to owners O(Ti,ki+2) of his choice, and then executes another s mutual
authentications with tags Ti.
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Algorithm 4.3.7: Learning phase of the exclusive ownership game
for i := 1 to r do
Ti ← OTag(parami);
OTransfer(Ti, O(Ti,ki),A);
for j := 1 to s do
OExecute(Ti);
O(Ti,k+2) ← OOwner(OIDi);
OTransfer(Ti,A, O(Ti,ki+2));
for j := 1 to s do
OExecute(Ti);
Algorithm 4.3.8: Challenge phase of the exclusive ownership game
Tc ← OTag(paramc);
Read(Tc);
Oc ← OOwner(OID);
b← OTransfer(Tc,A, Oc);
In the challenge phase, cf. Algorithm 4.3.8, adversary A queries the oracle OTag that
supplies A with a challenge tag Tc. Now, adversary A can read Tc’s internal state by calling
the function Read.
At the end of the challenge phase, A runs an ownership transfer protocol for tag Tc with
a challenge owner Oc of his choice by calling the oracle OTransfer. At the end of the ownership
transfer protocol, OTransfer outputs a bit b such that: b = 1, if the ownership transfer was
successful, and b = 0 otherwise.
A is said to win the exclusive ownership game, if i.) b = 1, and if ii.) adversary A is not
the owner of tag Tc.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the exclusive ownership game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 4.4 (Exclusive Ownership). ROTIV is said to ensure exclusive ownership, iff for
any adversary A(r, s, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the exclusive ownership game is negligible.
4.3.2.3 Issuer Verification
The security of issuer verification ensures that when an owner O in the supply chain accepts
a tag T , then this implies that tag T was originally issued by the trusted issuer I (with an
overwhelming probability).
The goal of some adversary A is to convince an owner Oc in the supply chain to accept
the ownership of a tag T that was not actually issued by I.
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The security of issuer verification is defined by a security game that proceeds as follows.
In the learning phase of the issuer verification game, adversary A queries the oracle OTag
that gives A a total of r tags Ti whose ownership is then transferred to adversary A. Now,
adversary A can run up to s mutual authentications for tag Ti by calling the oracle OExecute.
He can also call the oracle OTransfer to transfer the ownership of tags Ti to owners O(Ti,ki+2)
of his choice.
Algorithm 4.3.9: Learning phase of the security game of issuer verification
for i := 1 to r do
Ti ← OTag(parami);
OTransfer(Ti, O(Ti,ki),A);
for j := 1 to s do
OExecute(Ti);
O(Ti,ki+2) ← OOwner(OIDi);
OTransfer(Ti,A, O(Ti,ki+2));
Algorithm 4.3.10: Challenge phase of the security game of issuer verification
CreateTag Tc;
Oc ← OOwner(OIDc);
b← OTransfer(Tc,A, Oc);
In the challenge phase, A creates a new tag Tc 6∈ T (i.e., Tc is not a clone of some other
tag). Then, adversary A transfers the ownership of tag Tc to some challenge owner Oc of his
choice. At the end of the ownership transfer, the oracle OTransfer returns a bit b.
Adversary A is said to win the issuer verification game, if b = 1.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the security game of issuer verification is
defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 4.5 (Issuer Verification Security). ROTIV is secure with respect to issuer verifi-
cation, iff for any adversary A(r, s, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the security game of issuer
verification is negligible.
Remark 4.1. Issuer verification assures that an adversary cannot create and inject new tags
into the supply chain. Yet, the owner of a legitimate tag T can clone T to obtain new tags
that pass issuer verification. We believe that without tamper resistance or protected memory
mechanisms, cloned tags will always pass issuer verification. Fortunately, cloning can be
detected if tags have unique identifiers.
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In order to ensure tag privacy and enable issuer verification while keeping the storage re-
quirements in tags minimal, each tag T in the supply chain is required to store a secret key
KT and a short signature (22) of its identifier encrypted using elliptic curve Elgamal.
4.4.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe briefly the short signature scheme used in ROTIV to sign tags’
identifiers and Elgamal cryptosystem.
4.4.1.1 Short Signature
The short signature used in ROTIV consists of the following operations.
• Key generation: On input of a security parameter τ , the system obtains a tuple
(G1,G2,GT , e, g, h,H) where:
– G1, G2 and GT are groups such that G1 and GT have the same prime order q;
– g and h are random generators of G1 and G2 respectively;
– e : G1 × G2 → GT is an asymmetric bilinear pairing, see Section 2.3.3, Definition
2.5;
– H is a secure hash function from {0, 1}∗ → G1. This hash function will be viewed
as a random oracle in the rest of this chapter.
The system then picks up a random number x from F∗q. Now, the signature secret key
is sk = x, and the corresponding public key is pk = hsk ∈ G2.
• Signing: On input of a message m and secret key sk, this algorithm outputs S =
Signsk(m) = H(m)
sk.
• Verification: On input of a messagem, a signature S and public key pk, this algorithm
checks whether the following equation holds:
e(H(m), pk) = e(S, h) (4.1)
If so, it outputs Verifypk(m,S) = 1; otherwise it outputs Verifypk(m,S) = 0.
Note that if S = H(m)sk, then the Equation 4.1 will always hold.
Remark 4.2. We note that the signature presented above is a modified variant of the scheme
proposed by Boneh et al. (23). The difference between these two signatures lies on the fact
that the scheme in (23) requires symmetric bilinear pairings and its security relies on the
CDH assumption, whereas ROTIV’s signature requires asymmetric bilinear pairings and its
security is based on the BCDH assumption as will be proven in Section 4.6.3.
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4.4.1.2 Elliptic Curve Elgamal Cryptosystem
An elliptic curve Elgamal cryptosystem provides the following usual set of operations:
• Setup: On input of a security parameter τ , the system outputs an elliptic curve E over
a finite field Fp. Let g be a point on E(Fp) of a large prime order q such that the DDH
problem is intractable in G1 = 〈g〉.
• Key generation: The secret key is sk ∈ F∗q. The corresponding public key pk is the
pair of points (g, g˜ = gsk).
• Encryption: To encrypt a point m ∈ G1, one randomly selects r ∈ Fq and computes
Encpk(m) = (u, v) = (g
r,mg˜r). The ciphertext is c = (u, v).
• Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext c = (u, v), one computes Decsk(c) = v
usk
= m.
Remark 4.3. Note that Elgamal cryptosystem is
• IND-CPA under the DDH assumption in G1;
• homomorphic, i.e., ∀ m1,m2 ∈ G1,Enc(m1)Enc(m2) = Enc(m1m2).
4.4.2 Protocol Overview
In ROTIV, a tag T stores a state SjT = (K
j
T , c
j
T ), where K
j
T is a shared key between tag T
and its owner, and cjT is an Elgamal encryption of the signature of T ’s identifier by issuer I.
When an owner O(T,k) starts a mutual authentication with T , T replies with c
j
T and the
MAC of cjT computed using T ’s secret key K
j
T . Upon receipt of the tag reply, owner O(T,k)
uses his secret key to decrypt cjT . After decryption, O(T,k) checks if the resulting plaintext is in
his database DBk. If so, O(T,k) looks up the symmetric key K
j
T of tag T and verifies the MAC
sent by T . Consequently, ROTIV enables mutual authentication in constant time, while
tags are only required to compute symmetric primitives (i.e., MAC). After each successful
authentication, the state of tag T is updated using Elgamal re-encryption techniques and key
update mechanisms so as to ensure both forward and backward unlinkability.
Now to transfer the ownership of tag T , the current owner O(T,k) of T provides the
prospective owner O(T,k+1) with the ownership references refT of tag T . These ownership
references allow owner O(T,k+1) to first verify the issuer of tag T by checking whether the
ciphertext cjT encrypts a valid signature by issuer I, then to authenticate himself to T and
update the internal state of tag T .
4.4.3 Protocol Description
To ensure the privacy and the security of ROTIV, we employ bilinear groups where DDH is
hard, see Definition 2.35 and Definition 2.36. More precisely, we prove the security and the
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privacy of ROTIV by relying on the BCDH assumption (cf. Definition 2.32) and the XDH
assumption (cf. Definition 2.35) respectively.
Remark 4.4. ROTIV’s privacy can also rely on the SXDH assumption, see Definition 2.36.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that each tag T can evaluate a cryptographic
hash function G that is used to compute the MAC of tag T and to update its symmetric key
after each successful authentication.
4.4.3.1 Setup
A trusted third party (TTP) outputs (q,G1,G2,GT , g, h, e,H,G), where G1 and GT are
cyclic groups of prime order q, g and h are random generators of G1 and G2 respectively, and
e : G1 × G2 → GT is an asymmetric bilinear pairing. H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 is a cryptographic
hash function. To compute H, the different parties in ROTIV can use the hashing algorithm
proposed by Brier et al. (28) that hashes into ordinary elliptic curves. G : {0, 1}∗ → Fq is a
cryptographic hash function used to compute MACs and to update the tags’ keys.
The TTP chooses x ∈ F∗q and computes hx, and supplies issuer I with the secret key
skI = x and the corresponding public key pkI = h
x.
Next, the TTP selects η random numbers xk ∈ F∗q, computes g˜k = gxk , and supplies each
owner Ok in the supply chain with the secret key skk = xk, and the corresponding (Elgamal)
public key pkk = (g, g˜k).
4.4.3.2 Tag Initialization
To initialize a tag T , issuer I picks a pair of random numbers (K0T , ID) ∈ Fq × Fq, computes
the signature S = H(ID)skI , and writes into tag T the state S0T = (K0T , c0T ), where c0T = (1,S).
Finally, issuer I supplies owner O(T,1) with tag T and with T ’s ownership references:
refT = (S, id,Kold,Knew, randold, randnew) = (H(ID)skI , ID,−,K0T ,−, 1)
Without loss of generality, we assume that O(T,1) = O1.
Now, owner O1 updates the state and the ownership references of tag T as follows: he
chooses randomly r1 ∈ Fq and computes an Elgamal encryption of S using his public key
pk1 = (g, g˜1):
c1T = (u
1
T , v
1
T ) = (g
r1 ,S g˜r11 )
Then, he writes into T the state S1T = (K
1
T , c
1
T ), and adds an entry ET for tag T in his
database DB1:
ET = refT = (S, id,Kold,Knew, randold, randnew)
= (H(ID)skI , ID,K0T ,K
1
T , 1, h
r1)
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Figure 4.2: Authentication in ROTIV
4.4.3.3 Authentication Protocol
To authenticate a tag T , the current owner O(T,k) of tag T decrypts the ciphertext c
j
T =
(ujT , v
j
T ) sent by tag T and gets S. Using S, O(T,k) identifies T and starts a MAC-based
mutual authentication. If the mutual authentication succeeds, both owner O(T,k) and tag T
update their keys. Without loss of generality, we assume that O(T,k) = Ok.
1. To start an authentication with tag T , the owner Ok sends a random nonce N
j
T to T as
depicted in Figure 4.2.
Once T receives N jT , it generates a random number R
j
T ∈ Fq. Using its secret key KjT , T
computes: σjT = MACKj
T
(N jT , R
j
T , c
j
T ).
2. T replies with (RjT , c
j
T = (u
j
T , v
j
T ), σ
j
T ).
Upon receiving T ’s reply, the owner O(T,k) decrypts c
j
T using his secret key skk and gets
S = v
j
T
(ujT )
skk
. O(T,k) checks whether S ∈ DBk. If not, O(T,k) aborts the authentication.
Otherwise,O(T,k) retrieves T ’s ownership references refT = (S, id,Kold,Knew, randold, randnew)
in DBk and checks whether:
σjT = MACKnew(N
j
T , R
j
T , c
j
T ) or σ
j
T = MACKold(N
j
T , R
j
T , c
j
T )
If not, O(T,k) aborts the authentication.
If MACKold(N
j
T , R
j
T , c
j
T ) = σ
j
T then K
j
T = K
old, otherwise KjT = K
new.
Then, owner Ok chooses a new random number r
j+1 ∈ F∗q and computes:
cj+1T = (u
j+1
T , v
j+1
T ) = (g
rj+1 ,S g˜krj+1)
σ′jT = MACKj
T
(RjT , c
j+1
T )
Finally, Ok updates the ownership references refT of tag T :
(Kold,Knew) = (KjT , G(K
j
T , N
j
T , R
j
T ))
(randold, randnew) = (hr
j
, hr
j+1
)
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Figure 4.3: Ownership transfer in ROTIV
Where rj and rj+1 are the random numbers used to compute the ciphertext cjT and c
j+1
T
respectively.
3. Finally, owner Ok sends c
j+1
T and σ
′j
T to T .
Once T receives σ′jT and c
j+1
T , it checks if σ
′j
T = MACKj
T
(RjT , c
j+1
T ). If not, T aborts the
authentication. Otherwise, T updates its internal state Sj+1T = (K
j+1
T , c
j+1
T ), where:
Kj+1T = G(K
j
T , N
j
T , R
j
T )
Desynchronization If the last message of the authentication protocol is lost, tag T will
not update its state, and as a result, it will not update its secret key KjT . However, as
owner Ok keeps both keys K
old = KjT and K
new = G(KjT , N
j
T , R
j
T ), owner Ok can always
re-synchronize with T using Kold.
4.4.3.4 Ownership Transfer Protocol
The setup of ownership transfer in ROTIV consists of a current owner O(T,k), a prospective
owner O(T,k+1) and a tag T as shown in Figure 4.3. The ownership transfer consists of: i.)
a mutual authentication between T and O(T,k+1), ii.) an exchange of ownership references
between O(T,k) and O(T,k+1) to perform issuer verification and to allow the authentication of
O(T,k+1).
Without loss of generality, we assume that O(T,k) = Ok and that O(T,k+1) = Ok+1.
The ownership transfer protocol between Ok and Ok+1 for tag T proceeds as detailed
below:
1. The owner Ok+1 sends a nonce N
j
T to tag T .
2. T replies with cjT = (u
j
T , v
j
T ), a random number R
j
T and the MAC σ
j
T .
3. Ok+1 sends N
j
T , R
j
T , c
j
T , σ
j
T to T ’s owner Ok.
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Given N jT , R
j
T , c
j
T and σ
j
T , Ok authenticates T . If the authentication fails, Ok informs
Ok+1. Otherwise, Ok supplies Ok+1 with T ’s ownership references:
refT = (S, id,Kold,Knew, randold, randnew)
= (H(ID)skI , ID,−,KjT ,−, hr
j
)
4. Provided with refT , Ok+1 checks if the equation σ
j
T = MACKj
T
(N jT , R
j
T , c
j
T ) holds. If it
does, this implies that the key KjT provided by Ok corresponds to tag T .
Then, using the public key pkI = h
skI of issuer I, Ok+1 verifies whether tag T was issued
by I:
• First, Ok+1 checks whether e(H(id), pkI) = e(S, h) or not.
• Then, he verifies whether e(ujT , h) = e(g, randnew) or not.
• Finally, he checks if ciphertext cjT encrypts the signature S. This verification is
performed by checking the following equation:
e(S, h) = e(v
j
T , h)
e(g˜k, rand
new)
Note that if cjT is the encryption of S using the public key pkk, then cjT = (ujT , vjT ) =
(gr
j
,S g˜rjk ), and therefore,
e(vjT , h) = e(S g˜r
j
k , h) = e(S, h)e(g˜r
j
k , h)
= e(S, h)e(g˜k , hrj ) = e(S, h)e(g˜k , randnew)
Also if cjT verifies the equations above, then c
j
T encrypts S.
If the issuer verification fails, then Ok+1 aborts the ownership transfer. Otherwise, Ok+1
adds the entry refT into his database DBk+1, and finishes its authentication as follows:
• First, owner Ok+1 chooses a new random number rj+1 ∈ F∗q and computes:
cj+1T = (u
j+1
T , v
j+1
T ) = (g
rj+1 ,S g˜rj+1k+1 )
σ′jT = MACKj
T
(RjT , c
j+1
T )
So, cj+1T is the encryption of S with the public key pkk = (g, g˜k+1) of owner Ok+1.
• Then, Ok+1 sends cj+1T and σ′jT to T , and updates his database DBk+1 as in the
authentication protocol presented above.
• Upon receiving cj+1T and σ′jT , T authenticates Ok+1. If the authentication succeeds T
updates its state accordingly.
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At the end of the ownership transfer, owner Ok+1 queries tag T to check whether T has
updated its state successfully or not. If not, owner Ok+1 engages in mutual authentications
with tag T until the latter updates its internal state.
Remark 4.5. To prevent the old owner Ok of tag T from tracing T later in the future, the
new owner Ok+1 has to run a mutual authentication with T outside the range of Ok right
after the ownership transfer. In this manner, tag T and owner Ok+1 will share a symmetric
key that Ok cannot retrieve without a physical access to the tag.
4.5 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we prove that ROTIV is privacy preserving under the XDH assumption.
4.5.1 Forward Unlinkability
Theorem 4.1. ROTIV ensures forward unlinkability under the XDH assumption.
Proof. Assume that there is an adversaryA(r, s, t, ǫ) who succeeds in the forward unlinkability
game with a non negligible advantage ǫ. We will now construct an adversary B, who uses A
as a subroutine and breaks the DDH assumption in G1 with a non-negligible advantage ǫ
′.
Let ODDH be an oracle that when queried, selects first two random elements x, y ∈ Fq and
flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1, then ODDH sets z = xy; otherwise z is randomly selected
from Fq. Finally, it returns the tuple (g, g
x, gy , gz) ∈ G1.
To break the DDH assumption in G1, adversary B first queries the oracle ODDH to receive
(g, gx, gy, gz) and simulates a complete ROTIV system for A.
• Adversary B selects randomly a random number skI ∈ Fq and computes pkI = hskI .
(skI , pkI) represents the secret and the public keys of issuer I.
• Adversary B picks η random numbers xk ∈ Fq, and assigns to each owner Ok in the
supply chain a public key pkk = (g, g˜k = g
xxk).
Although, owner Ok does not know the secret key skk = xxk that corresponds to the
public key pkk, owner Ok can always authenticate tag T by running a MAC-based
authentication. Also, owner Ok can always transfer the ownership of tags he owns,
since the ownership references do not depends on the secret key skk.
• To issue a tag T , B first selects ID and K0T ∈ Fq, then computes S = H(ID)skI , c0T =
(u0T , v
0
T ) = (1,S). Finally, he stores S0T = (K0T , c0T ) in tag T .
Learning phase. Adversary B simulates challenger C.
• B simulates OTag and gives A two challenge tags T0 and T1.
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• A calls the oracle OExecute for tags T0 and T1. Without loss of generality, we assume
that T0 and T1 are owned by owner Ok and Ol respectively.
After a successful authentication, the ciphertexts cjT0 and c
j
T1
stored into tags T0 and
T1 respectively are updated using the pair (g
y, gz) as follows:
cj+1T0 = (u
j+1
T0
, vj+1T0 ) = (g
yr
j+1
0 ,H(ID0)
skIgzxkr
j+1
0 )
cj+1T1 = (u
j+1
T1
, vj+1T1 ) = (g
yr
j+1
1 ,H(ID1)
skIgzxlr
j+1
1 )
Where rj+10 and r
j+1
1 are randomly selected in Fq.
• B provides A with additional s tags T ′i . The ownership of tags T ′i is transferred to A
who can run mutual authentications with tags T ′i .
Challenge phase.
• In the challenge phase, B picks randomly b ∈ {0, 1} and returns tag Tb from the pair of
tags T0 and T1. Then, he starts a mutual authentication with tag Tb outside the range
of adversary A by sending a nonce N j′Tb .
Without loss of generality, we assume that tag Tb is owned by owner Ok (i.e., b = 0).
• At the end of the authentication, B updates the state of tag Tb as follows:
Sj
′+1
Tb
= (Kj
′+1
Tb
, cj
′+1
Tb
)
Kj
′+1
Tb
= G(Kj
′
Tb
, N j
′
Tb
, Rj
′
Tb
)
cj
′+1
Tb
= (uj
′+1
Tb
, vj
′+1
Tb
) = (gr
j′+1
,H(IDb)
skI g˜r
j′+1
k )
Where Rj
′
Tb
is the nonce generated by tag Tb during the mutual authentication.
• B simulates OFlip and returns tag Tb to adversary A.
The ownership of tag Tb is then transferred to A.
Notice that B can compute correct ownership references for tag Tb:
refTb = (Sb, idb,Koldb ,Knewb , randoldb , randnewb )
= (H(IDb)
skI , IDb,−,Kj
′+1
Tb
,−, hrj
′+1
)
Given that A does not have access to N j′Tb and R
j′
Tb
, Kj
′+1
Tb
= G(Kj
′
Tb
, N j
′
Tb
, Rj
′
Tb
) does not
give A any information about Tb’s past interactions. Consequently, adversary A has to
rely on ciphertext cj
′+1
Tb
to build his attack against ROTIV’s forward unlinkability.
• At the end of the challenge phase, A outputs his guess b′ of bit b.
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If z = xy, then the simulation of ROTIV by adversary B in the learning phase does not
differ from an actual ROTIV system. As a result, adversary A can output a correct guess b′
for bit b with a non-negligible advantage ǫ.
If z 6= xy, then the view of adversary A during the learning phase of the forward unlink-
ability game is independent of b. Therefore, adversary A has only a negligible advantage in
outputting a correct guess b′ for the bit b.
This constructs a statistical distinguisher between the two distributions (g, gx, gy, gxy) and
(g, gx, gy, gz), x, y, z ∈ Fq, which breaks the DDH assumption in G1. In fact, if adversary A
outputs a correct guess b′ for the bit b, then adversary B outputs z = xy; otherwise adversary
B outputs z 6= xy.
Hence, if adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the forward unlinkabil-
ity of ROTIV, then adversary B will also have a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ = ǫ in breaking
the DDH assumption in G1. This leads to a contradiction under the XDH assumption.
4.5.2 Backward Unlinkability
Theorem 4.2. ROTIV ensures backward unlinkability under the XDH assumption.
Proof. Assume that there is an adversary A(r, s, t, ǫ) who succeeds in the backward unlink-
ability game with a non-negligible advantage ǫ. We will now construct an adversary B, who
uses A as a subroutine and breaks the DDH assumption in G1 with a non-negligible advantage
ǫ′.
To break the DDH assumption in G1, adversary B first queries the oracle ODDH to receive
(g, gx, gy, gz) and simulates a complete ROTIV system for A. .
• Adversary B selects randomly a random number skI ∈ Fq and computes pkI = hskI .
(skI , pkI) represents the secret and the public keys of issuer I.
• Adversary B picks η random numbers xk ∈ Fq, and assigns to each owner Ok in the
supply chain a public key pkk = (g, g˜k = g
xxk).
• To issue a tag T , B first selects ID and K0T ∈ Fq, then computes S = H(ID)skI , c0T =
(u0T , v
0
T ) = (1,S). Finally, he stores S0T = (K0T , c0T ) in tag T .
Learning phase. Adversary B simulates challenger C as follows.
• B simulates OTag and gives A two challenge tags T0 and T1.
• The ownership of tags T0 and T1 is transferred to adversary A. A now has full control
over tags T0 and T1.
• B provides A with s tags T ′i whose ownership is transferred to A.
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Challenge phase.
• Adversary A releases the ownership of the challenge tags T0 and T1 by calling the oracle
OTransfer.
• B simulates challenger C by first picking randomly b ∈ {0, 1} and returning tag Tb from
the pair of tags T0 and T1. Then, he starts a mutual authentication with tag Tb outside
the range of adversary A by sending a nonce N j′Tb .
Without loss of generality, we assume that tag Tb is owned by owner Ok.
• At the end of the authentication, B updates the state of tag Tb using the pair (gy, gz)
as follows:
Sj
′+1
Tb
= (Kj
′+1
Tb
, cj
′+1
Tb
)
Kj
′+1
Tb
= G(Kj
′
Tb
, N j
′
Tb
, Rj
′
Tb
)
cj
′+1
Tb
= (uj
′+1
Tb
, vj
′+1
Tb
) = (gyr
j′+1
,H(IDb)
skIgzxkr
j′+1
)
• B simulates OFlip and returns tag Tb to adversary A.
Given that A does not have access to N j′Tb and R
j′
Tb
, it follows thatKj
′+1
Tb
= G(Kj
′
Tb
, N j
′
Tb
,
Rj
′
Tb
) does not give A any information about tag Tb, and adversary A has to build his
attack against the backward unlinkability of ROTIV upon the ciphertext cj
′+1
Tb
.
• At the end of the challenge phase, A outputs his guess b′ of bit b.
Note that if z = xy, then the ciphertext cj
′+1
Tb
is a correct encryption of H(IDb)
skI , i.e.,
Sj
′+1
Tb
is a valid state that corresponds to tag Tb. Hence, the simulation of ROTIV by
adversary B does not differ from an actual ROTIV system, and adversary A can output a
correct guess b′ for bit b with a non-negligible advantage ǫ.
If z 6= xy, then the state Sj′+1Tb does not correspond to tag Tb, and the view of adversary
A during the backward unlinkability game is independent of b. Consequently, adversary A
has only a negligible advantage in outputting a correct guess b′ for the bit b.
This leads to a statistical distinguisher between the two distributions (g, gx, gy , gxy) and
(g, gx, gy, gz), x, y, z ∈ Fq, breaking hereby the DDH assumption in G1. In fact, if adversary
A outputs b′ = b, then adversary B outputs z = xy; otherwise adversary B outputs z 6= xy.
Therefore, if A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the backward unlinkability of
ROTIV, then adversary B will have a non-negligible advantage ǫ = ǫ′ in breaking the DDH
assumption in G1. This contradicts the XDH assumption.
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4.6 Security Analysis
4.6.1 Secure Authentication
Theorem 4.3. ROTIV ensures secure authentication under the resistance to existential
forgery of MAC.
Proof. To simplify the proof, we assume that the key KT shared between a tag T and its
owner is not updated after each successful authentication. As the key update is only required
to achieve privacy and exclusive ownership, it is irrelevant for the authentication proof.
Let OMAC be an oracle that when queried with message m returns σ = MACK(m), where
K ∈ Fq.
We show that if there is an adversary A who breaks the security of ROTIV’s authentica-
tion with a non-negligible advantage ǫ, then we can construct an adversary B that breaks the
resistance to existential forgery of MAC (See Definition 2.10) with a non-negligible advantage
ǫ′.
To break the resistance to existential forgery of MAC, adversary B simulates challenger C
and creates a complete ROTIV system as described in the following.
• B selects randomly x ∈ Fq, and computes hx. Here, x is the secret key skI of issuer I
and hx is the corresponding public key pkI .
• B selects η elements xk ∈ Fq, and provides each owner in ROTIV with the secret key
skk = xk and the matching public key pkk = (g, g˜k = g
xk).
• To initialize the set of n tags in ROTIV, adversary B proceeds as follows:
– B selects randomly IDi ∈ Fq, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and computes c0Ti = (1,H(IDi)skI ).
Then, B selects randomly KTi ∈ Fq and stores S0Ti = (KTi , c0Ti) into Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤
n− 1. Finally, B computes Ti’s ownership references refTi .
– Then B creates a tag Tn whose secret key is K. Tag Tn stores the state S0Tn = c0Tn .
Learning phase. Adversary B simulates challenger C as depicted below:
• B simulates OTag and returns r tags Ti to adversary A, for which A queries the oracle
OExecute.
Note that if A selects tag Tn at this step of the game, then B simulates both tag Tn
and Tn’s owner O(Tn,k) by querying the oracle OMAC.
• Again, B simulates oracle OTag in order to return r additional tags T ′i to adversary A.
This time, A can read the internal states of tags T ′i . We point out that if adversary A
selects tag Tn at this step, then B stops the authentication game.
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Challenge phase.
• In the challenge phase, adversary A selects a challenge tag Tc by querying the oracle
OTag. If Tc 6= Tn, then B stops the authentication game.
• Otherwise, adversary A queries the oracle OExecute with tag Tc which starts a ROTIV’s
authentication.
1.) If A impersonates O(Tc,k), then A starts the authentication by sending a nonce
N jTc to Tc.
B simulates tag Tc: he generates a random nonce RjTc and queries the oracle OMAC
with message m = (N jTc , R
j
Tc
, cjTc). The oracle OMAC returns σ = MACK(m), and
B sends RjTc , c
j
Tc
and σ to adversary A.
Adversary A replies with (cj+1Tc , σc).
Since adversaryA has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in impersonating owner O(Tc,k),
σc = MACK(mc), where mc = (R
j
Tc
, cj+1Tc ). To break the resistance to existential
forgery of MACK , adversary B outputs (mc, σc).
2.) If A impersonates Tc, then B sends a fresh nonce N jTc to A. Upon receiving N
j
Tc
,
A generates a random number RjTc and sends R
j
Tc
, a ciphertext cjTc and σc to B.
If adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in impersonating tag Tc, then
σc = MACK(N
j
Tc
, RjTc , c
j
Tc
).
Accordingly, to break the existential forgery of MACK , B outputs (mc, σc), where
mc = (N
j
Tc
, RjTc , c
j
Tc
).
Here we quantify the advantage ǫ′ of adversary B. Adversary B succeeds in breaking the
resistance to existential forgery of MAC, if he does not stop the authentication game when
simulating challenger C.
Let E denote the event: B does not stop the authentication game.
Let E1 denote the event: B does not stop the authentication game in the learning phase.
Let E2 denote the event: B does not stop the authentication game in the challenge phase.
Let p denote the probability that A selects tag Tn.
Adversary B does not stop the authentication game in the learning phase, if and only if,
adversary A does not pick tag Tn in the second phase of the learning phase. Consequently,
Pr(E1) = (1− p)r. Further, B does not stop the authentication game in the challenge phase,
if and only if, adversary A selects tag Tn as his challenge tag Tc. Thus, Pr(E2) = p.
It follows that π = Pr(E) = Pr(E1)Pr(E2) = (1− p)rp, and that ǫ′ = πǫ.
Therefore, if adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking ROTIV’s security,
then B will have a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ in breaking the resistance to existential forgery
by making at most 4rs + 1 queries to the oracle OMAC. This leads to a contradiction under
the security of MAC.
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Note that π is maximal when p =
1
r
and πmax =
(
1− 1
r
)r
r
≃ 1
er
.
4.6.2 Exclusive Ownership
Theorem 4.4. ROTIV ensures exclusive ownership under the XDH assumption.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A who succeeds in the exclusive ownership game with a
non-negligible advantage ǫ. We show that there is an adversary B who uses adversary A to
break the DDH assumption in G1 with a non-negligible advantage ǫ
′.
To break the DDH assumption in G1, adversary B proceeds as follows.
First, B simulates challenger C and creates a complete ROTIV system.
• B selects randomly skI ∈ Fq and computes pkI = hskI . Here skI is the secret key of
issuer I and pkI is the corresponding public key.
• B selects randomly η random numbers xk ∈ Fq, and provides each owner Ok in the
supply chain with a pair of matching public and secret keys pkk = (g, g˜k = g
xk) and
skk = xk.
• B creates n tags Ti.
Learning phase. Adversary A enters the learning phase.
• B simulates OTag and supplies A with r tags Ti.
• Adversary A is allowed to run authentication sessions with tags Ti, to acquire their
ownership and to transfer this ownership to owners of his choice.
Challenge phase.
• Adversary B queries the oracle ODDH to receive (g, gx, gy , gz).
• In the challenge phase, B simulates OTag and provides A with a challenge tag Tc.
Without loss of generality, we assume that Tc’s owner is Ok.
Before giving the tag Tc to adversary A, adversary B encrypts Tc’s signature using gx
from the DDH challenge:
cjTc = (u
j
Tc
, vjTc) = (g
xr,H(IDc)
skI (gxr)xk) = (gxr,H(IDc)
skI g˜xrk )
Where r is a random number in Fq.
• A now can read the internal state of tag Tc.
• A selects a challenge owner Oc, and transfers the ownership of tag Tc to Oc.
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If adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the exclusive ownership, then
adversary A will be able to supply Oc during the ownership transfer protocol with correct
ownership references:
refT = (S, id,Kold,Knew, randold, randnew)
Where e(gxr, h) = e(g, randnew), i.e., randnew = hxr.
To break the DDH assumption, adversary B verifies whether e(gz , hr) = e(gy , randnew) =
e(gy , hxr). If so, B outputs z = xy, otherwise, he outputs z 6= xy.
As a result, if adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking exclusive own-
ership, then adversary B will have a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ = ǫ in breaking the DDH
assumption.
4.6.3 Issuer Verification Security
To prove the security of issuer verification in ROTIV, we first show that the short signature
we employ to sign tags’ identifiers is secure (resistant to existential forgery).
Theorem 4.5. The short signature presented in Section 4.4.1.1 is secure in the random
oracle model under the BCDH assumption.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A who breaks the resistance to existential forgery (see
Definition 2.20) of ROTIV’s short signature with a non-negligible advantage ǫ, we show that
there is an adversary B who uses A to break the BCDH assumption, see Definition 2.32, with
a non-negligible advantage ǫ′.
Let OBCDH be an oracle that selects randomly x, y, z ∈ Fq, and returns g, gx, gy , gz ∈ G1,
and h, hx, hy ∈ G2.
To break the BCDH assumption, adversary B simulates 1.) a short signature scheme of
secret key sk = x and public key pk = hx, and 2.) a random oracle H to compute H.
Simulation of the random oracle H. To respond to the queries of the random oracle
H, adversary B keeps a table TH of tuples (mj , rj , coin(mj),H(mj)) as explained below.
On a query H(mi), B replies as follows:
1.) If there is a tuple (mi, ri, coin(mi),H(mi)) that corresponds to mi, then B returns H(mi).
2.) If mi has never been queried before, then adversary B picks a random number ri ∈ Fq,
and flips a random coin coin(mi) ∈ {0, 1} such that: coin(mi) = 1 with probability
p, and it is equal to 0 with probability 1 − p. If coin(mi) = 0, then B answers with
H(mi) = g
ri . Otherwise, he answers with H(mi) = (g
z)ri . Finally, adversary B stores
the tuple (mi, ri, coin(mi),H(mi)) in table TH .
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Learning phase. In the learning phase of the resistance to existential forgery game, ad-
versary B simulates challenger C. We recall that adversary A is allowed to make rs query to
the signature oracle OSign.
On query of a message mi to the oracle OSign, B simulates the random oracle H and gets
the tuple (mi, ri, coin(mi),H(mi)).
• If coin(mi) = 0, then adversary B computes Signsk(mi) = H(mi)x = grix.
• If coin(mi) = 1, then adversary B stops the game as he cannot compute Si = Signsk(mi).
Challenge phase. In the challenge phase, adversary A returns a challenge message mc and
a signature Sc.
Since adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the resistance to exis-
tential forgery of ROTIV’s short signature, it follows that e(Sc, h) = e(H(mc), hx), i.e.,
Sc = H(mc)x.
Now, when receiving the pair (mc,Sc), adversary B queries the random oracle H with mc
and obtains the tuple (mc, rc, coin(mc),H(mc)).
• If coin(mc) = 0, adversary B stops the game.
• If coin(mc) = 1, thenH(mc) = gzrc , and therewith, Sc = gxzrc . Consequently, adversary
B breaks the BCDH assumption by outputting:
e(Sc, hy)
1
rc = e(gxzrc , hy)
1
rc = e(g, h)xyz
Note that adversary B breaks the resistance to existential forgery if he does not stop the
security game.
Let E denote the event: B does not stop the security game.
Let E1 denote the event: B does not stop the security game in the learning phase.
Let E2 denote the event: B does not stop the security game in the challenge phase.
Adversary B does not stop the game in the learning phase, if and only if, for all the rs
queries mi to the oracle OSign, coin(mi) = 0. Therefore, Pr(E1) = (1− p)rs .
Additionally, B does not stop the authentication game in the challenge phase, if and only
if, coin(mc) = 1, and as a result, Pr(E2) = p.
We conclude that: π = Pr(E) = Pr(E1)Pr(E2) = (1− p)rsp, and that ǫ′ = πǫ.
Accordingly, if adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the resistance
to existential forgery, then B will have a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ in breaking the BCDH
assumption.
We indicate that π is maximal when p =
1
rs
and πmax =
(
1− 1
rs
)rs
rs
≃ 1
ers
.
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Theorem 4.6. ROTIV ensures issuer verification security under the resistance to existential
forgery of the short signature.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A who breaks the issuer verification security of ROTIV
with a non-negligible advantage ǫ, we build an adversary B that uses A to break the resistance
to existential forgery of ROTIV’s short signature with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′.
B simulates challenger C for the issuer verification game by creating a complete ROTIV
system.
• B selects η random numbers xk ∈ Fq and computes g˜k = gxk , then assigns to each
owner Ok in the supply chain the matching pair of secret and public keys (skk, pkk) =
(xk, (g, g˜k)).
• B simulates issuer I whose public key is pk = hsk, which is the public key of the challenge
short signature, and initializes n tags Ti: he selects randomly IDi ∈ Fq, then queries the
oracle OSign which returns Si = H(IDi)sk. Provided with Si, adversary B computes the
ownership references of tag Ti.
Learning phase. Adversary A enters the learning phase.
• B simulates OTag and supplies A with r tags Ti. Using the ownership references refTi
of tag Ti, adversary B transfers the ownership of Ti to A.
• Now, A has full control over tag Ti, he can now run authentications with tags Ti and
transfer their ownership.
Challenge phase.
• In the challenge phase, adversary A creates a new tag Tc ( i.e., IDi 6= IDc, where IDc is
Tc’s identifier).
• Adversary B simulates the oracle OOwner and provides A with a challenge owner Oc.
• Adversary A calls the oracle OTransfer to transfer the ownership of tag Tc to Oc.
Since adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the security of issuer
verification, it follows that adversary A will output valid ownership references refTc for tag
Tc:
refTc = (Sc, idc,Koldc ,Knewc , randoldc , randnewc )
This implies that Sc is the signature of idc with secret key sk.
Now to break the resistance to existential forgery of ROTIV’s short signature, adversary
B outputs (idc,Sc).
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Hence, if there is an adversary A who wins the issuer verification game of ROTIV with
a non-negligible advantage ǫ, then there is an adversary B who breaks the resistance to
existential forgery of ROTIV’s short signature with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ = ǫ.
4.7 Related Work
Molnar et al. (117) address the problem of ownership transfer in RFID systems by using
tag pseudonyms and relying on a trusted third party. Here, the TTP is the only entity
than can identify tags. To transfer the ownership of some tag T , its current owner O(T,k)
and its prospective owner O(T,k+1), contact the TTP, which then provides O(T,k+1) with T ’s
identity. Once the ownership transfer of T takes place, the TTP refuses identity requests
from T ’s previous owner O(T,k). Still, relying on a TTP is a drawback: in many scenarios,
the availability of a trusted third party during tag ownership transfer is probably unrealistic.
Other solutions based on symmetric primitives have been proposed by Lim and Kwon
(111), Fouladgar and Afifi (60), Song (149), and Kulseng et al. (101). These schemes however
suffer as discussed in Section 4.2.2 from three major drawbacks: 1.) tag identification and
authentication is linear in the number of tags, 2.) denial of service attacks and 3.) no tag
issuer verification.
Dimitriou (51) proposes a solution to ownership transfer that relies on symmetric cryptog-
raphy while relaxing the privacy requirements for both backward and forward unlinkability.
Unlike previous schemes on ownership transfer, this solution allows an owner of a tag to
revert the tag to its original state. This is useful for after sale services where a retailer can
recognize a sold tag T . Note that ROTIV offers the same feature: the unique identifier of a
tag T enables any owner to verify whether he owned T before or not.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented ROTIV to address the security and the privacy issues related
to RFID ownership transfer in supply chains. As part of ownership transfer, ROTIV offers a
constant-time and privacy-preserving authentication while tags only evaluate a hash function.
It also enables issuer verification that allows every owner in the supply chain to verify the ori-
gin of tags that he owns. ROTIV’s main idea is to 1.) combine a MAC-based authentication
with Elgamal encryption to achieve constant-time and privacy preserving authentication, and
2.) to use a short signature scheme to execute issuer verification. ROTIV is provably secure
and privacy preserving under standard assumptions: MAC security, the BCDH assumption
and the XDH assumption.
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5RFID-based Product Tracking in
Supply Chains
5.1 Introduction
Product tracking is one of the major applications of RFID-enabled supply chains as it allows
genuineness verification and replica prevention of products (56, 83, 118, 151, 160). The idea
is to trace the path that products took in the supply chain by reading their attached RFID
tags. However, the use of RFID tags for genuineness verification comes with new threats to
security and privacy of both tags and partners in the supply chain.
With respect to security, it must be verifiable whether a product is genuine by only
scanning the tag attached to the product. To this end, the supply chain has a set of verifiers
that check the path that tags took in the supply chain, whereas readers along the supply
chain update the states of tags in their vicinity. The main challenge is to enable readers to
update tags’ states while preventing them from injecting fake products.
The second challenge regards the privacy of tags. Typically, partners in the supply chain
do not want to reveal any information about their internal details, strategic relationships and
processes to adversaries, e.g., competitors or customers. Thus, an adversary must not be able
to trace and recognize tags through subsequent steps in the supply chain.
Solutions addressing these security and privacy requirements have to be lightweight to
allow wide deployment. Ideally, they should be suited for the cheapest RFID tags, namely,
storage only tags. Therefore, any cryptographic computation required by the scheme should
be performed by the readers. Moreover, the path verification at the readers should not be
computationally heavy to avoid overloading readers and hindering supply chain performances.
Along these lines, we present in this chapter two protocols called Tracker and Checker
for secure and privacy-preserving RFID-based product tracking in the supply chain. The
main idea behind these two protocols is to encode paths in a supply chain using polynomials
and then employ the path encoding to sign tags’ identifiers. Tracker targets the product
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traceability scenario where the genuineness verification is performed by a trusted party called
manager, whereas Checker addresses the problem of on-site checking by enabling each
reader in the supply chain to act as a non-trusted verifier.
The major contributions of the protocols proposed in this chapter are:
• They allow to determine the exact path that each tag went through in the supply chain.
• They provide provable privacy and security in the random oracle model.
• Contrary to related work such as Ouafi and Vaudenay (127) or Li and Ding (110), our
protocols do not require tags to perform any computation. Instead, they rely on storage
only tags .
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: after presenting the notations that will be
used throughout this chapter in Section 5.2, we introduce formal definitions that capture the
security and the privacy requirements of product tracking in Section 5.3. Then in Section 5.4,
we present Tracker, our first tracking protocol that relies on a trusted party to perform
the path verification for tags in the supply chain. In Section 5.5, we introduce Checker
which implements on-site checking by allowing each reader in the supply chain to verify the
genuineness of products. Then in Section 5.6, we survey some of the previous work on product
tracking. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Notations
A supply chain in this chapter simply denotes series of consecutive steps that a product can
go through. The exact meaning or semantic of such a “step” in the supply chain depends on
the particular application and will not be discussed here, one could imagine a step being a
warehouse, retail store or a manufacturing unit. Each step of the supply chain is equipped
with an RFID reader, and when a product moves to the subsequent step of a supply chain,
an interaction takes place between the product’s RFID tag and the reader associated with
the step. Finally, verifiers want to know whether a product in their vicinity went through a
“correct” sequence of steps in the supply chain or not.
Accordingly, a product tracking system involves the following entities:
5.2.1 Entities
• Tags Ti: Each tag is attached to a product or object. A tag Ti features re-writable
memory representing Ti’s current “state” denoted S
j
Ti
.
• Issuer I: The issuer I prepares tags for deployment. When attaching a tag Ti to a
product, I writes an initial state S0Ti into Ti.
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• Readers Rk: Representing step vk in the supply chain, reader Rk can interact with a
product’s tag Ti in its range. It reads out Ti’s current state S
j
Ti
and writes an updated
state Sj+1Ti into Ti.
• Verifiers Vk: The supply chain has a set of checkpoints pk. Each checkpoint pk is
associated with a verifier Vk. At checkpoint pk, the verifier Vk checks the genuineness of
products that are present in his site. This is carried out by verifying whether a tag Ti
has passed through a valid (“correct”) sequence of steps in the supply chain that leads
to verifier Vk. To this effect, verifier Vk reads out the current state S
j
Ti
of Ti, and based
on a set of νk verification keys KkV = {K1k ,K2k , ...,Kνkk }, verifier Vk decides whether Ti
went through a valid path Pvalidi that leads to Vk or not.
Remark 5.1. Verifiers Vk in a tracking system could either be:
• A single trusted party (i.e., cannot be corrupted by adversaries) called manager M , who
at the end of the supply chain verifies whether tags went through valid paths or not.
This scenario corresponds to product traceability by trusted party, see Section 5.4
• Readers Rk which are potentially malicious. In this scenario, each step vk in the supply
chain is a checkpoint pk. This corresponds to on-site checking protocols, cf. Section
5.5.
5.2.2 Supply Chain
Formally, a supply chain is represented by a digraph G = (V,E) consisting of vertices V and
edges E. Each vertex vk ∈ V is equivalent to one step in the supply chain. A vertex/step
vk in the supply chain is uniquely associated with a reader Rk. Each directed edge e ∈ E,
e := −−→vjvk, from vertex vj to vertex vk, expresses that vk is a possible next step to step vj in
the supply chain. This simply means that according to the organization of the supply chain,
a product might proceed to step vk after being at step vj. If products must not advance
from step vj to vk, then
−−→vjvk /∈ E. Note that a supply chain can include loops and reflexive
edges. Whenever a product in the supply chain proceeds from step vj to step vk, reader Rk
interacts with the product’s tag. The issuer I of the supply chain is represented in G by the
only vertex without incoming edges v0.
A path P is a finite sequence of steps P = {v0, v1, . . . , vl}, where ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1} :
−−−−→vkvk+1 ∈ E, and l is the length of path P. Clearly, paths can have different path lengths.
Whereas a valid path Pvalid is a particular legitimate sequence of steps that products are al-
lowed to take. There may be up to ν multiple different valid paths {Pvalid1 ,Pvalid2 , . . . ,Pvalidν},
in a supply chain.
When a tag T arrives at a checkpoint pk, the verifier Vk associated with this checkpoint
checks for T ’s path validity. While verifier Vk might not know all possible paths in G, we
assume in the following that each verifier Vk knows the valid paths that lead to him.
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Figure 5.1: Simple supply chain, checkpoints are encircled.
Figure 5.1 depicts a sample supply chain, we note that checkpoints pk where verifiers Vk
checks the genuineness of tags/products are encircled. So, after their deployment at issuer
I, tags can either start in steps a or b. Valid paths in Figure 5.1 are, for example, {I, a, d},
{I, a, d, e} or {I, a, c, c, e}.
5.2.3 A Tracking System
Using the above definitions, a complete product tracking system consists of
• a supply chain G = (V,E);
• a set T of n different tags;
• a set of possible states S that can be stored into tags;
• a total of η different readers, η = |V|;
• issuer I;
• a set V of m verifiers (m = 1 or m = η);
• a set of ν valid paths;
• a set of valid states Svalid that can be stored into tags and which are accepted by the
verifiers of the supply chain;
• a function Read : T → S that reads out tag T and returns T ’s current state SjT ;
• a function Write: T × S → S that writes a new state Sj+1T into tag T ;
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• a function Check: S ×V → {0, 1}. Check(SjT , Vk) = 1, if tag T went through some valid
path Pvalidi in the supply chain that leads to verifier Vk, and 0 otherwise.
5.3 Adversary Model
Readers in a tracking system are supposed to read the state stored into tags and update it
accordingly. We assume that readers’ corruption is possible. That is, readers can try tracking
tags in order to spy on other readers, as well as injecting fake products in the supply chain.
Further, we assume that the issuer I is honest and cannot be corrupted by adversaries.
This implies that when tags are initialized at the beginning of the supply chain by I, these
tags will definitely meet the supply chain requirements and quality standards.
As the two protocols proposed in this chapter rely on storage only tags to implement
product tracking, an adversary A against product tracking is not only allowed to eavesdrop
on tags’ communication but to also tamper with tags’ internal states. Adversary A can as
well have access to the communication between tags and readers and know the steps vk that
a tag T is visiting. He can also monitor a step vk in the supply chain by eavesdropping on
tags going into or leaving the step vk.
To capture formally these capabilities in our security and privacy definitions, a challenger
C provides adversary A with access to the following oracles:
• OTag(param): When queried with a parameter param, the oracle OTag randomly selects
a tag T from the n tags T in the supply chain that fulfills the parameter param. Then,
it returns tag T to adversary A. For example:
1. To have access to a tag T which just entered the supply chain (i.e., tag T is at
step v0), A queries the oracle OTag with parameter param = “tag at step v0”.
2. To have access to a tag T whose identifier is ID, A calls the oracle OTag with
parameter param = “tag with identifier ID”. OTag returns a tag with identifier ID
if there is any.
3. To have access to a tag T whose next step in the supply chain is the step vk, A
queries the oracle OTag with parameter param = “tag’s next step is vk”.
• OCheck(T, Vk): On input of tag T and verifier Vk, the oracle OCheck returns the output
of Check(SjT , Vk).
• OStep(T ): On input of tag T , the oracle OStep(T ) returns the next step of tag T in the
supply chain to adversary A.
• OFlip(T0, T1): On input of two tags T0 and T1, the oracle OFlip flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1}
and returns tag Tb to adversary A.
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• OCorruptR(Rk): On input of reader Rk, the oracle OCorruptR returns the secret information
Seck associated with reader Rk to adversary A. We say that adversary A controls the
step vk associated with reader Rk.
Note that whenever adversary A is given access to a tag T , A is allowed to read from T by
calling the function Read and to write into T through the function Write.
By having access to these oracles, an adversary A is able 1.) to corrupt readers, 2.) to
have an arbitrary access to tags, and 3.) to monitor readers in the supply chain.
5.3.1 Security
A secure product tracking protocol has to fulfill the following two properties:
5.3.1.1 Completeness
Completeness ensures that when a tag T stores a state SjT ∈ Svalid, it follows that there is a
verifier Vk in the supply chain that will accept tag T , i.e., Check(S
j
T , Vk) = 1.
Definition 5.1 (Completeness). A product tracking protocol is said to be complete iff, for any
tag T storing a valid state SjT ∈ Svalid, there exists a verifier Vk ∈ V such that Check(SjT , Vk) =
1.
Denial of service through malicious writing. We remind the reader that in this chapter
we target storage only tags that cannot implement any reader authentication mechanisms.
As a result, an adversary A might write any content into tags at any time to spoil their
genuineness verification in the supply chain. That is, even if a tag has been through a valid
path Pvalidi in the supply chain, the adversary might still replace and invalidate the state
of the tag leading the Check function to output “0”. This corresponds to a denial of service
attack.
Still, we believe that the scope of such attacks is limited, since only partners in the supply
chain can access a large number of tags. While it is reasonable to assume that these partners
may try to learn sensitive information about other partners through the tags they scan, it is
highly unlikely that they will invalidate the content of tags that are present in their sites.
5.3.1.2 Soundness
Soundness ensures that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary A to forge a valid
state for a tag T that did not go through a valid path in the supply chain. This corresponds
to the soundness property of the Check function. Using the notations presented in Section
5.2, this goal is stated as follows: if the Check function computed by some verifier Vk in the
supply chain using the internal state SjT of some tag T returns 1, then this implies that tag
T must have gone through some valid Pvalidi in the supply chain that leads to verifier Vk.
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Algorithm 5.3.1: Learning phase of the soundness game
for i := 1 to r do
Seci ← OCorruptR(Ri);
for i := 1 to ρ do
IterateSupplyChain;
for j := 1 to s do
T(i,j) ← OTag(param(i,j)) ;
SiT(i,j) :=Read(T(i,j));
Write(T(i,j), S
′i
T(i,j)
);
bT(i,j) ← OCheck(T(i,j), VT(i,j));
Algorithm 5.3.2: Challenge phase of the soundness game
Tc ← A;
for i := 1 to m do
b(i,Tc) ← OCheck(Tc, Vi);
It is important to note however that when we say that a tag went through the valid path
Pvalidi = −−−−−→v0v1...vl, this means that the tag was issued by I and that its state has been updated
correctly using the secrets of readers R1, R2, ..., Rl in that order. It does not mean that the
tag went actually through the steps composing the path Pvalidi . If we imagine a scenario
where an adversary A knows all the readers’ secrets, adversary A can update the state of
any tag in the supply chain and make it look as if it went through a step vk ∈ {v1, v2, ..., vη}
without the tag leaving the range of adversary A.
Consequently, we say that a tracking protocol is sound, if and only if, a verifier Vk in the
supply chain accepts a tag T only when the state of tag T has been updated correctly using
the secrets of readers in some valid path leading to verifier Vk in an orderly fashion.
Now we formalize the soundness property of tracking schemes using a security game as
depicted in Algorithm 5.3.1 and Algorithm 5.3.2.
In this game, an adversary A runs in two phases. First in the learning phase, adversary
A can corrupt r readers of his choice by calling the oracle OCorruptR. Then, adversary A
is allowed to iterate the supply chain ρ times by calling the function IterateSupplyChain.
Whenever called, the function IterateSupplyChain advances the tags in the supply chain to
their next step. Now per iteration, A gets access to a set of s tags T(i,j) through the oracle
OTag, he can then read-out and re-write their internal states with some arbitrary data. Also,
adversary A has access to the oracle OCheck which whenever queried with a tag T(i,j), returns
the output of the Check function.
Finally in the challenge phase, adversary A selects a challenge tag Tc that he returns to
the challenger C, who then gives Tc to the oracle OCheck. The oracle OCheck outputs a set of
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m bits b(i,Tc) such that b(i,Tc) = Check(STc , Vi).
A is said to win the soundness game if and only if, i.) ∃ a verifier Vi such that Check(STc ,
Vi) = 1, i.e., there is a valid path Pvalidi that leads to verifier Vi and that corresponds to Tc’s
state; ii.) ∃ vk ∈ Pvalidi such that the reader Rk associated with step vk was not corrupted
by A; iii.) and finally, Tc did not go through step vk.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the soundness game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− |Svalid||S|
Definition 5.2 (Soundness). A product tracking protocol is said to be sound iff, for any
adversary A(r, s, ρ, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the soundness game is negligible.
The adversary A captured by the definition above is a strong adversary in the sense of
(159). He can access tags arbitrarily and tamper with their states. He is also allowed to
access the output of the protocol and corrupt readers. In the real world, such an adversary
corresponds to a malicious partner whose goal is to inject fake products into the supply chain.
Remark 5.2. The adversary model above does not capture an adversary hijacking tags and
performing “extra” steps with tags. For example, if the “extra” steps do not change the tags’
state, this will go unnoticed by the verifiers. We claim that these attacks, as well as physical
attacks, e.g., removing one tag from one product and attaching it to another product, cannot
be tackled using cryptographic measures especially when using storage only tags.
Cloning. As we assume cheap re-writable tags without any computational abilities, no
tag/reader authentication is possible on the tag side. Any adversary can read from and write
into a tag. Trivially, an adversary might “clone” a tag. This is impossible to prevent in our
setup with storage only tags.
We note however that when the verification of genuineness is performed by a single trusted
party (managerM in Section 5.4), the cloning can be easily detected and therewith mitigated
by keeping a database DBM on the manager M . Initially empty, DBM will contain identifiers
of tags that went through a valid path of a supply chain and were checked by manager
M . Each time manager M is required to verify the genuineness of some tag, he first checks
whether this tag’s identifier is already in DBM – to detect cloning. Details about identifiers
and handling of DBM will be given later in Section 5.4.3. As a result, in the presence of
a centralized trusted party, an adversary cannot clone a tag more than once, and cloning
cannot be performed in a large scale.
Yet, when genuineness verification is performed by potentially malicious readers along the
supply chain tag cloning is trickier to address. To tackle tag cloning in this case, we suggest
that each partner Pi in the supply chain keeps a database DBi that contains the identifiers of
tags present at Pi’s site. Then, we divide time into epochs ek (typically, the duration of an
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epoch ek is one day) and partners are required to update their databases at the beginning of
each epoch ek.
Now to detect clones, each pair of partners Pi and Pj invoke a protocol for privacy
preserving set intersection (44, 45) at the beginning of each epoch ek, to check whether
there is an identifier ID that is present in both of their databases. At the end of the privacy
preserving set intersection protocol, both partners obtain a set of identifiers S(i,j) = DBi∩DBj
that represent the clones in their sites. If S(i,j) 6= ∅, then Pi and Pj can discard the clones
and investigate where the clones come from.
5.3.2 Privacy
We say that a tracking protocol is privacy preserving if it ensures tag unlinkability. As
discussed previously, tag unlinkability assures that it is computationally infeasible for an
adversary A to distinguish between tags based on their interactions with readers in the
supply chain or based on their interactions with him. In particular, tag unlinkability ensures
that a reader Rk in the supply chain cannot trace tags once they leave its site (vicinity).
It is important to note that in this chapter we target passive tags that only feature storage
capabilities and thereby cannot perform any computation. Consequently, tags cannot update
their states after an interaction with a reader on their own. Hence, the tag state does not
change in between two protocol executions. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to
provide tag unlinkability against an adversary who tries to link tags in between two subsequent
reader interactions. Thus, as explained in 3.4 and in line with previous work on storage-only
tags, such as Ateniese et al. (3) and Sadeghi et al. (139), we assume that an adversary cannot
permanently access tags or eavesdrop on tags’ communications, and therefore, we conjecture
that there is at least one interaction between a tag and an honest reader in the supply chain
that is unobserved by the adversary.
Similar to Chapter 4, we define tag unlinkability using an indistinguishability-based game
that takes place in two phases.
In the learning phase cf. Algorithm 5.3.3, adversary A(r, s, ρ, ǫ) calls the oracle OCorruptR
to corrupt up to r readers Ri. A is provided then with two challenge tags T0 and T1 that just
entered the supply chain (tags at step v0) from the oracle OTag. Adversary A starts iterating
the supply chain up to ρ times. Before each iteration of the supply chain, adversary A reads
and writes into the tags T0 and T1, then queries the oracle OStep to get their next steps in
the supply chain. Moreover, adversary A can query the oracle OTag to get access to s tags
T(i,j) that he can read from and write into. He can also query the oracle OStep to get T(i,j)’s
next step in the supply chain. Finally, adversary A is allowed to iterate the supply chain and
to read the states of tags T(i,j).
In the challenge phase, cf. Algorithm 5.3.4, adversary A is provided with the next step of
tags T0 and T1, and he is allowed to read and write into T0 and T1 one more time. Next, the
supply chain is iterated first outside the range of adversary A. That is, tags T0 and T1 have
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Algorithm 5.3.3: Learning phase of tag unlinkability
for i := 1 to r do
Seci ← OCorruptR(Ri);
T0 ← OTag(“tag at step ”v0);
T1 ← OTag(“tag at step ”v0);
for i := 0 to ρ− 1 do
vi+1T0 ← OStep(T0);
SiT0 :=Read(T0);
Write(T0, S
′i
T0
);
vi+1T1 ← OStep(T1);
SiT1 :=Read(T1);
Write(T1, S
′i
T1
);
for j = 1 to s do
T(i,j) ← OTag(param(i,j));
vT(i,j) ← OStep(T(i,j));
ST(i,j) :=Read(T(i,j));
Write(T(i,j), S
′
T(i,j)
);
IterateSupplyChain;
for j = 1 to s do
Read(T(i,j));
one interaction with an honest reader outside the range of A. The oracle OFlip then provides
adversary A with tag Tb, b ∈ {0, 1}. Now given the data stored into Tb and the result of the
different readings, adversary A returns a guess b′ for the bit b to challenger C.
Adversary A is said to win the tag unlinkability game if i.) b = b′, ii.) the readers
associated with steps vk+1T0 and v
k′+1
T1
are not corrupted by adversary A.
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the tag unlinkability game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− 1
2
Definition 5.3 (Tag Unlinkability). A product tracking protocol is said to ensure tag un-
linkability, iff for any adversary A(r, s, ρ, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the tag unlinkability
game is negligible.
In a real world scenario, the adversary A against the above game corresponds to a set of
r supply chain partners {P1, P2, ..., Pr} that collude in order to compromise the privacy of
another partner Pi by eavesdropping on and tampering with tags in the supply chain.
Remark 5.3. The adversary A defined above is a narrow adversary according to Vaudenay
(159). That is, A does not have access to the output of the Check function. Note that if we
allow adversary A to access to the output of the Check function, then he can mount a trivial
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Algorithm 5.3.4: Challenge phase of tag unlinkability
vk+1T0 ← OStep(T0);
SkT0 :=Read(T0);
Write(T0, S
′k
T0
);
vk
′+1
T1
← OStep(T1);
Sk
′
T1
:=Read(T1);
Write(T1, S
′k′
T1
);
IterateSupplyChain; // Challenger C iterates the supply chain outside the range of A
Tb ← OFlip{T0,T1};
STb :=Read(Tb);
Output b′;
attack where he writes “dummy data” into some tag T . Now since tag T will not be accepted by
any verifier Vk in the supply chain with an overwhelming probability, i.e., Check(ST , Vk) = 0,
it follows that adversary A can always distinguish T from legitimate tags.
5.4 TRACKER: Product Tracking by a Trusted Party
Here we present our first protocol for product tracking called Tracker. Tracker relies
on a trusted party called manager M to verify the genuineness of tags in the supply chain.
Using the notations of Section 5.2, this means that V = {M}. We recall that genuineness
verification of tags is carried out by verifying the sequence of steps that tags have taken.
Hence, a tag T in Tracker stores a state SjT that encodes the path in the supply chain
that T went through. The underpinning idea of Tracker is to encode different paths in
the supply chain using different polynomials. More precisely, a path P in the supply chain is
represented by the evaluation of unique polynomial QP ∈ Fq[X] in a fixed value x0, offering
thus a compact and efficient encoding of paths.
Now, Tracker relies on the property that for any two different paths P 6= P ′, valid or
not, the equation QP(x0) = QP ′(x0) holds only with negligible probability when q is large
enough and x0 is a generator of F
∗
q. Two different paths will result in two different polynomial
evaluations, and therefore, the state of a tag T at the end of the supply chain can be uniquely
mapped to one single (valid) path.
However, the path representation as introduced above does not prevent path cloning,
i.e., copying the path of a valid tag into a fake tag and then injecting the fake tag in the
supply chain. To tackle this issue, tags in Tracker stores a path signature σP(ID) defined
as σP(ID) = H(ID)
QP (x0) instead of QP(x0), where H is some cryptographic hash function.
The path signature corresponds hence to the tag’s identifier signed by the path encoding. By
construction, valid path signatures prove that tags are issued by a legitimate authority, and
that they went through valid paths in the supply chain.
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Tracker can be structured into three parts: 1.) Issuer I writes an initial state S0T into a
new tag T . 2.) Readers Rk in the supply chain update the path signature stored into tag T by
applying simple arithmetic operations represented by an update function denoted fRk on T ’s
current state SjT . Eventually, this results in the evaluation of the σPvalidi = H(ID)
QPvalidi
(x0).
3.) Finally, manager M checks whether T ’s state SjT matches one of the ν evaluations of
valid polynomials QPvalidi (x0). If so, manager M accepts tag T and identifies the valid path
that tag T has taken.
Privacy and security overview. On the one hand, to protect tag privacy in Tracker,
each tag stores probabilistic elliptic curve Elgamal encryptions of its state ST = (ID,H(ID), σP (
ID)), and readers use homomorphic (re-)encryption techniques to update the path signature
stored in tags without decryption. At the end of the supply chain, the manager M can then
decrypt and verify the validity of the path.
On the other hand, security of Tracker relies on the computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption (cf. Definition 2.27). In fact, we show that if there is an adversary A who is able
to compute a valid encrypted state ST = (ID,H(ID), σPvalidi (ID)), then this adversary will be
able to break the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, see Definition 2.27.
Before the detailed protocol description in Section 5.4.3, we first provide an overview of
Tracker’s polynomial path encoding.
5.4.1 Path Encoding
Tracker’s polynomial path encoding is based on techniques for software fault detection
that were proposed by Noubir et al. (121). The idea is to map each path P in the supply
chain to some polynomial QP ∈ Fq[X], where q is a prime number. To this end, each step
vk, 0 ≤ k ≤ η, in the supply chain is associated with a unique random number ak ∈ Fq.
Now each path in the supply chain is represented by a polynomial in Fq. The polynomial
corresponding to path P = −−−−−−→v0v1 . . . vl is defined as follows:
QP(x) = a0x
l +
l∑
k=1
akx
l−k (5.1)
To have a more compact representation of paths, a path P is encoded as the evaluation of
QP(x) in x0, where x0 is a generator of F
∗
q. We denote φ(P) = QP(x0) the polynomial-based
path encoding of path P.
It is noteworthy that when the coefficient ak ∈ Fq are randomly chosen and q is large
enough, the above path encoding has the desired property that for any two different paths P
and P ′, φ(P) 6= φ(P ′) with an overwhelming probability. In fact, Noubir et al. (121) proved
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the following result.
∀P,P ′ with P 6= P ′, the equation φ(P) = φ(P ′) holds with probability 1
q
.
We also note that for any path P and for any step vk in the supply chain, the following
equation always holds.
φ(
−−→Pvk) = x0φ(P) + ak
5.4.2 Path Signature
Let T be a tag that took path P. We define T ’s path signature as:
σP(ID) = H(ID)
φ(P)
Where ID is T ’s unique identifier and H is a cryptographic hash function. Therefore, the
path signature defined above depends on tags’ ID to prevent an adversary from copying the
path signature of one tag into another one.
Note that σP(ID) is a signature of ID using the secret key φ(P). More precisely, it is an
aggregate signature using the secret coefficients ak of readers Rk in the path P.
5.4.2.1 Reader Computation
A reader that is visited by some tag T , reads T ’s current path signature, updates it, and writes
the updated path signature into T . To eventually achieve the evaluation of path signature
σPl(ID) of path Pl = −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→v0v1 . . . vk−1vkvk+1 . . . vl, the per reader effort is quite low. Assume that
T arrives at reader Rk, i.e., step vk in the supply chain. So far, T went through (sub-)path
Pk−1 = −−−−−−−−→v0v1 . . . vk−1, and stores ID, H(ID), and path signature σPk−1(ID).
To get σPk(ID), reader Rk simply computes its state transition function fRk defined as:
fRk(x, y) := x
x0 + yak
In fact,
fRk(σPk−1(ID),H(ID)) = σPk−1(ID)
x0 H(ID)ak = H(ID)φ(Pk−1)x0 H(ID)ak
= H(ID)x0φ(Pk−1)+ak = H(ID)φ(
−−−−−→
Pk−1vk) = H(ID)φ(Pk) (5.2)
= σPk(ID)
Reader Rk then writes σPk(ID) in tag T .
5.4.2.2 Tag State Decoding
This operation corresponds to the Check function of the Tracker protocol.
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To verify the genuineness of tags in the supply chain managerM stores a list of all possible
valid paths Pvalidi together with their corresponding verification keys Ki = φ(Pvalidi).
Now when manager M reads the state SjT = (ID,H(ID), σP (ID)) of some tag T in the
supply chain that went through a path P, he first computes H(ID) and verifies the second
element of T ’s state. If T passes the verification, manager M checks whether there exists a
verification key Ki ∈ KV that verifies the following equation:
σP(ID) = H(ID)
Ki = H(ID)φ(Pvalidi )
5.4.3 TRACKER
Tracker consists of an initial setup phase, the preparation of new tags entering the supply
chain, reader and tag interaction as part of the supply chain, and finally a path verification
conducted by manager M .
• Setup: A trusted third party (TTP) sets up an elliptic curve Elgamal cryptosystem
and generates the secret key sk and the corresponding public key pk = (g, g˜ = gsk) such
that the order of g is a large prime q, (|q| = 160 bits). Without loss of generality, we
denote G = 〈g〉.
Then, it selects a generator x0 of the finite field Fq, and generates η+1 random numbers
ak ∈ Fq, 0 ≤ k ≤ η.
Through a secure channel, the TTP sends to each reader Rk, representing step vk the
tuple (x0, ak, pk), while providing issuer I with the tuple (x0, a0, pk). Finally, it supplies
manager M with the secret key sk, the generator x0 and the tuples (k, ak).
Now, manager M is informed which reader Rk at step vk knows which ak. As manager
M knows which paths in the supply chain will be valid, he now computes his set of
verification keys KV = {K1,K2, ...,Kν}. Each verification key Ki is computed as the
encoding of a valid path Pvalidi in the supply chain using Equation (5.1). That is,
Ki = φ(Pvalidi)
Finally, manager M stores the pairs (Ki, steps), where steps is the sequence of steps
composing the path Pvalidi . Accordingly, manager M can verify the validity of the path
that a tag took, and if the path is valid he can identify it.
• Tag initialization: For each new tag T entering the supply chain, issuer I draws a
random point ID ∈ E which is T ’s unique identifier. Now, let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a
cryptographic hash function6. H will be viewed in the rest of this section as a random
oracle.
6The hash function H can be computed using the algorithm proposed by Brier et al. (28).
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Provided with the secret coefficient a0, issuer I computes
σv0 = H(ID)
a0
Next, he selects three random numbers r0ID, r
0
H , r
0
σ ∈ Fq to compute the following ci-
phertexts:
c0ID = Encpk(ID) = (u
0
ID, v
0
ID) = (g
r0
ID , IDg˜r
0
ID)
c0H = Encpk(H(ID)) = (u
0
H , v
0
H) = (g
r0H ,H(ID)g˜r
0
H )
c0σ = Encpk(σv0) = (u
0
σ , v
0
σ) = (g
r0σ ,H(ID)a0 g˜r
0
σ )
Finally, he writes the state S0T = (c
0
ID, c
0
H , c
0
σ) into tag T which can now enter the supply
chain.
• Tag state update by readers: Assume a tag T arrives at reader Rk that is as-
sociated with step vk in the supply chain. Reader Rk reads out T ’s current state
SjT = (c
j
ID, c
j
H , c
j
σ). Without loss of generality, we assume that the path that tag T took
so far is P.
Given the ciphertexts cjH = (u
j
H , v
j
H), c
j
σ = (u
j
σ , v
j
σ), generator x0, and ak, reader Rk
computes cj+1σ = (u
j+1
σ , v
j+1
σ ) as follows:
uj+1σ = fRk(u
j
σ , u
j
H) = (u
j
σ)
x0(ujH)
ak
= gx0r
j
σgakr
j
H = gx0r
j
σ+akr
j
H = gr
j+1
σ
vj+1σ = fRk(v
j
σ , v
j
H) = (v
j
σ)
x0(vjH)
ak
=
(
H(ID)φ(P)g˜r
j
σ
)x0 (
H(ID)g˜r
j
H
)ak
= H(ID)x0φ(P)g˜x0r
j
σH(ID)ak g˜akr
j
H
= H(ID)x0φ(P)H(ID)ak g˜x0r
j
σ g˜akr
j
H
= H(ID)(x0φ(P)+ak)g˜x0r
j
σ+akr
j
H
= H(ID)φ(
−−→
Pvk)g˜r
j+1
σ
= σ−−→
Pvk
(ID)g˜r
j+1
σ
To get cj+1ID and c
j+1
H , reader Rk re-encrypts c
j
ID and c
j
H respectively: it picks randomly
two numbers r′ID and r
′
H ∈ Fq and outputs two new ciphertexts cj+1ID = (uj+1ID , vj+1ID ) =
(gr
′
IDujID, g˜
r′
IDvjID) and c
j+1
H = (u
j+1
H , v
j+1
H ) = (g
r′
HujH , g˜
r′
HvjH).
The reader also re-encrypts cj+1σ . It picks randomly r
′
σ ∈ Fq and outputs: c′j+1σ =
(u′j+1σ , v
′j+1
σ ) = (g
r′σuj+1σ , g˜
r′σvj+1σ ). Finally, reader Rk writes the new state S
j+1
T =
(cj+1ID , c
j+1
H , c
′j+1
σ ) into tag T .
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• Path verification by manager M : This operation corresponds to Tracker’s re-
alization of the Check function. Upon reading the state SlT = (c
l
ID, c
l
H , c
l
σ) stored into
tag T , manager M decrypts clID and gets ID ∈ G. Manager M checks first for cloning
by looking up ID in his database DBM . If ID ∈ DBM , then manager M outputs 0 and
rejects tag T .
Otherwise, manager M decrypts clH , gets a point g
′ ∈ E and verifies whether the
equation g′ = H(ID) holds. If it does not, manager M outputs 0 and rejects tag T .
If g′ = H(ID), then manager M decrypts clσ which results in another point σ˜. Given
H(ID), manager M verifies whether there exists Ki ∈ KV such that
σ˜ = H(ID)K
i
= H(ID)φ(Pvalidi )
If it is not the case, manager M outputs 0 and rejects the tag T . Otherwise, manager
M outputs 1 and adds ID to his database DBM .
5.4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we present the main security theorems regarding Tracker.
Theorem 5.1. Tracker is complete.
Proof. We note that if a tag T went through a valid path Pvalidi , then T will store a state
ST = (cID, cH , cσ) such that:
cID = Encpk(ID)
cH = Encpk(H(ID))
cσ = Encpk(σPvalidi (ID)) = Encpk(H(ID)
φ(Pvalidi ))
When manager M decrypts the state ST , he obtains the tuple (ID,H(ID), σPvalidi (ID)).
Now it is clear that for Ki = φ(Pvalidi), the equation H(ID)K
i
= σPvalidi (ID) holds, leading
the check function to output “1”.
Theorem 5.2. Tracker is sound under the CDH assumption in G in the random oracle
model.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A who breaks the security of Tracker with a non-
negligible advantage ǫ, we build an adversary B that uses A as a subroutine to break the
CDH assumption with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′.
Let OCDH be an oracle that selects randomly x, y ∈ Fq, and returns g, gx, gy ∈ G.
Proof overview. If adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the security
of Tracker, then adversary A will be able to output a challenge tag Tc that stores an
encrypted state STc , such that:
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i.) Check(STc ,M) = 1, i.e., there is a valid path Pvalidi that corresponds to Tc’s state;
ii.) ∃ vk ∈ Pvalidi such that step vk is not corrupted by adversary A;
iii.) Tc did not go through step vk.
To break the CDH assumption, adversary B simulates a Tracker system for A where
he creates a step vk in the supply chain such that Seck = (x0, g
x) instead of Seck = (x0, ak).
Without loss of generality, we assume in the rest of the proof that vk = v0 and that
adversary A corrupts all readers in the supply chain.
Now, adversary B must convince adversary A that v0 is associated with secret coefficient
a0 = x that corresponds to g
x received from the oracle OCDH. That is, adversary B has to be
able to compute H(ID)x only by knowing gx. To this end, adversary B simulates a random
oracle H to compute the hash function H.
When H is queried in the learning phase with identifier IDj , B picks a random number rj
and computes H(IDj) = g
rj .
When adversary A queries the random oracle H with the identifier IDc of the challenge tag
Tc, adversary B simulates H by picking a random number rc and computing H(IDc) = gyrc .
In the challenge phase, adversary A returns the challenge tag Tc to B.
As adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in winning the soundness game, it fol-
lows that the challenge tag Tc stores an encrypted valid state that corresponds to the tuple
(IDc,H(IDc), σc) such that σc = H(IDc)
φ(Pvalidi ), while Tc did not go through the step v0.
We assume that tag Tc stores a state STc that corresponds to the valid path Pvalidi =−−−−−→
v0P ′validi , and we denote l the length of path Pvalidi .
By definition, φ(Pvalidi) = a0xl0 + φ(P ′validi) = xxl0 + φ(P ′validi), and given σc and the
encoding φ(P ′validi) of the sub-path P ′validi , adversary B computes:
σc
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
=
H(IDc)
φ(Pvalidi)
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
= H(IDc)
xxl0
H(IDc)
x =
(
σc
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
) 1
xl
0
Adversary B thus has access to H(IDc)x = (gyrc)x = gxyrc , and he can compute (gxyrc)
1
rc =
gxy. This breaks the CDH assumption leading to a contradiction.
Simulation of the random oracle H. To respond to the queries of the random oracle
H, the adversary B keeps a table TH of tuples (IDj , rj , coin(IDj),H(IDj)) as explained below.
On a query H(IDi), adversary B replies as follows:
1. If there is a tuple (IDi, ri, coin(IDi),H(IDi)) that corresponds to IDi, then B returns
H(IDi).
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2. If IDi has never been queried before, then B picks a random number ri ∈ Fq and
flips a random coin coin(IDi) ∈ {0, 1} such that: coin(IDi) = 1 with probability p,
and it equals to 0 with probability 1 − p. If coin(IDi) = 0, then B answers with
H(IDi) = g
ri . Otherwise, he answers with H(IDi) = (g
y)ri . Finally, he stores the tuple
(IDi, ri, coin(IDi),H(IDi)) in table TH .
Construction. First, adversary B queries OCDH to receive g, gx, gy ∈ G. Then, adversary
B simulates the challenger C:
• Adversary B generates a pair of matching Elgamal public and secret keys (sk, pk). Then,
he generates η random coefficients ak.
• Next, he provides each reader Rk in Tracker with the pair Seck = (x0, ak).
• He provides the issuer I with the pair (x0, gx), as if a0 = x.
• Instead of computing the verification keys Ki as the encoding of valid paths in the
supply chain φ(Pvalidi), adversary B computes Ki = gφ(Pvalidi ).
Without loss of generality, a valid path Pvalidi in the supply chain could be represented
as Pvalidi =
−−−−−→
v0P ′validi . Thus, gφ(Pvalidi) = g
xxl0+φ(P
′
validi
)
, where l is the length of path
Pvalidi .
Once Ki are computed for all the valid paths in the supply chain, B provides the pairs
(Ki, steps) to the manager M .
• B simulates the issuer I and creates n tags Tj of Tracker. For each tag Tj , B selects
randomly IDj ∈ G and simulates the random oracleH to get the tuple (IDj , rj , coin(IDj),
H(IDj)).
If coin(IDj) = 1, i.e., H(IDj) = g
yrj , then B cannot compute H(IDj)x = gxyrj as he
does not know both x and y. Consequently, B stops the soundness game.
Otherwise, using rj, adversary B computes H(IDj)x = (gx)rj .
Finally, adversary B encrypts the tuple (IDj ,H(IDj), σv0(IDj)) using the public key pk
of Elgamal cryptosystem. B stores the resulting ciphertexts (c0IDj , c0Hj , c0σj ) into tag Tj .
Learning phase. B then calls adversary A and simulates the challenger C as follows.
• Adversary B simulates the oracle OCorruptR for A. For ease of understanding, we assume
that adversary A corrupts all readers Rk in the supply chain.
• Adversary B simulates readers Rk along the supply chain. Let Tj be a tag which arrives
at step vk. B updates the state of tag Tj using the secret coefficient ak and Elgamal
public key pk.
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• Adversary B simulates the oracle OCheck. Let Tj be a tag that went through some path
P in the supply chain. Tag Tj stores a state STj = (cIDj , cHj , cσj ).
B first decrypts the state of tag Tj and gets a tuple of points (IDj, g′j , σ˜j). He then
looks up IDj in TH to retrieve (IDj, rj , coin(IDj),H(IDj)), verifies whether H(IDj) = g
′
j ,
and finally, checks whether there is a valid path Pvalidi in the supply chain such that
σ˜j = (K
i)rj and Ki = gφ(Pvalidi).
Note. Here, we assume that coin(IDj) = 0 for ease of understanding. Otherwise,
adversary B has to stop the soundness game whenever coin(IDj) = 1, as he cannot
verify the validity of the path that tag Tj took.
Challenge phase. Adversary A outputs a tag Tc.
Since adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the soundness game, it follows that
i.) Check(STc ,M) = 1, and ii.) Tc did not go through step v0.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the state of tag Tc corresponds to the tuple
(IDc,H(IDc), σc), and that Tc’s path signature σc corresponds to path Pvalidi =
−−−−−→
v0P ′validi .
First, B checks whether coin(IDc) = 1 or not.
If coin(IDc) = 0, then B stops the game. Notice that if H(IDc) = grc , B will not be able
to break the CDH assumption.
If coin(IDc) = 1, i.e., H(IDc) = g
yrc , then B continues the game, and computes gxy.
Let l denote the length of path Pvalidi . Accordingly,
φ(Pvalidi) = a0xl0 + φ(P ′validi) = xxl0 + φ(P ′validi)
H(IDc)
xxl0 =
σc
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
=
H(IDc)
φ(Pvalidi )
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
H(IDc)
x =
(
σc
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
) 1
xl0
= (gyrc)x = gxyrc
Provided with the random number rc, adversary B finally computes gxy.
Here we compute the advantage ǫ′ of B. We indicate that without knowing the value of x,
adversary B cannot identify the valid path that the state of the challenge tag Tc encodes. As
a result, B picks randomly a valid path Pvalidi from his set of ν valid paths, and he succeeds
in breaking the CDH assumption only if, 1.) his guess of the valid path that the state of tag
Tc encodes is correct and if 2.) he does not stop the soundness game.
1.) Adversary B makes a correct guess of the valid path that the state of tag Tc encodes with
probability
1
ν
.
2.) Adversary B stops the soundness game in the learning phase, if during the initialization
phase of the n tags in Tracker, there is a tag Tj with identifier IDj such that coin(IDj) =
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1. This event occurs with probability p. Hence, the probability that B does not stop the
soundness game in the learning phase is: (1− p)n.
3.) Adversary B does not stop the game during the challenge phase, if coin(IDc) = 1, which
occurs with probability p.
Let E denote the event: B does not stop the soundness game.
Let E1 denote the event: B does not stop the soundness game in the learning phase,
Pr(E1) = (1− p)n.
Let E2 denote the event: B does not stop the soundness game in the challenge phase,
Pr(E2) = p. Hence,
π = Pr(E) = Pr(E1)Pr(E2)
= p(1− p)n
Now, if adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the security of Tracker,
then adversary B can break the CDH assumption with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ = π
ν
ǫ,
leading to a contradiction.
Note that π is maximal when p =
1
n
and πmax =
(
1− 1
n
)n
n
≃ 1
en
.
5.4.5 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we prove that Tracker ensures tag unlinkability under the DDH assumption
(see Definition 2.29).
Theorem 5.3 (Tag Unlinkability). Tracker ensures tag unlinkability under the DDH as-
sumption.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A whose advantage ǫ in winning the tag unlinkability
game is non-negligible. We below construct a new adversary B that executes A and breaks
the DDH assumption in G = 〈g〉 with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′.
Let ODDH be an oracle that when queried selects two random elements x, y ∈ Fq and flips
a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1, then ODDH sets z = xy; otherwise it randomly selects z from
Fq. Finally, it returns the tuple (g, g
x, gy , gz).
To break the DDH assumption in G, adversary B proceeds as follows:
He queries the oracle ODDH and gets the tuple (g, gx, gy , gz). Then, he simulates challenger
C and creates a supply chain for the Tracker protocol where the public key of Elgamal is
defined as pk = (g, g˜ = gx).
Learning phase. He calls adversary A who enters the learning phase of the tag unlinka-
bility game.
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• Adversary A queries the oracle OCorruptR with the identity of r readers Rk in the supply
chain. B simulates the oracle OCorruptR and returns to adversaryA the secret information
of readers Rk defined as Seck = (x0, ak).
• Simulating the oracle OTag, adversary B supplies adversary A with two challenge tags
T0 and T1 that have just been issued by issuer I (i.e., T0 and T1 have just entered the
supply chain).
• Adversary A iterates the supply chain ρ times. Before each iteration j of the supply
chain:
1.) A reads and writes into tags T0 and T1.
2.) Simulating the oracle OStep, adversary B provides A with the next step of tags T0
and T1.
3.) B simulates the oracles OTag and OStep and supplies A with s tags T(i,j) together
with their next step vT(i,j) in the supply chain.
Challenge phase.
• Adversary B simulates the oracles OStep and provides adversary A with the next steps
of tags T0 and T1. Then, he iterates the supply chain for tags T0 and T1 outside the
range of adversary A, updates the path signature and re-encrypts the states of tags
T0 and T1 according to Tracker. Finally, adversary B simulates the oracle OFlip as
follows.
1.) He first picks randomly b ∈ {0, 1} and returns tag Tb from the pair of tags T0
and T1. We assume that Tb at this point of the game stores the state STb =
(cIDb , cHb , cσb).
2.) He re-encrypts the state STb = (cIDb , cHb , cσb) using (g
y , gz) to obtain a new state
S′Tb = (c
′
IDb
, c′Hb , c
′
σb
):
c′IDb = (u
′
IDb
, v′IDb) = (g
yrIDuIDb , g
zrIDvIDb)
c′Hb = (u
′
Hb
, v′Hb) = (g
yrHuHb , g
zrHvHb)
c′σb = (u
′
σb
, v′σb) = (g
yrσuσb , g
zrσvσb)
• Now, adversary B returns tag Tb to adversary A.
Notice that if z = xy, then the state S′Tb is a correct re-encryption of the state STb , i.e.,
S′Tb is a valid state that corresponds to tag Tb. Consequently, the simulation of Tracker by
adversary B does not differ from an actual Tracker system, and adversary A can output a
correct guess b′ for the value of b with a non-negligible advantage ǫ.
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If z 6= xy, then the state S′Tb does not correspond to tag Tb, and adversary A’s view of
the tag unlinkability game is independent of b. Therefore, adversary A has only a negligible
advantage in outputting a correct guess b′ for the bit b.
This leads to a statistical distinguisher between the two distributions (g, gx, gy , gxy) and
(g, gx, gy, gz), x, y, z ∈ Fq, breaking hereby the DDH assumption in G.
If adversary A outputs b′ = b, then adversary B outputs z = xy; otherwise adversary B
outputs z 6= xy.
In conclusion, if there is an adversary A(r, s, ρ, ǫ) who breaks the tag unlinkability of
Tracker, then there is an adversary B who breaks the DDH assumption in G with a non-
negligible advantage ǫ′ = ǫ.
5.4.6 Evaluation
Tracker can be implemented using today’s available RFID tags. It requires tags to only
store data, i.e, the encrypted ID, the encrypted hash and the encrypted path signature. Con-
sequently, the tag stores three Elgamal ciphertexts cID = (g
rID , IDg˜rID) , cH = (g
rH ,H(ID)g˜rH )
and cσ = (g
rσ , σP (ID)g˜
rσ), which results in an overall storage of 2 · 3 · 160 = 960 bits. Storing
only 1 Kbit of data is feasible for today’s EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF tags, for example Alien
Technology’s Higgs 3 tags (2).
Complexity for readers is also low in Tracker. A reader Rk at step vk is required to
store the pair (x0, ak) ∈ Fq and the public key of Elgamal pk = (g, g˜). So, the total storage
per reader is approximately 80 bytes. Regarding computation, Rk is required to update the
path signature of the tags passing by and to re-encrypt three ciphertexts: this sums up to a
total of eight exponentiations in G. Based on previous research (17), we conjecture this to
be feasible even for lightweight embedded readers.
The manager M is required to maintain two lookup tables. The first table stores the list
of valid paths in the supply chain, while the second corresponds to the managerM ’s database
DBM that contains the identifiers of tags that he has read. Therefore, the storage required in
M is linear in the number of valid paths, and the number of tags in the supply chain O(ν+n).
The path verification on the other hand, requires the managerM to 1.) decrypt three elliptic
curve ciphertexts to get ID, H(ID) and σP(ID). Then, 2.) to parse its database DBM for clone
detection. Finally, if no cloning is detected, 3.) managerM is required to check for each valid
path Pvalidi in the supply chain whether the equation H(ID)K
i
= H(ID)φ(Pvalidi) = σP(ID)
holds or not, which results in performing O(ν) exponentiation in G.
However, we note that the path verification can be optimized to reach a constant time
complexity O(1) by trading off computation load on the manager and the storage on tags.
The main idea is to store into tags the encryption of the tuple (ID,H(ID),H(ID)φ(Pvalidi),
gφ(Pvalidi )). Now, the verification key Ki of the valid path Pvalidi in the supply chain is
defined as Ki = (φ(Pvalidi), gφ(Pvalidi)) ∈ Fq × G. When a tag arrives at manager M , the
latter decrypts the tag’s state and retrieves the tuple (ID, g′, σP (ID), σ˜). Manager M first
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checks for clones using ID. Then, he verifies whether g′ = H(ID) and whether there is an
entry in his set of verification keys that matches σ˜. If so, manager M verifies the path that
the tag took using the path encoding that corresponds to σ˜. The manager thus verifies the
paths of tags in constant time while tags are required to store an encryption of gφ(Pvalidi )
which counts for an additional 320 bits.
5.5 CHECKER: On-site Checking in Supply Chains
Although Tracker allows for efficient, secure and privacy preserving product tracking in
the supply chain, it suffers from two major drawbacks. 1.) It requires a centralized, trusted
party called “manager” to carry out the path verification; otherwise, the manager is able to
inject fake products into the supply chain. 2.) The verification can only be performed once
the tags arrive at the manager, but not before. This limits the wide deployment of such a
solution, especially in a context where partners do not trust each other and demand to be
able to verify product genuineness in real-time “on-site”.
Therefore, we propose in this section another solution for product tracking and hence
genuineness verification called Checker. Checker addresses the problem of on-site checking
by enabling each reader Rk in the supply chain to verify the validity of the path taken by
the tag, instead of a global path verification performed by a trusted party that only takes
place at the end of the supply chain. Using the notations of Section 5.2, this corresponds to
a tracking system, where each step in the supply chain is a checkpoint, and each reader in
the supply chain is a verifier.
Accordingly in Checker, each tag stores an identifier ID along with the path signature
of ID computed using the polynomial path encoding presented in Section 5.4.1. The main
idea behind Checker is to use a combination of polynomial path encoding and mechanisms
of public key signatures to allow readers in the supply chain to verify the path that tags went
through while preventing these same readers from injecting fake products. By verifying the
signature in the tag, each reader thus validates the path taken that far, and by signing the ID
the reader updates the path encoding. To protect tag privacy against readers in the supply
chain, we encrypt tag identifiers and the corresponding path signature using an IND-CCA
(see Definition 2.17) encryption, namely elliptic curve Cramer-Shoup encryption (41).
5.5.1 Overview
In Checker, a tag T going through a valid path Pvalidi stores a randomly encrypted state
SjT = (Enc(ID),Enc(σPvalidi (ID))), such that ID is T ’s identifier and σPvalidi (ID) is the path
signature defined as σPvalidi (ID) = H(ID)
φ(Pvalidi).
At initialization, the issuer I writes into a tag T an initial encrypted state S0T = (Encpk1(ID),
Encpk1(σv0(ID))), where pk1 is the public key of T ’s next step in the supply chain.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that whenever tag T visits a reader Rk, the latter
reads the encrypted state SjT stored into T and decrypts it using its own secret key skk to get
the pair (ID, σP(ID)). Reader Rk uses its set of verification keys KkV = {K1k ,K2k , ...,Kνkk } to
verify whether T went through a valid path leading to Rk or not. After the path verification,
reader Rk computes the function fRk to update the state stored into tag T as depicted in
Equation 5.2. Finally, it encrypts the new state of tag T using the public key of T ’s next
step.
Privacy and security overview. To protect the privacy of tags against readers in the
supply chain, tags store an IND-CCA secure encryption of their states. As Checker takes
place in subgroups of elliptic curves that support bilinear pairings, we note that any IND-
CCA secure scheme that takes place in DDH-hard groups 7 can be used to encrypt the tag
state. For ease of presentation, we use Cramer-Shoup’s scheme (CS for short) (41) as the
underlying encryption. Also, readers in the supply chain do not share the same CS pair of
keys, instead each reader Rk is equipped with a matching pair of CS public and secret keys
(skk, pkk).
Similar to Tracker, security is ensured by storing in tags a signature of their identifiers
using the polynomial-based encoding of the path they took so far in the supply chain. The
difference between Checker and Tracker lies in the fact that Checker takes place in
bilinear groups, which enables us to compute the verification key Ki for any valid path
Pvalidi as Ki = hφ(Pvalidi), instead of Ki = φ(Pvalidi). This property allows Checker to offer
readers the possibility to verify product genuineness using relatively short signatures without
jeopardizing the security of the entire supply chain. In fact, we show that without having
access to the polynomial-based encoding of valid paths, an adversary cannot forge a valid
state; otherwise he will be able to break the bilinear computational Diffie-Hellman (BCDH)
assumption (cf. Definition 2.32).
Remark 5.4. We use an IND-CCA cryptosystem to encrypt tags’ states in order to ensure
tag unlinkability against readers which can perform genuineness verification and therewith
decrypt the encrypted states of tags.
5.5.2 CHECKER
Before presenting the details of Checker, we first introduce the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem
that is used to encrypt the tags’ states.
5.5.2.1 Cramer-Shoup Encryption
An elliptic curve Cramer-Shoup encryption consists of the following operations:
7
Checker can take place either in bilinear groups where the XDH assumption holds or in bilinear groups
where the SXDH assumption holds.
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• Setup: The system outputs an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp. Let G1 be a
subgroup of E of a large prime order q (|q| = 160 bits), where DDH is intractable. Let
(g1, g2) be a pair of generators of the group G1.
• Key generation: The secret key is the random tuple sk = (x1, x2, y1, y2, z) ∈ F5q. The
system computes then (c, d, f) = (gx11 g
x2
2 , g
y1
1 g
y2
2 , g
z
1). Let G be a cryptographic hash
function. The public key is pk = (g1, g2, c, d, f,G).
• Encryption: Given a message m ∈ G1, the encryption algorithm chooses r ∈ Fq at
random. Then it computes u1 = g
r
1, u2 = g
r
2, u = mf
r, α = G(u1, u2, u), v = c
rdrα. The
encryption algorithm outputs the ciphertext Encpk(m) = (u1, u2, u, v).
• Decryption: On input of a ciphertext C = (u1, u2, u, v), the decryption algorithm first
computes α = G(u1, u2, u), and tests if v = u
x1+y1α
1 u
x2+y2α
2 . If this condition does not
hold, the decryption algorithm outputs ⊥; otherwise, it outputs Decsk(C) = u
uz1
.
5.5.2.2 Protocol Description
Checker consists of an initial setup phase, the initialization of tags by the issuer, and finally
the path verification and tag state update by the readers.
• Setup: A trusted third party (TTP) outputs (q,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, h,H,G, e), where
G1, GT are subgroups of prime order q, and e : G1 × G2 → GT is an asymmetric
bilinear pairing, cf. Section 2.3.3, Remark 2.5. g1 and g2 are random generators of G1,
while h is a generator of G2. H : {0, 1}∗ → G18 and G : {0, 1}∗ → Fq are secure hash
functions.
The TTP generates η+1 pairs of matching public and secret keys for the Cramer-Shoup
encryption: skk = (x(1,k), x(2,k), y(1,k), y(2,k), zk) ∈ F5q and pkk = (g1, g2, ck, dk, fk, G),
0 ≤ k ≤ η. The TTP generates as well η + 1 random coefficients ak ∈ Fq. Then, it
selects a generator x0 of Fq.
Through a secure channel, the TTP sends to each reader Rk, 1 ≤ k ≤ η, the tuple
(x0, ak, skk, pkk,H) and sends the tuple (x0, a0, sk0, pk0,H) to issuer I.
The TTP computes the verification keys for each reader Rk in the supply chain. Let
Pvalidi be a valid path leading to reader Rk. To obtain the verification key Kik corre-
sponding to path Pvalidi , the TTP computes the path encoding φ(Pvalidi) and outputs
Kik = h
φ(Pvalidi) ∈ G2
Once all the verification keys are computed, the TTP provides each reader Rk with its
set KkV of verification keys.
8The hash function H will be viewed as a random oracle in the rest of this section.
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We assume that the public keys pkk, 0 ≤ k ≤ η, are known to all parties in the system.
• Tag initialization: For each new tag T in the supply chain, I chooses a random iden-
tifier ID ∈ G1. The issuer computes the hash H(ID), and using his secret coefficient a0,
he computes H(ID)a0 . Provided with the public key of T ’s next step, the issuer com-
putes a CS encryption of both ID and σv0(ID) = H(ID)
a0 . Without loss of generality, we
assume that T ’s next step is v1. The public key of step v1 is pk1 = (g1, g2, c1, d1, f1, G).
Issuer I draws two random number rID and rσ in Fq and computes the following cipher-
texts:
c0ID = Encpk1(ID) = (u(1,ID), u(2,ID), uID, vID)
= (grID1 , g
rID
2 , ID f
rID
1 , c
rID
1 d
rIDαID
1 )
αID = G(u(1,ID), u(2,ID), uID)
c0σ = Encpk1(σv0(ID)) = (u(1,σ), u(2,σ), uσ, vσ)
= (grσ1 , g
rσ
2 , σv0(ID) f
rσ
1 , c
rσ
1 d
rσασ
1 )
ασ = G(u(1,σ), u(2,σ), uσ)
Finally, I writes the state S0T = (c
0
ID, c
0
σ) ∈ G81 into tag T . T then enters the supply
chain.
• Path verification by readers: Assume a tag T arrives at steps vk in the supply
chain. The reader Rk associated with step vk reads the state S
j
T = (c
j
ID, c
j
σ) stored in
tag T . Without loss of generality, we assume that T went through path P. Rk using
its secret key skk decrypts the CS ciphertexts c
j
ID and c
j
σ and gets respectively the pair
(ID, σP(ID)).
LetKkV denote the set of verification keysKkV = {K1k ,K2k , ...,Kνkk } = {h
φ(P1validk
)
, h
φ(P2validk
)
,
..., h
φ(P
νk
validk
)} corresponding to the valid paths leading to step vk.
To verify whether tag T went through a valid path or not, Rk computes the hash H(ID)
and checks whether there exists i ∈ {1, 2, ..., νk}, such that:
e(σP(ID), h) = e(H(ID),K
i
k)
= e
(
H(ID), h
φ(Pivalidk
)
)
If so, then this implies that T went through a valid path leading to step vk. Otherwise,
the reader concludes that tag T is illegitimate and rejects it.
• Tag state update by readers: If the verification succeeds, then reader Rk in the
supply chain is required to update the state of tag T . Using the update function fRk ,
the reader computes the new path signature σ−−→
Pvk
(ID) using Equation 5.2
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Without loss of generality, we assume that the tag’s next step is vk+1. The reader Rk
prepares tag T for reader Rk+1 by encrypting the pair (ID, σ−−→Pvk
(ID)) using the public
key pkk+1 = (g1, g2, ck+1, dk+1, fk+1, G) of reader Rk+1. Reader Rk obtains therefore,
two ciphertexts cj+1ID and c
j+1
σ .
Finally, Rk writes the state S
j+1
T = (c
j+1
ID , c
j+1
σ ) into T .
5.5.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 5.4. Checker is complete.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem 5.5. Checker is sound under the BCDH assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A who breaks the security of Checker with a non-
negligible advantage ǫ, we build an adversary B that uses A as a subroutine to break the
BCDH assumption with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′.
Let OBCDH be an oracle that selects randomly x, y, z ∈ Fq, and returns g, gx, gy , gz ∈ G1,
and h, hx, hy ∈ G2.
Proof overview. If A has a non-negligible advantage in breaking the security of Checker,
then A will be able to output a challenge tag Tc that stores a valid encrypted state STc that
fulfills the following:
i.) ∃ Ri such that Check(STc , Ri) = 1, i.e., there is a path Pvalidi that corresponds to Tc’s
state;
ii.) ∃ vk ∈ Pvalidi such that the step vk is not corrupted by A;
iii.) Tc did not go through step vk.
To break BCDH, adversary B simulates a Checker system for A where he provides a step
vk in the supply chain with the tuple (x0, g
x, skk, pkk) instead of the tuple (x0, ak, skk, pkk).
Without loss of generality, we assume in the rest of the proof that vk = v0 and that
adversary A corrupts all readers in the supply chain.
Now, adversary B must convince adversary A that v0 is associated with the secret coeffi-
cient a0 = x that corresponds to the pair (g
x, hx) received from the oracle OBCDH. Accord-
ingly, B has to be able to compute H(ID)x only by knowing (gx, hx). To this effect, adversary
B simulates a random oracle H that computes the hash function H.
When H is queried in the learning phase with identifier IDj , B picks a random number rj
and computes H(IDj) = g
rj .
Before the challenge phase, adversary A queries the random oracle H with an identifier
IDc, where IDc is the identifier of the challenge tag Tc. Simulating H, adversary B picks a
random number rc, computes H(IDc) = g
zrc , and returns H(IDc) to adversary A.
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At the end of the challenge phase, adversary A supplies adversary B with the challenge
tag Tc.
Since adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in winning the soundness game, it
follows that the challenge tag Tc stores an encrypted valid state that corresponds to some
valid path Pvalidi in the supply chain. That is, tag Tc stores the encrypted pair (IDc, σc =
σPvalidi (ID)) while Tc did not go through step v0.
Using σc and Checker’s verification keys, adversary B can identify the path Pvalidi that
corresponds to the state of tag Tc. We assume that Pvalidi =
−−−−−→
v0P ′validi , and we denote l the
length of path Pvalidi .
By definition, φ(Pvalidi) = a0xl0+φ(P ′validi) = xxl0+φ(P ′validi). Given σc and the encoding
φ(P ′validi) of the sub-path P ′validi , B computes:
σc
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
=
H(IDc)
φ(Pvalidi)
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
= H(IDc)
xxl0
H(IDc)
x =
(
σc
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
) 1
xl0
Now adversary B has access to H(IDc)x = (gzrc)x = gxzrc , which he can use to compute
(gxzrc)
1
rc = gxz, and finally e(gxz , hy) = e(g, h)xyz , breaking thus the BCDH assumption.
Simulation of the random oracle H. To respond to the queries of the random oracle
H, adversary B keeps a table TH of tuples (IDj, rj , coin(IDj),H(IDj)) as explained below.
On a query H(IDi), B replies as follows:
1.) If there is a tuple (IDi, ri, coin(IDi),H(IDi)) that corresponds to IDi, then B returns
H(IDi).
2.) If IDi has never been queried before, then adversary B picks a random number ri ∈ Fq,
and flips a random coin coin(IDi) ∈ {0, 1} such that: coin(IDi) = 1 with probability
p, and it is equal to 0 with probability 1 − p. If coin(IDi) = 0, then B answers with
H(IDi) = g
ri . Otherwise, he answers with H(IDi) = (g
z)ri . Finally, adversary B stores
the tuple (IDi, ri, coin(IDi),H(IDi)) in table TH .
Construction. First, adversary B queriesOBCDH to receive g, gx, gy , gz ∈ G1 and h, hx, hy ∈
G2. Then, B simulates the challenger C and creates a complete Checker system.
• Adversary B generates η + 1 pairs of matching CS public and secret keys (skk, pkk).
Then, he generates η random coefficients ak.
• He provides each reader Rk in Checker with the tuple (x0, ak, skk, pkk).
• He provides the issuer I with the tuple (x0, gx, sk0, pk0), as if a0 = x.
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• He computes the verification keys for each reader Rk in the supply chain. With-
out loss of generality, a valid path Pvalidi in the supply chain could be represented
as Pvalidi =
−−−−−→
v0P ′validi . Thus, the corresponding verification key Ki is computed as:
Ki = (hx)x
l
0h
φ(P ′validi
)
= hφ(Pvalidi ), where l is the length of path Pvalidi .
Once the verification keys are computed for all the readers Rk, A provides each reader
Rk with its set KkV of verification keys.
• Adversary B simulates the issuer I and creates n tags Tj for Checker.
He selects randomly IDj ∈ G1, simulates the random oracle H and gets the tuple
(IDj, rj , coin(IDj),H(IDj)).
If coin(IDj) = 1, i.e., H(IDj) = g
zrj , then B cannot compute H(IDj)x = gxzrj as he
does not know both x and z. Consequently, adversary B stops the soundness game.
Otherwise using rj, adversary B computes H(IDj)x = (gx)rj .
Finally, adversary B encrypts both IDj and σv0(IDj) using the public key of Tj ’s next
step. B stores the resulting ciphertexts (c0IDj , c0σj ) into tag Tj.
Learning phase. Adversary B calls adversary A and simulates the learning phase of the
soundness game.
• Adversary B simulates the oracle OCorruptR for A. For ease of understanding, we assume
that A corrupts all readers Rk in the supply chain.
• Adversary B simulates readers Rk along the supply chain. Let Tj be a tag which went
through path P and arrives at step vk.
Adversary B decrypts the state of tag Tj using CS secret key skk of reader Rk and gets
the pair (IDj, σP (IDj)). He verifies the path of tag Tj using KkV . Then B updates the
path of tag Tj using the secret coefficient ak.
Finally, using the public key of Tj ’s next step, B encrypts Tj’s identifier and Tj ’s path
signature.
Challenge phase. Adversary A outputs a tag Tc.
Since adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the soundness game, it follows that
i.) ∃ Ri such that Check(Ri,Tc) = 1, and ii.) Tc did not go through step v0.
We assume without loss of generality that Tc’s state corresponds to the pair (IDc, σc).
• B first checks whether coin(IDc) = 1 or not.
If coin(IDc) = 0, then adversary B stops the game. Notice that if H(IDc) = grc ,
adversary B will not be able to break the BCDH assumption.
If coin(IDc) = 1, i.e., H(IDc) = g
zrc , then adversary B continues the game, and computes
e(g, h)xyz .
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• Using the verification keys, adversary B identifies the path Pvalidi =
−−−−−→
v0P ′validi that
matches Tc’s path signature σc.
Let l denote the length of path Pvalidi . We have:
φ(Pvalidi) = a0xl0 + φ(P ′validi) = xxl0 + φ(P ′validi)
H(IDc)
xxl0 =
σc
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
=
H(IDc)
φ(Pvalidi)
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
H(IDc)
x =
(
σc
H(IDc)
φ(P ′validi
)
) 1
xl0
= (gzrc)x = gxzrc
Provided with the random number rc, B finally computes:
e (H(IDc)
x, hy)
1
rc = (e(g, h)xyzrc)
1
rc = e(g, h)xyz
Here we compute the advantage ǫ′ of adversary B. Notice that adversary B succeeds in
breaking the BCDH assumption if he does not stop the soundness game.
1.) B halts the game, if during the initialization of the n tags in Checker, there is a tag
Tj such that coin(IDj) = 1. This event occurs with probability p. Hence, the probability
that B does not stop the game during the learning phase is: (1− p)n.
2.) B stops the game during the challenge phase, if coin(IDc) = 0. As a result, B does not
stop the game in the challenge phase with probability p.
Let E denote the event: adversary B does not stop the soundness game.
Let E1 denote the event: adversary B does not stop the soundness game in the learning
phase, Pr(E1) = (1− p)n.
Let E2 denote the event: adversary B does not stop the soundness game in the challenge
phase, Pr(E2) = p. Hence,
π = Pr(E) = Pr(E1)Pr(E2)
= p(1− p)n
Now, if adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the security of Checker,
then B can break the BCDH assumption with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ = πǫ, leading to
a contradiction.
Note that π is maximal when p =
1
n
and πmax =
(
1− 1
n
)n
n
≃ 1
en
.
5.5.4 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 5.6. Checker ensures tag unlinkability under the XDH assumption.
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Proof. To prove tag unlinkability, we use the IND-CCA property of Cramer-Shoup encryption
ensured under the XDH assumption, see Definition 2.35.
Assume there is an adversary A who breaks the tag unlinkability of Checker with a non-
negligible advantage ǫ, we show that there is an adversary B that uses A as a subroutine and
breaks the IND-CCA property of Cramer-Shoup encryption with a non-negligible advantage
ǫ′.
Let ODec be the oracle that, on input of a ciphertext c encrypted with public key pk,
outputs the underlying plaintext m.
Let OEnc be the oracle that, provided with two messages m0 and m1 and public key pk,
randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts mb using public key pk, and returns the challenge
ciphertext cb.
Proof overview. The idea of the proof is to build a Checker system such that there is a
step vk in the supply chain that is associated with public key pk, where pk is the challenge
public key from the IND-CCA security game.
In the learning phase, adversary B is required to simulate reader Rk. This implies that
B has to decrypt the state of tags arriving at step vk. Hence the need to a decryption oracle
and therewith to an IND-CCA secure encryption. Now, whenever a tag T arrives at step
vk, B first calls the decryption oracle for the Cramer-Shoup encryption ODec that returns
the underlying plaintexts, i.e., ID and σP(ID). Then, B verifies the validity of the pair and
updates the state of tag T .
In the challenge phase, adversary A returns the challenge tags T0 and T1 to adversary
B. Adversary B decrypts the state of tags T0 and T1 and gets their identifiers ID0 and ID1
respectively. Then, adversary B queries the encryption oracle OEnc with messages ID0 and
ID1. The encryption oracle OEnc returns the challenge ciphertext cb = Encpk(IDb), b ∈ {0, 1}.
Adversary B iterates the supply chain outside the range of A, and simulates the oracle OFlip
by returning Tb which stores the ciphertext cb along with an encryption of Tb’s path signature.
As B makes a guess to choose the path signature that corresponds to tag Tb, it follows that
the path signature stored into Tb will be correct with probability
1
2
.
If adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the tag unlinkability game,
then he outputs a correct guess for the value of b. If adversary A outputs b = 0, then
this implies that Tb stores an encryption of ID0 and thus cb = Encpk(ID0); otherwise, cb =
Encpk(ID1).
Construction. To break the IND-CCA property of Cramer and Shoup encryption, B pro-
ceeds as follows:
Adversary B creates a supply chain for theChecker protocol and simulates the challenger
C of the tag unlinkability game.
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Learning phase.
• Adversary B calls adversary A who queries the oracle OCorruptR with the identity of r
readers Ri. Adversary B simulates the oracle OCorruptR and assigns to each reader Ri a
tuple (x0, ai, ski, pki) that he returns to adversary A.
• Now, B selects a reader Rk from the set of uncorrupted readers and assigns to reader
Rk the tuple (x0, ak, pkk = pk). Without loss of generality, we assume that step vk in
the supply chain is associated with reader Rk.
• Simulating the oracle OTag, adversary B supplies A with two challenge tags T0 and T1
that have just been issued by issuer I (i.e., just entered the supply chain).
• Adversary A iterates the supply chain ρ times. Before each iteration j of the supply
chain:
1.) Adversary A reads and writes into tags T0 and T1.
2.) Simulating the oracle OStep, adversary B provides adversary A with the next step
of tags T0 and T1.
3.) B simulates the oracles OTag and OStep and supplies A with s tags T(i,j) together
with their next step vT(i,j) in the supply chain. Then A iterates the supply chain
and reads the states stored into tags T(i,j).
• When a tag T in the learning phase arrives at step vk, then adversary B simulates
reader Rk:
1.) Adversary B reads the state stored into tag T and gets two CS ciphertexts cID and
cσ.
2.) He queries the decryption oracle ODec with the ciphertexts cID and cσ. The oracle
ODec returns the corresponding plaintexts ID and σ.
3.) He checks then if the pair (ID, σ) corresponds to a valid path leading to step vk.
4.) Finally, he updates the path signature of T and encrypts both the identifier ID
and the path signature using the public key of T ’s next step.
Challenge phase. Adversary B simulates the oracles OStep and provides adversary A with
the next steps of tags T0 and T1. Then, he iterates the supply chain for tags T0 and T1
outside the range of adversary A.
• Adversary B decrypts the states stored into T0 and T1, and gets ID0 and ID1 respectively.
• B queries the oracle OEnc with messages ID0 and ID1. The encryption oracle OEnc
returns cIDb = Encpk(IDb).
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• B prepares the challenge tag Tb for adversary A:
1.) Adversary B updates the path of tags T0 and T1 and encrypts the path signature
using the public key pk. He obtains two ciphertexts cσ0 and cσ1 .
2.) He randomly selects b′ ∈ {0, 1} and stores the state STb = (cIDb , cσb′ ) in Tb. There-
fore, Tb’s next step is step vk associated with public key pk.
• Simulating the oracle OFlip, adversary B provides adversary A with the challenge tag
Tb.
Notice that if b = b′, then the state STb = (cIDb , cσb′ ) computed by B when simulating
Checker corresponds to a well formed pair (IDb, σPvalidi (IDb)), and consequently, the simu-
lation of Checker by B does not differ from an actual Checker system. A can accordingly
output a correct guess for the tag corresponding to the challenge tag Tb with a non-negligible
advantage ǫ.
If adversaryA outputs b = 0, this means that Tb stores an encryption of ID0, and adversary
B outputs 0. If A outputs b = 1, then this means that Tb stores an encryption of ID1, and B
outputs 1.
If b 6= b′, then the probability that B breaks the IND-CCA property of CS is at worst a
random guess, i.e.,
1
2
.
Now, we quantify the advantage of adversary B(re, 0, rd, 0, ǫ′) in breaking the IND-CCA
property of CS. We note that re ≤ sρ+ 2ρ+ 2 and rd ≤ sρ+ 2ρ+ 2.
– Let E1 be the event that B breaks the IND-CCA property of CS.
– Let E2 be the event that b = b
′.
Since b′ is selected randomly, the probability that b = b′ is
1
2
. Hence,
Pr(E1) = Pr(E1|E2) · Pr(E2) + Pr(E1|E2) · Pr(E2)
=
1
2
Pr(E1|E2) + 1
2
Pr(E1|E2)
=
1
2
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
+
1
2
Pr(E1|E2)
≥ 1
2
(
1
2
+ ǫ+
1
2
)
=
1
2
+
ǫ
2
Thus, the advantage ǫ′ of adversary B in breaking the IND-CCA property of CS is at
least
ǫ
2
.
We conclude that ifA has a non-negligible advantage ǫ to breakChecker, then B(re, 0, rd,
0, ǫ′) will have a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ to break the IND-CCA property of Cramer and
Shoup encryption, which leads to a contradiction under the XDH assumption.
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5.5.5 Evaluation
A tag in Checker is required to store a pair of IND-CCA encryptions of its identifier ID
and its path signature σPvalidi (ID) = H(ID)
φ(Pvalidi ). Since we use Cramer-Shoup’s scheme as
the underlying encryption, tags are required to store 2 · 4 · 160 = 1280 bits. We emphasize
that any IND-CCA1 secure encryption in DDH-hard subgroups of elliptic curve is sufficient to
implement Checker. One possible choice of encryption scheme is CS-lite (41), a light variant
of CS encryption which is IND-CCA1 secure and costs 480 bits per encryption instead of 640
bits. Also, there is a variant of Elgamal proposed by Fujisaki and Okamoto (62) which is IND-
CCA2 secure in the random oracle model, and whose storage requirements are comparable to
Elgamal’s. We believe that Checker can be implemented in current ISO 18000-3 HF tags,
such as UPM RFID MiniTrack tags (155) that feature 1 Kbit of memory.
Moreover, a reader Rk in the supply chain is required to decrypt the state stored into
tags using its secret key skk, then to verify the validity of the paths that tags went through,
and finally, to update and encrypt the states of tags. This amounts to performing: 1.) two
decryptions in G1 where |G1| = 160 bits, 2.) the computation of νk bilinear pairings in GT ,
where νk is the number of verification keys of reader Rk and |GT | = 1024 bits, 3.) two
exponentiations in G1 to update the path signature, and finally 4.) two encryptions in G1.
The costly operation at reader Rk is the verification of the path signature which is linear in
the number of valid paths leading to reader Rk. As in Tracker, we can further decrease the
computation load at the readers by allowing tags to store a pointer to the verification key
that corresponds to the path that they took in the supply chain.
The idea is that instead of storing the encrypted pair (ID,H(ID)φ(P)), a tag in the supply
chain stores the encrypted tuple (ID,H(ID)φ(P), gφ(P)). Now the verification key Ki of the
valid path Pvalidi is defined as Ki = (gφ(Pvalidi), hφ(Pvalidi )) ∈ G1 ×G2. When tag T arrives at
step vk, reader Rk decrypts the tag’s state and gets a tuple (ID, σP(ID), σ˜). First, Rk checks
whether σ˜ corresponds to a pair in its set of verification keys KkV or not. If so, Rk verifies
the path signature σP(ID). Consequently, the cost of the verification of the path signature
at the readers is constant. We note that a reader in the supply chain is required to perform
an additional table lookup, one decryption, two exponentiations and one encryption in G1,
and to store an additional 160 bits for each valid path in the supply chain that lead to it.
Tags on the other hand have to store three encryptions of size 640 bits each in the case of
Cramer-Shoup, and of size 480 bits in the case of CS-lite.
5.6 Related Work
Ouafi and Vaudenay (127) address counterfeiting of products using cryptographic hash func-
tions on RFID tags. To protect against malicious state updates, tags authenticate readers at
every step in the supply chain. Only if readers are successfully authenticated, tags will up-
date their internal states. Ouafi and Vaudenay (127) require tags to evaluate a cryptographic
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hash function twice: for reader authentication and for the state update. A similar approach
with tags evaluating cryptographic hash functions is proposed by Li and Ding (110). While
such setups using cryptography-enabled tags might lead to a secure and privacy-preserving
solution of the counterfeiting problem, tags will always be more expensive than storage only
tags.
Chawla et al. (39) check for covert channels that leak information about a supply chain’s
internal details. Therefore, tags are frequently synchronized with a backend-database. If a
tag’s state contains “extra” data that is not in the database, the tag is rejected. Also, Shuihua
and Chu (148) detect malicious tampering of a tag’s state in a supply chain using watermarks.
Both of these schemes nonetheless do not protect tag privacy in the supply chain.
Burbridge and Soppera (31) suggest the use of proxy re-signature to allow path segment
verification while using storage only tags. The tag stores a signature of the last trusted party
it has visited. To prevent product injection in the supply chain, partners in the supply chain
do not have secret keys to sign tags’ identifiers, but rather secret proxy keys that only allow
partners to transform a valid signature of one partner to their own signature. This scheme
however does not address the problem of implementing practical proxy re-signatures without
trusted third party. Further, it does not protect the privacy of tags in the supply chain; a
tag always sends its identifier in clear when replying to readers’ queries.
Other solutions exist that rely on physical properties of a “tag”. For example, TAGSYS
produces holographic “tags” that are expensive to clone (151). Verayo produces tags with
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) (160). While these approaches solve product gen-
uineness verification, they do not support the protection of tag privacy.
Our construction based on polynomial path encoding might resemble other (crypto-
graphic) constructions based on, e.g., Rabin fingerprints (134), aggregated messages authen-
tication codes (96) or aggregated signatures (24). However, we stress that our design focuses
on 1.) preserving both the order or sequence of steps in the supply chain and the privacy of
tags, 2.) at the same time putting only minimal computational burden on the verifiers (O(1)
complexity with low overhead), and 3.) being provable. While alternative constructions
might be envisioned, this is far from being straightforward.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented two protocols that are Tracker and Checker to address
security and privacy challenges of product tracking in RFID-enabled supply chains. The
main idea of these protocols is to verify the genuineness of products by verifying the paths
that they took in the supply chain. Accordingly, paths in the supply chain are encoded
using polynomials, then the resulting path encoding is used to sign tags’ identifiers. Readers
representing steps in the supply chain update the path encoding successively by signing tags’
identifiers, while verifiers check the genuineness of products by verifying the signature stored
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in tags. The security of both protocols relies on standard assumptions, namely CDH and
BCDH, whereas the privacy of tags relies on the DDH assumption. Contrary to related
work, our protocols do not require any computational complexity on tags and they can be
implemented in current storage only tags.
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6RFID-based Item Matching in
Supply Chains
6.1 Introduction
One prominent application of RFID technology is the automation of safety inspections when
transporting hazardous goods such as highly reactive chemicals in supply chains. Here, it is
dangerous to place specific reactive chemicals close to each other, because small leaks can
already result in a threat to the life of workers managing these chemicals.
Some recent solutions to enforce safety regulations when storing or transporting chemicals
in supply chains rely on equipping each chemical container with an RFID tag that stores infor-
mation that identifies the chemical in the container as highlighted by EU project CoBIs (40).
Before two tags are placed next to each other, their tags are wirelessly “scanned” using an
RFID reader. Each tag sends its content in cleartext to a server. The server performs chem-
icals’ matching based on a set Ref of matching references that it knows beforehand. Each
matching reference identifies a pair of chemicals that react. Now, when two reactive chemicals
are detected, the server triggers an alarm.
However, the above solution suffers from several shortcomings that may lead to security
and privacy threats. The fact that tags transmit their contents in cleartext allows any ma-
licious entity with proper wireless equipment to learn the content of a container, to infer
information about reactive chemicals, and finally to track their location.
Consequently, RFID-based protocols for tag matching require a careful design that takes
into account both the security and the privacy threats to RFID tags and the consequences
thereof on the security and safety of users managing matched items.
A privacy preserving RFID-based tag matching must assure that tag matching is per-
formed without disclosing the content of tags. That is, the only information revealed after
executing the protocol to readers in the supply chain is a bit b indicating whether the tags
involved in the protocol execution “match” or not. It must also ensure location privacy so as
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to prevent tracking attacks by eavesdroppers. Ideally, an eavesdropper must not be able to
distinguish between tags based on the traces of the matching protocol, in accordance with
previous chapters this requirement will be called hereafter tag unlinkability.
With respect to security, it is mandatory to ensure that a matching protocol is correct
(almost) all the time. Namely, it is required to detect all incompatible items (reactive chem-
icals). This corresponds to the completeness property: the protocol must always trigger an
alarm when two reactive chemicals are put next to each other. Moreover, the protocol has
to be efficient: an alarm is triggered only when necessary. When a match is detected by the
protocol, one can safely derive that the tags involved in the protocol are attached to reactive
chemicals. This second requirement corresponds to the soundness property of the protocol.
Note that solutions to answer the above security and privacy problems are strongly con-
strained by the limitations of RFID environment. While tag privacy against eavesdroppers
can be achieved by using re-encryption techniques, tag privacy against readers is more diffi-
cult to address especially when using cheap RFID storage only tags unable to perform any
computation. Traditional security and privacy solutions based on heavyweight secret match-
ing protocols between two parties , cf. Ateniese et al. (4), Balfanz et al. (9), cannot be
implemented in an RFID setting.
Accordingly, we design T-Match, a new tag matching protocol that involves tags Ti
attached to “containers” (barrels) of chemicals traveling in a supply chain, multiple readers
Rk and a backend server S. T-Match targets storage only tags only featuring storage and
no computational capabilities so as to allow for the deployment of such an application with
a reasonable cost.
Overview: In T-Match, a reader Rk in the supply chain reads out the content of a pair
of tags Ti and Tj , cooperates with backend server S to perform tag matching, and finally
outputs the outcome of the matching while assuring various privacy properties in the face of
curious readers Rk and curious backend server S.
Reader Rk and backend server S are required to evaluate securely a boolean function
Check for any pair of tags Ti and Tj , such that Check outputs b = 1, if Ti and Tj match.
To this effect, each tag Ti in T-Match stores a homomorphic IND-CPA encryption Enc
of its attribute aTi . When two tags Ti and Tj are in the range of reader Rk, reader Rk
reads both tags and retrieves the encryptions Enc(aTi) and Enc(aTj ) of Ti and Tj ’s attributes
respectively. To protect the privacy of tags, reader Rk re-encrypts the ciphertexts stored
into tags Ti and Tj. Now to evaluate the Check function, reader Rk uses the homomorphic
property of Enc to compute an encryption Enc(f(aTi , aTj )) of a function f of Ti and Tj’s
attributes. Then, reader Rk and backend server S engage in a two party protocol for a
modified privacy preserving plaintext equality test (84) to check whether f(aTi , aTj ) ∈ Ref,
where Ref is the set of matching references of backend server S. If so, Check outputs b = 1;
otherwise, Check outputs b = 0.
To summarize, T-Match’s major contributions are:
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• T-Match proposes a novel solution for item matching that targets storage only tags.
A tag Ti in T-Match does not perform any computation, it is only required to store a
state that is updated at every protocol execution by readers Rk.
• T-Match is provably privacy preserving: T-Match relies on techniques of secure two-
party computation to ensure that neither readers Rk nor backend server S can disclose
the content of a tag or learn its attribute.
• T-Match is provably secure: readers Rk raise an alarm only when they interact with
a pair of matching tags.
This chapter is organized as follows: we first introduce the problem statement and T-
Match’s setup in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, we formalize our privacy and security re-
quirements by presenting an adversary model that is suited for RFID-based item matching
applications. Then, we present T-Match in Section 6.4, followed by a security and privacy
analysis in Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 respectively. In Section 6.7, we provide a quick eval-
uation of T-Match, and we survey some of the previous work in Section 6.8. Section 6.9
concludes the chapter.
6.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce T-Match’s problem statement and T-Match’s entities.
6.2.1 Problem Statement
A storage only tag Ti in T-Match stores a state that encodes its attribute aTi . By solely
relying on the states of any pair of tags Ti and Tj, a reader Rk in the supply chain has to
decide whether tags Ti and Tj match or not.
A first solution to tackle this problem could be encrypting the state of tags. When two
tags Ti and Tj are in the range of an authorized reader Rk, reader Rk decrypts the content of
tags Ti and Tj. Finally, based on a set of matching references Ref, reader Rk decides whether
Ti and Tj match or not.
However, the solution above has two limitations: first, if the underlying encryption is
not IND-CPA, tags will be sending the same ciphertexts whenever queried. This enables any
eavesdropper to track tags, and consequently, enables eavesdroppers to violate tag unlinka-
bility. Second, it does not ensure tag privacy against readers Rk. The solution relies on
disclosing the tags’ attributes to readers Rk in the supply chain.
Although, the first limitation can be tackled by using an IND-CPA encryption, the second
limitation is difficult to address, as tags cannot perform any computation.
We recall that our main goal is to enable readers Rk to perform tag matching for any pair
of tags Ti and Tj while preserving the privacy of tags. That is, at the end of the matching
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protocol, a reader Rk only gets the outcome of a boolean function Check which outputs a bit
b = 1 if tags Ti and Tj match, otherwise, it outputs b = 0.
A straightforward solution to address the problem above is to use homomorphic en-
cryption. Homomorphic encryption enables readers Rk to compute the encrypted value
Enc(Check(Ti, Tj)) using the encrypted value Enc(aTi) of attribute aTi stored in tag Ti and
the encrypted value Enc(aTj ) of attribute aTj stored in tag Tj.
However, a limitation of this approach arises when we allow readers to decrypt the ci-
phertext Enc(Check(Ti, Tj)): if a reader Rk is allowed to decrypt Enc(Check(Ti, Tj)), then by
the same means, it can decrypt Enc(aTi) and Enc(aTj ), leading to the potential disclosure of
the tag attributes to readers in the supply chain.
An idea to overcome this limitation consists of preventing readers from decrypting cipher-
texts by themselves. This calls for the use of secret sharing techniques (145). We identify two
methods to implement secret sharing: the first method relies on distributing secret shares to
readers and tags. The idea would be to allow a reader Rk to decrypt only when it reads a
pair of tags Ti and Tj that match. Yet, such a solution requires that tags Ti in the system are
either active and able to perform cryptographic operations, or synchronized by readers. The
second method relies on an additional third-party component that is a backend server S. S
possesses the set Ref of matching references. Readers Rk and backend server S hold secret
shares of some secret key sk that allows backend server S and any reader Rk to evaluate
securely Check(Ti, Tj).
T-Match relies on the second method to implement item matching. That is, in addition
to readers Rk which read and re-encrypt the content of tags, T-Match involves a backend
server S that stores the set Ref of matching references for any pair of attributes that match.
Despite the fact that this approach requires backend server S to be always online with readers
Rk, it remains realistic. We stress that today, even handheld RFID readers can establish
continuous connection with backend server S using wireless technologies such as Bluetooth,
ZigBee, WiFi or even 3G. Furthermore, having a backend server S allows for using techniques
of secure multi-party computation to ensure that at the end of an execution of T-Match,
readers Rk and backend server S learn at most the output of the Check function.
Now to check whether a pair of tags Ti and Tj match, a reader Rk reads first the encrypted
states stored into Ti and Tj , then Rk contacts backend server S in order to securely evaluate
the Check function for Ti and Tj . The Check function has as input the encrypted states of
tags Ti and Tj along with the matching references Ref of backend server S. At the end of a
T-Match’s execution, reader Rk gets the output of the Check function.
6.2.2 T-MATCH’s Setup
T-Match involves the following entities:
• Tags Ti: Each tag is attached to an item (container, barrel, . . .). A tag Ti is equipped
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with a re-writable memory storing Ti’s current “state” denoted S
j
Ti
. The state SjTi
encodes and encrypts an attribute aTi ∈ A, where A is the set of valid attributes in
T-Match. We denote T the set of tags in T-Match, and we assume that |A| = l and
|T | = n.
• Issuer I: The issuer I initializes tags. It chooses an attribute aTi ∈ A, then computes
an initial state S0Ti , and finally writes the state S
0
Ti
into Ti.
• Readers Rk: A reader Rk in the supply chain interacts with tags Ti in its vicinity.
Rk reads the states S
ki
Ti
and S
kj
Tj
stored into tags Ti and Tj respectively by calling the
function Read, and updates the states SkiTi and S
kj
Tj
accordingly. Next, Rk writes the
new states Ski+1Ti and S
kj+1
Tj
into Ti and Tj by calling the function Write. Finally, Rk
engages in a two party protocol with backend server S to compute securely a boolean
function Check. Rk’s input to Check is the states S
ki
Ti
, S
kj
Tj
, and its secret share αRk . If
Check outputs b = 1, then reader Rk raises an alarm meaning that Ti and Tj match.
Otherwise, Ti and Tj do not match and reader Rk does nothing. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the supply chain comprises η readers Rk.
• Backend server S: Backend server S stores a set of ν matching references Ref =
{ref1, ref2, ..., refν}. Backend server S is required to compute a boolean function Check
jointly with reader Rk. Backend server S’s input to the Check function is its set of
matching references Ref and its secret share αS .
6.3 Adversary Models
We recall that in secure multiparty computation protocols, two adversary models are identi-
fied: semi-honest and malicious in compliance with the work of Goldreich (70).
• Semi-honest model : Readers Rk and backend server S are assumed to act according
to the protocol with the exception that each party keeps a record of all its computations.
• Malicious model : An adversary A ∈ {Rk, S} in this model may act arbitrarily.
Adversary A may i.) refuse to participate in the protocol when the protocol is first
invoked. A may as well ii.) substitute its local input: this corresponds for instance to
a reader Rk providing an input that does not match the states of tags it has just read,
or to backend server S submitting a set of bogus matching references as its local input.
A may also iii.) abort the protocol before sending its last message.
In (70), Goldreich established the following result: if trapdoor permutations exist, then
any secure and privacy preserving protocol against semi-honest adversaries can be compiled
into a secure and a privacy preserving protocol against malicious adversaries. The idea is
135
6. RFID-BASED ITEM MATCHING IN SUPPLY CHAINS
to force the parties participating in the protocol to behave in a protocol compliant manner
using namely commitment schemes and zero knowledge proofs.
We point out however that it is infeasible to force readers Rk and backend server S to
behave according to the protocol when interacting with tags in the supply chain, as tags
cannot perform any computation. Yet we believe that in the real world, it is hard for readers
Rk and backend server S to deviate from the protocol arbitrarily without being detected.
Note that it is always feasible to verify whether a reader Rk raises an alarm when it should
or not. Whereas, it is hard to prevent readers Rk and backend server S from keeping records
of their previous protocol executions or from eavesdropping on tags in the system.
Hence, in the sequel of this chapter, we assume that readers Rk and backend server S are
semi-honest, i.e., they behave in compliance with T-Match. We assume as well that issuer
I is honest, meaning that when I initializes some tag, then this tag correctly encodes the
attribute of the item to which it is attached.
Now, to formally capture the capabilities of an adversary A against the security and the
privacy of T-Match, a challenger C provides adversary A with access to the following oracles:
• OTag(param): When queried with a parameter param, the oracle OTag(param) returns a
tag based on the value of the parameter chosen by A. For instance, if param = ai ∈ A,
then OTag returns a tag that encodes attribute ai.
• OCheck(Ti, Tj): When queried with a pair of tags Ti and Tj , the oracle OCheck returns a
bit b = Check(Ti, Tj). If b = 1, then this entails that Ti and Tj store a pair of attributes
that match; otherwise, they do not.
• OFlip(T0,T1): When queried with two tags T0 and T1, OFlip flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}.
If b = 1, then OFlip returns tag T1; otherwise, it returns tag T0.
6.3.1 Security
In the following, we introduce the security requirements of T-Match.
6.3.1.1 Completeness
Completeness ensures that if two tags Ti and Tj store a pair of matching attributes, then
Check(Ti, Tj) outputs b = 1.
Definition 6.1 (Completeness). T-Match is complete ⇔ For any pair of tags (Ti, Tj) that
store a pair of matching attributes, Check(Ti, Tj) = 1.
Denial of service. Similarly to the tracking protocols proposed in Chapter 5, an adversary
A against T-Match can spoil the “completeness” property by writing any content “garbage”
into tags. As discussed previously, RFID protocols that rely on storage only tags are vulner-
able to denial of service attacks, since these tags do not implement any reader authentication
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mechanism. However, if T-Match is used in an application scenario where denial of ser-
vice attacks may result in real physical threats to the supply chain, then the partners in the
supply chain may decide to use more “intelligent” and “expensive” tags that can implement
T-Match on top of a reader authentication protocol. It is clear that there is a trade-off
between tags’ cost and resistance to denial of service, and that is depending on the nature
of the items participating in the matching protocol and the trust level between the partners
of the supply chain, these partners can decide whether to use ”cheap” storage only tags or to
use more “expensive” tags.
6.3.1.2 Soundness
Soundness assures that if the Check function outputs b = 1, then this entails that the tags
Ti and Tj presented to reader Rk encode a pair of attributes aTi and aTj that match with an
overwhelming probability.
We formalize soundness using a game-based definition as depicted in Algorithm 6.3.1 and
Algorithm 6.3.2. In the learning phase, challenger C calls the oracle OTag that supplies A
with r tags Ti. A is allowed to read and write into tags Ti. He can also query the oracle
OCheck with any tag from the set of r tags Ti for a maximum of s times.
Algorithm 6.3.1: Learning phase of the soundness game
for i := 1 to r do
Ti ← OTag(parami);
for j := 1 to s do
SjTi = Read(Ti);
Write(Ti, S
′j
Ti
);
T(i,j) ← OTag(param(i,j));
ST(i,j) = Read(T(i,j));
Write(T(i,j), S
′
T(i,j)
);
b(i,j) ← OCheck(Ti, T(i,j));
Algorithm 6.3.2: Challenge phase of the soundness game
(T0,T1)← A; // A submits tags T0 and T1 to challenger C
b← OCheck(T0,T1);
In the challenge phase, adversary A submits two challenge tags T0 and T1 to challenger
C who queries the oracle OCheck with tags T0 and T1. Finally, the oracle OCheck outputs a bit
b.
Adversary A is said to win the soundness game, if i.) b = 1 and if ii.) T0 and T1 encode
two attributes aT0 and aT1 that do not match.
137
6. RFID-BASED ITEM MATCHING IN SUPPLY CHAINS
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in winning the soundness game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)
Definition 6.2 (Soundness). T-Match is sound, iff for any adversary A(r, s, ǫ), the advan-
tage ǫ in winning the soundness game is negligible.
The definition above captures the capabilities of an active adversary A, who in addition
to being able to read tags, can re-write their internal states. The adversarial goal of A is to
provide a pair of tags T0 and T1 which do not store matching attributes, yet Check(T0,T1)
outputs 1.
6.3.2 Privacy
T-Match is said to be privacy preserving, with respect to tags in the supply chain if the
only information learned by an adversary A after executing T-Match with a pair of tags Ti
and Tj is the output of Check(Ti, Tj). That is, adversary A only learns whether tags Ti and
Tj match or not.
Along these lines, we define first T-Match’s privacy against readers Rk and backend
server S, so as to measure information leakage through reader and backend server interaction.
Second, we define T-Match’s privacy against an outsider adversary A 6∈ {Rk, S} to quantify
information leakage through the wireless channel between tags and readers Rk in the supply
chain.
6.3.2.1 Privacy against Readers and Backend Server
In accordance with previous work on secure two-party computation (70), we define privacy of
T-Match against readers Rk and backend server S in the semi-honest model by considering,
first an ideal model in which both parties communicate their inputs to a TTP that computes
the output of the Check function for reader Rk and backend server S. Then, we consider an
execution of T-Match which evaluates the Check function in the real model without a TTP
as depicted in Figure 6.3.2.1.
T-Match is said to be privacy preserving against readers Rk and backend server S, if for
every semi-honest behavior of one of the parties (reader Rk or backend server S), the joint
view of both parties can be simulated by a computation of the Check function in the ideal
model, where also one party is semi-honest and the other is honest. That is, T-Match does
not leak information about the private inputs of readers Rk and backend server S.
Definition 6.3 (Privacy against reader Rk and backend server S (70)). Let A¯ = (A1,A2)
be an admissible pair representing adversarial behavior by reader Rk and backend server S in
the real model. Such a pair is admissible if at least one party Ai is honest.
138
6.3 Adversary Models
S R
k

S R
k

	


 


Figure 6.1: Computing the Check function in both the ideal model and the real model
• On input pair (X,Y ) (X is Rk’s input and Y is S’s input), let View1 = (X, r,M1, ...,Mp,
Check(X,Y )) denote the view of reader Rk, where r is the outcome of Rk’s internal
randomness, and Mi is the i
th message that Rk has received.
• Let View2 = (Y, r′,M ′1, ...,M ′q ,⊥) denote the view of backend server S, where r′ is the
outcome of S’s internal randomness, and M ′i is the i
th message that S has received.
We denote the joint execution under A¯ in the real model on input pair (X,Y ) RealA¯(X,Y ),
and it is defined as (A1(View1),A2(View2)).
Let B¯ = (B1,B2) be an admissible pair representing adversarial behavior by reader Rk and
backend server S in the ideal model.
We denote the joint execution under B¯ in the ideal model on input pair (X,Y ) IdealB¯(X,Y ),
and it is defined as (B1(X,Check(X,Y )),B2(Y,⊥)).
T-Match is said to be privacy preserving with respect to reader Rk and backend server
S in the semi-honest model, if there is a transformation of pairs of admissible adversaries
A¯ = (A1,A2) in the real model, into pairs of admissible adversaries B¯ = (B1,B2) in the ideal
model, so that the distributions {RealB¯(X,Y )}X,Y and {IdealB¯(X,Y )}X,Y are computationally
indistinguishable.
Remark 6.1. Using the notations of Section 6.2.2, we indicate that:
• the input of X of reader Rk to T-Match is defined as its secret share αRk and the
states SkiTi and S
kj
Ti
of tags Ti and Tj respectively;
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• the input Y of backend server S to T-Match is its set of matching references Ref and
its secret share αS;
• at the end of T-Match’s execution, only reader Rk gets the bit b = Check(Ti, Tj).
Remark 6.2 (Readers and backend server collusion). In the definition above of the privacy
of T-Match against readers Rk and backend server S, it is assumed that at least one party is
honest. This implies that we implicitly assume that readers Rk and backend server S do not
collude against tags participating in the protocol. Notice that if readers Rk and backend server
S collude against tags in T-Match, then tag privacy cannot be ensured. Readers Rk and
backend server S can use their respective secret shares αRk and αS to reveal tags’ attributes
without invoking T-Match.
6.3.2.2 Privacy against Outsiders
Ideally, a privacy preserving protocol for tag matching against an outsider adversary A should
provide tag unlinkability. As discussed in previous chapters, tag unlinkability is the privacy
property that ensures that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary A to tell two tags
Ti and Tj apart.
However, we note that any adversary A who has access to the output of the Check function
can mount a trivial attack against tag unlinkability. In fact, to break tag unlinkability for
a pair of tags (Ti, Tj), all A has to do is to run T-Match, first with a pair of tags (Ti, Tk)
and then with another pair of tag (Tj , Tk). Next, if Check(Ti, Tk) 6= Check(Tj , Tk), then A
concludes that Ti and Tj encode different attributes, and by the same token, he concludes
that Ti and Tj are different tags, breaking hereby tag unlinkability.
Also, as in Chapter 5, it is impossible to ensure tag unlinkability against an adversary
who monitors all of tags’ interactions. We recall that T-Match targets storage only tags
and therewith it relies on readers Rk to update tags’ states, and as a result, a tag’s state does
not change in between two protocol executions. Accordingly, we relax again the definition of
tag unlinkability, by assuming that there is at least one unobserved interaction between tags
and an honest reader Rk outside the range of adversary A.
Now in accordance with previous chapters, we use an indistinguishability based definition
to formalize tag unlinkability.
In the learning phase as depicted in Algorithm 6.3.3, challenger C provides adversary A
with access to the oracle OTag that A can query to get a set of r tags which he can read from
and write into, and for which he can query the oracle OCheck for a maximum of s times.
In the challenge phase, cf. Algorithm 6.3.4, A generates two challenge tags T0 and T1
that he submits to challenger C. These two tags are read outside the range of adversary A,
then they are submitted to the oracle OFlip. Next, the oracle OFlip supplies A with tag Tb,
b ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, A outputs his guess b′ for the value of b.
A is said to win the tag unlinkability game if b = b′.
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Algorithm 6.3.3: Learning phase of the tag unlinkability game
for i := 1 to r do
Ti ← OTag(parami);
for j := 1 to s do
SjTi = Read(Ti);
Write(Ti, S
′j
Ti
);
T(i,j) ← OTag(param(i,j));
ST(i,j) = Read(T(i,j));
Write(T(i,j), S
′
T(i,j)
);
OCheck(Ti, T(i,j));
Algorithm 6.3.4: Challenge phase of the tag unlinkability game
(T0,T1)← A; // A submits T0 and T1 to challenger C
// T0 and T1 are read outside the range of A by some reader Rk in the supply chain
Tb ← OFlip(T0,T1);
Read(Tb);
Output b′;
The advantage ǫ of adversary A in wining the tag unlinkability game is defined as:
ǫ = Pr(A wins)− 1
2
Definition 6.4 (Tag Unlinkability). T-Match is said to ensure tag unlinkability, iff for any
adversary A(r, s, ǫ), the advantage ǫ in winning the tag unlinkability game is negligible.
Roughly speaking, the above definition of tag unlinkability ensures that if a pair of tags
Ti and Tj interact with an honest reader outside the range of a narrow adversary
9 A at least
once, then it is computationally infeasible for adversary A to distinguish between tags Ti and
Tj .
6.4 Protocol
To perform tag matching in T-Match, we store into each tag Ti an IND-CPA homomorphic
encryption Enc(aTi) of its attribute aTi . When reader Rk reads a pair of tags Ti and Tj , it
uses the homomorphic property of Enc to compute an encryption C(i,j) of a function f of Ti
and Tj’s attributes, i.e., C(i,j) = Enc(f(aTi , aTj )).
Now, the matching reference of any pair of attributes (ai, aj) is computed as ref(i,j) =
f(ai, aj). To evaluate the Check function, reader Rk and backend server S rely on a two
9An adversary who does not always access the oracle OCheck (159).
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party privacy preserving plaintext equality test (84) (PET for short) to decide whether C(i,j)
encrypts one of S’s matching references or not.
Although, it may seem that any IND-CPA homomorphic encryption such as Elgamal or
Paillier could suit the privacy and the security requirements of T-Match when readers Rk in
the supply chain and backend server S are semi-honest, not all of them prevent backend server
S from forging new matching references from its initial set Ref. We recall that Elgamal is
multiplicatively homomorphic and thus the function f is going to be expressed as f(ai, aj) =
ψ(ai)ψ(aj) = ref(i,j), where ψ is the attribute encoding in T-Match. We note also that
Paillier is additively homomorphic, and as a consequence: f(ai, aj) = ψ(ai)+ψ(aj) = ref(i,j).
Therefore, neither the use of Elgamal nor Paillier as the underlying encryption technique
can stop backend sever S from forging a new matching reference ref from its set Ref.
To prevent forgery of matching references, we use Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) encryption
(26). In addition to being multiplicatively homomorphic, BGN encryption allows computing
an encryption of a bilinear pairing of two plaintexts from their ciphertexts. Consequently,
a matching reference of two attributes ai and aj in T-Match is computed as: ref(i,j) =
f(ai, aj) = f(aj, ai) = e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)), where ψ is the attribute encoding in T-Match. We
show that in this case, forging a new matching reference ref from Ref is as hard as the bilinear
computational Diffie-Hellman problem, see Appendix A.
Now, we introduce the definitions and the notations that will be used in this chapter.
6.4.1 Tools
T-Match uses the BGN cryptosystem which takes place in subgroups of finite composite
order that support bilinear pairings of type 1, (see Section 2.3.3, Remark 2.5) as in previous
work of Katz et al. (97).
6.4.1.1 Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) Cryptosystem
We now describe Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryptosystem that we employ to encrypt tags’
attributes in T-Match.
• Key generation: On input of a security parameter τ , the system obtains a tuple
(q1, q2,G,GT , e) such that:
1. q1 and q2 are two random primes. Typically, |q1| = |q2| = 512 bits;
2. G is a bilinear group of composite order N = q1q2;
3. e : G×G → GT is a bilinear pairing of type 1.
The system then picks up two random generators g, u ∈ G and sets g˜1 = uq2. Finally,
the system outputs the public key pk = (N,G,GT , e, g, g˜1) and the secret key sk = q1.
• Encryption: The encryption algorithm is defined in both groups G and GT .
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– Encryption in G: On input of a message m ∈ G, the encryption algorithm selects
a random number r ∈ ZN and computes c = EncG(m) = mg˜r1.
– Encryption in GT : On input of a messageM ∈ GT , the encryption algorithm picks
a random number r ∈ ZN and computes C = EncGT (M) =Me(g, g˜1)r.
• Decryption: Decryption in BGN relies on computing discrete logarithm in a finite
group of order N . Thus, decryption takes O(
√
N) steps, and consequently, BGN is
only suitable for encrypting short messages. However, in T-Match we do not decrypt
any ciphertext C. For completeness purposes, we detail below the decryption algorithm
of BGN.
– Decryption in G: On input of a ciphertext c ∈ G and secret key sk = q1, the
decryption algorithm computes: C = cq1 = mq1 g˜rq11 . Since the order of g˜1 is q1, it
follows that C = mq1.
As g is a generator of G, there exists xm ∈ ZN such that: m = gxm . xm is
computed as loggq1 (C) and DecG(c) = gxm = m.
– Decryption in GT : On input of a ciphertext C ∈ GT and secret key sk = q1, the
decryption algorithm computes: C = Cq1 =M q1e(g, g˜1)rq1 = M q1, since the order
of e(g, g˜1) is q1.
As e(g, g) is a generator of GT , then there exists xM ∈ ZN such that: M =
e(g, g)xM . Therefore, C = (e(g, g)q1 )xM and xM is computed as loge(g,g)q1 (C).
Finally, DecGT (C) = e(g, g)
xM =M .
Remark 6.3. The Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption takes place in supersingular curves.
We refer to the work of Boneh et al. (26) for more details on how to construct subgroups
of elliptic curves of order N that support symmetric bilinear pairings.
The BGN cryptosystem is IND-CPA under the subgroup decision assumption.
Definition 6.5 (The Subgroup Decision Assumption (26, 125)). Let G be a group of order
N where N = q1q2 is the product of two primes q1 and q2. The subgroup decision assumption
is said to hold in G, if given a random element u in G, it is computationally hard to decide
whether u is in the subgroup of G of order q1 or not.
Moreover, the following homomorphic properties hold:
∀ m1,m2 ∈ G, EncG(m1)EncG(m2) = EncG(m1m2)
e(EncG(m1),EncG(m2)) = EncGT (e(m1,m2))
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6.4.1.2 Attribute Encoding
Let G be a group of composite order N = q1q2 and e : G×G → GT be a bilinear pairing.
We denote G1 and G2 the subgroups of G of order q1 and q2 respectively.
We also denote GT1 and GT2 the subgroups of GT of order q1 and q2 respectively.
Let g, u be two random generators of G. By construction, g˜1 = u
q2 is a generator of G1
and g˜2 = g
q1 is a generator of G2.
Let xI = q1x
′
I mod N be the issuer’s secret key, where x
′
I is randomly selected in Z
∗
N .
An attribute ai in T-Match is encoded as ψ(ai) = H(ai)
xI , where H : {0, 1}∗ → G is a
cryptographic hash function.
To evaluate H, issuer I can use the algorithm proposed by Icart (81) that hashes into
elliptic curves.
We note that:
∀ai ∈ A, ∃xi ∈ Z∗N such that: ψ(ai) = H(ai)xI = (gxi)xI = gxixI
= gxiq1x
′
I = (gq1)xix
′
I = g˜
xix
′
I
2 ∈ G2,
And it follows that:
∀(ai, aj) ∈ A2, e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)) ∈ GT2
6.4.2 T-MATCH Overview
Here we provide an overview of T-Match that summarizes how the matching protocol works.
Each tag Ti stores a state S
ki
Ti
that consists of a BGN encryption ckiTi = EncG(ψ(aTi)) =
EncG(H(aTi)
xI ) of Ti’s attribute aTi (where H : {0, 1}∗ → GT is a cryptographic hash func-
tion, and xI is the secret key of issuer I), together with a MAC σ
ki
Ti
= MACK(c
ki
Ti
), i.e.,
SkiTi = (c
ki
Ti
, σkiTi). Whereas backend server S stores a set Ref of ν matching references. Each
matching reference ref(i,j) corresponds to two attributes ai and aj in A that match and it is
computed as:
ref(i,j) = f(ai, aj) = f(aj, ai) = e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)) = e(H(ai)
xI ,H(aj)
xI )
When two tags Ti and Tj come together in the range of a reader Rk, reader Rk reads the
current states SkiTi and S
kj
Tj
of tags Ti and Tj ’s respectively. Reader Rk checks first, whether
the keyed MAC stored into tags Ti and Tj are valid or not. If they are, reader Rk computes
the bilinear pairing e(ckiTi , c
kj
Tj
).
C(i,j) = e(c
ki
Ti
, c
kj
Tj
) = e(EncG(ψ(aTi)),EncG(ψ(aTj )))
= EncGT (e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj )))
Next, reader Rk and backend server S engage in a secure two party protocol for plaintext
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equality test (PET) to check whether the underlying plaintext of ciphertext C(i,j) belongs to
the set of matching references Ref of backend server S or not. That is, reader Rk and backend
server S check whether:
∃ refp ∈ Ref, C(i,j) = EncGT (refp)
Now, a reader Rk outputs b = 1 (i.e., Check(Ti, Tj) = 1), if the plaintext equality test outputs
1; otherwise, it outputs b = 0.
Privacy and security overview. To protect the privacy of tags, a tag Ti in T-Match
stores a BGN encryption of its attribute aTi and a keyed MAC of the encryption. In each
protocol execution, the BGN encryption is re-encrypted by readers Rk and the MAC is
computed accordingly. Now, to protect the privacy of tags that participate in the matching
protocol against readers Rk and backend server S, we rely on a modified privacy preserving
plaintext equality test that is run jointly by some reader Rk and backend server S. Moreover,
T-Match uses shuﬄing techniques to ensure that the only information leaked at the end of
the matching protocol is a bit b that indicates whether the pair of tags participating in the
current execution of T-Match match or not.
Furthermore, to prevent backend server S from forging new matching references from the
set Ref, attributes in T-Match are encoded as “signatures” by issuer I, and the matching
references are computed as bilinear pairings. Finally, T-Match relies on a keyed MAC to
prevent adversaries (intruders) from tampering with tags’ content without being detected.
6.4.3 Protocol Description
We now describe in more details how T-Match performs tag matching.
6.4.3.1 System Setup
A trusted third party (TTP) outputs a matching pair of BGN public key pk = (N,G,GT , e, g, g˜1)
and secret key sk = q1, a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → GT , a secret key
xI = q1x
′
I mod N where x
′
I is selected randomly in Z
∗
N , and a MAC key K. The TTP selects
randomly a secret share α1 ∈ ZN , then it sets the second secret share to α2 = sk − α1 =
q1 − α1 mod N .
Next, the TTP computes the set Ref of matching references. On input of attribute ai ∈ A,
TTP computes ψ(ai) = H(ai)
xI ∈ G2. If two attributes ai and aj match, then the TTP
computes the corresponding matching reference ref(i,j) = e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)) = e(ψ(aj), ψ(ai)) ∈
GT2 .
Finally, the TTP supplies
• each reader Rk with its share αRk = α1 of secret key sk and with the MAC key K;
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• backend server S with its share αS = α2 of secret key sk and with the set of matching
references Ref;
• issuer I with the hash function H, secret key xI = q1x′I mod N and the MAC key K.
6.4.3.2 Tag Initialization
For each new tag Ti, issuer I computes ψ(aTi) = H(aTi)
xI , such that aTi is the attribute
associated with the chemical in the container that Ti will label. Then, using the BGN public
key pk, issuer I picks a random number r0i and computes a ciphertext c
0
Ti
= EncG(ψ(aTi)) =
ψ(aTi)g˜
r0i
1 . Finally, issuer I computes σ
0
Ti
= MACK(c
0
Ti
) and stores into tag Ti the state
S0Ti = (c
0
Ti
, σ0Ti).
6.4.3.3 Tag Matching
We break down the tag matching protocol into three operations that describe, first the
interaction between tags Ti, Tj and reader Rk, second the interaction between reader Rk
and backend server S, and third the computation of the output of the Check function by
reader Rk.
Tag Ti ↔ Reader Rk ↔ Tag Tj. Assume there are two tags Ti and Tj in the range of
reader Rk. Tags Ti and Tj store states S
ki
Ti
= (ckiTi , σ
ki
Ti
) and S
kj
Tj
= (c
kj
Tj
, σ
kj
Tj
) respectively.
Reader Rk first reads out the tags Ti and Tj and checks whether σ
ki
Ti
= MACK(c
ki
Ti
) and
σ
kj
Tj
= MACK(c
kj
Tj
) or not. If not, reader Rk updates the states of tags Ti and Tj and aborts
the protocol. Otherwise, it updates the states of tags Ti and Tj and continues the execution
of the protocol.
Now to update the state of tag Ti participating in the protocol, reader Rk proceeds as
follows.
• If σkiTi = MACK(c
ki
Ti
), then reader Rk picks a random numbers r
′
i and re-encrypts the
ciphertexts ckiTi to obtain new BGN ciphertext c
ki+1
Ti
= ckiTi g˜
r′i
1 . Then, it computes σ
ki+1
Ti
=
MACK(c
ki+1
Ti
). Finally, reader Rk writes the new state S
ki+1
Ti
= (cki+1Ti , σ
ki+1
Ti
) into tag
Ti.
• If σkiTi 6= MACK(c
ki
Ti
), then reader Rk picks two random strings (st1, st2) and stores them
into tag Ti.
Reader Rk then computes the BGN ciphertext C(i,j) = e(c
ki
Ti
, c
kj
Tj
) ∈ GT .
Without loss of generality, we assume that ckiTi = EncG(ψ(aTi)) = ψ(aTi)g˜
ri
1 and c
kj
Tj
=
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EncG(ψ(aTj )) = ψ(aTj )g˜
rj
1 , ri, rj ∈ ZN . By bilinearity of e:
C(i,j) = e(c
ki
Ti
, c
kj
Tj
) = e(ψ(aTi)g˜
ri
1 , ψ(aTj )g˜
rj
1 )
= e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj )g˜
rj
1 )e(g˜
ri
1 , ψ(aTj )g˜
rj
1 )
= e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj ))e(ψ(aTi ), g˜
rj
1 )e(g˜
ri
1 , ψ(aTj ))e(g˜
ri
1 , g˜
rj
1 )
We recall that:
• g˜1 = uq2 where u is a generator of G, and that there exist x ∈ ZN such that g˜1 = gx;
• ψ(aTi) and ψ(aTj ) are elements of G2 and that g˜2 = gq1 is a generator of G2. As a result,
there exist xi and xj ∈ Zq2 such that ψ(aTi) = g˜xi2 = gq1xi and ψ(aTj ) = g˜xj2 = gq1xj .
C(i,j) = e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj ))e(g
q1xi , uq2rj)e(uq2ri , gq1xj)e(gxri , g˜
rj
1 )
= e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj ))e(g
xi , urj )q1q2e(uri , gxj )q1q2e(g, g˜1)
xrirj
= e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj )) e(g
xi , urj )N︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
e(uri , gxj )N︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
e(g, g˜1)
xrirj
= e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj ))e(g, g˜1)
R = EncGT (e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj )))
where R = xrirj.
This directly follows from the homomorphic property of BGN as illustrated in Section
6.4.1.1.
Reader Rk ↔ Backend server S. Reader Rk then sends ciphertext C(i,j) to backend
server S.
Without loss of generality, we assume that Ref = {ref1, ref2, ..., refν}, and that for all
refp ∈ Ref, there exist ai and aj in A, such that refp = e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)).
Upon receiving ciphertext C(i,j) from reader Rk, backend server S proceeds as follows:
• It picks ν random numbers rp ∈ Z∗N , and computes ν ciphertexts Cp =
(
C(i,j)
refp
)rp
, for
all p in {1, 2, ..., ν}.
• On input of its secret share α2 and ciphertexts Cp, backend server S computes M ′p =
(M(1,p),M(2,p)) = (Cp, C
α2
p ). Next, backend server S shuﬄes M
′
p.
We note that by shuﬄing messages M ′p, T-Match prevents semi-honest readers Rk
from telling whether two pairs of matching tags satisfy the same matching reference or
not.
• Finally, backend server S sends M ′p to reader Rk.
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The output of the Check function. When receiving M ′p from backend server S, reader
Rk uses its secret share α1 and computes:
Mp = M(1,p)
α1M(2,p) = C
α1
p C
α2
p = C
α1+α2
p = C
q1
p =
((
C(i,j)
refp
)rp)q1
=
((
e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj ))e(g, g˜1)
R
refp
)rp)q1
=
(
e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj ))
refp
)q1rp
e(g, g˜1)
q1Rrp
=
(
e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj ))
refp
)q1rp
Note that if Ti and Tj match then there exists a matching reference refp ∈ Ref such that:
e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj )) = refp. That is:
∃ p ∈ {1, 2, ..., ν} such that: Mp =
(
e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj ))
refp
)q1rp
= 1
Consequently, if there exists p ∈ {1, 2, ..., ν} such that Mp = 1, then reader Rk outputs b = 1
meaning that Ti and Tj match. Otherwise, Rk outputs b = 0, i.e., Ti and Tj do not match.
6.5 Security Analysis
In the following section, we state the security theorems of T-Match.
We recall that backend server S and readers Rk are semi-honest, and that issuer I is
honest.
6.5.1 Completeness
Theorem 6.1. T-Match is complete.
Proof sketch. If two tags Ti and Tj store attributes aTi and aTj that match, then there is
ref ∈ Ref, such that ref = e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj )). Therefore, one of the ν messages Mp computed
by reader Rk will be equal to 1, and reader Rk will output Check(Ti, Tj) = 1.
6.5.2 Soundness
To prove the soundness of T-Match, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1. If rp ∈ Z∗N then: Mp = 1⇔ e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj )) = refp.
Proof. Note that for all ai ∈ A, ψ(ai) ∈ G2, and that g˜2 = gq1 is a generator of G2.
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As a result, for all ai ∈ A,∃ xi ∈ Zq2 such that ψ(ai) = g˜xi2 = gq1xi . Consequently, there
exist xi, xj , xp ∈ Zq2 such that:
e(ψ(aTi), ψ(aTj )) = e(g, g)
q21xixj
refp = e(g, g)
q21xp
Thus, Mp =
(
e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj ))
refp
)q1rp
= e(g, g)q
3
1xrp , where x = xixj − xp mod q2.
If Mp = e(g, g)
q31xrp = 1, then this implies that q31xrp = 0 mod N . Since rp ∈ Z∗N , it
follows that q31x = 0 mod N and x = xixj − xp = 0 mod q2.
We conclude that xixj = xp mod q2 and q
2
1xixj = q
2
1xp mod N , and e(ψ(aTi ), ψ(aTj )) =
refp.
Theorem 6.2. T-Match is sound under the security of MAC and the security of the hash
function H.
Proof sketch. If there is an adversary A who breaks the soundness property of T-Match,
then this implies that adversary A is able to provide reader Rk with a pair of tags T0 and T1
such that:
i.) Tag T0 (respectively T1) stores a state ST0 = (cT0 ,MACK(cT0)) (respectively ST1 =
(cT1 ,MACK(cT1)));
ii.) Check(T0,T1) = 1, i.e., there exists a matching reference ref(p,q) = e(ψ(ap), ψ(aq)) that
matches the pair of tags T0 and T1;
iii.) and finally, {DecG(cT0),DecG(cT1)} 6= {ψ(ap), ψ(aq)}.
There are two cases to consider, depending on whether T0 and T1 encode valid attributes or
not.
Case 1. T0 and T1 encode valid attributes, i.e., there exist ai, aj ∈ A such that DecG(cT0) =
ψ(ai) and DecG(cT1) = ψ(aj). Breaking the soundness property of T-Match implies that
there exist {ai, aj} 6= {ap, aq} ⊂ A such that ref(p,q) = e(ψ(ap), ψ(aq)) = e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)) using
Lemma 1.
• Let E denote the event that for all {ai, aj} 6= {ap, aq} ⊂ A, e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)) 6= e(ψ(ap),
ψ(aq)).
• Let E¯ denote the event that there exists {ai, aj} 6= {ap, aq} ⊂ A, such that e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj))
= e(ψ(ap), ψ(aq)).
Assuming that H : {0, 1}∗ → G is a cryptographic hash function implies that for all ai ∈ A,
H(ai) is uniformly distributed in G. Therefore, ψ(ai) = H(ai)
xI = H(ai)
q1x
′
I is randomly
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distributed in G2, i.e., for all ai ∈ A there exists xi uniformly distributed in Zq2 such that
ψ(ai) = g˜
xi
2 , where g˜2 is a random generator of G2.
Accordingly, for any pair of attributes (ai, aj) ∈ A, e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)) = e(g˜2, g˜2)xixj is
distributed uniformly in the subgroup GT2 of order q2 in GT .
• Let PA denote the set of all possible pairs in A and L denote the number of these pairs,
i.e., L = |PA| = l(l − 1)
2
, where l is the number of attributes in T-Match. Without
loss of generality, we denote PA = {p1, p2, ..., pL}.
• Let Ei denote the event that pair pi in PA does not have the same matching reference
as pairs {p1, p2, ..., pi−1}.
We recall that q2 is the order of GT2 , and that |q2| = 512 bits. Now, the probability of event
E is:
Pr(E) =
L∏
i=1
Pr (Ei) = 1
(
1− 1
q2
)(
1− 2
q2
)
...
(
1− L− 1
q2
)
≥
(
1− L− 1
q2
)L
≃
(
1− 2
2|l|
2|q2|
)L
≃
(
1− L 2
2|l|
2|q2|
)
≃
(
1− 2
4|l|
2|q2|
)
Pr(E¯) = 1− Pr(E) ≃ 24|l|−|q2|
Since typically |l| ≤ 10, it follows that the probability that event E¯ occurs is negligible.
We conclude that given the security of the hash function H, the probability that an
adversary A breaks the soundness property when tags T0 and T1 encode valid attributes is
negligible.
Case 2. T0 or T1 does not encode valid attributes, i.e., for all ap ∈ A, DecG(cT0) 6= ψ(ap)
or DecG(cT1) 6= ψ(ap).
Without loss of generality, we assume that for all ap ∈ A, DecG(cT0) 6= ψ(ap).
Now, if for all ap ∈ A DecG(cT0) 6= ψ(ap), then this implies that tag T0 was not issued by
issuer I. Consequently, T0’s state ST0 = (cT0 , σT0) was necessarily computed by adversary
A. As a result, adversary A is able to compute the MAC of cT0 without the secret key K.
This leads to a contradiction under the security of MAC.
We conclude that given the security of MAC, an adversary A cannot break the soundness
of T-Match when tag T0 or tag T1 does not encode valid attributes.
6.6 Privacy Analysis
In the this section, we present T-Match’s privacy theorems.
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6.6.1 Privacy against Readers and the Backend Server
Theorem 6.3. T-Match ensures the privacy of tags against readers Rk and backend server
S in the semi-honest model under the subgroup decision assumption.
Proof sketch. We need to show how to transform any admissible pair (A1,A2) of adversaries
against T-Match in the real model, into an admissible pair (B1,B2) of adversaries in the
ideal model.
Backend server S is honest. First, we start with the case of an honest backend server S.
In this case, we transform the adversary A1 (semi-honest reader Rk) against backend server S
in the real model into an adversary B1 (semi-honest reader Rk) against S in the ideal model.
Adversary B1 will execute A1 locally, obtaining therefore the messages that A1 would have
sent in a real execution of T-Match, and providing A1 with the messages that he expects
to receive from backend server S.
• A1 reads the states SkiTi and S
kj
Tj
stored into tags Ti and Tj respectively, and computes
the bilinear pairing C(i,j) of the ciphertexts stored into Ti and Tj. Then, A1 sends C(i,j)
to B1 who simulates backend server S.
• B1 sends the ciphertexts stored into tags Ti and Tj and the secret share α1 of adversary
A1 to the trusted third party.
• B1 receives a bit b from the TTP which is the output of the Check function.
• To simulate backend server S to adversary A1, B1 computes ν messages M ′p such that:
1. If b = 1: B1 picks ν − 1 pairs of random numbers (xp, rp) in Z∗N , and computes:
M ′p = (M(1,p),M(2,p)) = (e(g, g)
rp , e(g, g)xpe(g, g)−α1rp), where α1 is the secret
share of A1. Note that Mp = Mα1(1,p)M(2,p) = e(g, g)xp is randomly distributed in
GT .
Next, B1 selects a random number rν ∈ ZN and computes: M ′ν = (M(1,ν),M(2,ν)) =
(e(g, g)rν , e(g, g)−α1rν ).
2. If b = 0: B1 picks ν pairs of random numbers (xp, rp) in Z∗N , and computes:
M ′p = (M(1,p),M(2,p)) = (e(g, g)
rp , e(g, g)xpe(g, g)−α1rp).
• Finally, B1 shuﬄes M ′p and sends them to adversary A1.
We show that the distribution of messages M ′p sent to A1 when B1 is simulating backend
server S is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of messages M ′p that A1
actually receives from backend server S in a real execution of T-Match.
When adversary A1 runs T-Match in the real model, he expects to receive ν messages
M ′p distributed as described below:
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• Tags Ti and Tj match: there exists a message M ′q = (M(1,q),M(2,q)) such that Mq =
Mα1(1,q)M(2,q) = 1, and for all M
′
p 6= M ′q, the product Mp = Mα1(1,p)M(2,p) is randomly
distributed in GT2.
• Tags Ti and Tj do not match: for all M ′p = (M(1,p),M(2,p)), the product Mp =
Mα1(1,p)M(2,p) is randomly distributed in GT2 .
Note that the resulting product Mp = M
α1
(1,p)M(2,p) from the message M
′
p = (M(1,p),M(2,p))
sent by adversary B1 during his simulation of backend server S is distributed in GT and not
in GT2. However, this cannot be detected by A1. Otherwise, this implies that A1 is able to
tell whether an element of GT is an element of the subgroup GT2 or not, and this leads to a
contradiction under the subgroup decision assumption, see Definition 6.5.
Thus, B1 successfully simulates backend server S to adversary A1, and the distribution
RealA¯ is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution IdealB¯ when backend server
S is honest.
Reader Rk is honest. We transform next an adversary A2 (semi-honest backend server
S) against reader Rk in the real model into an adversary B2 (semi-honest backend server S)
against reader Rk in the ideal model as follows.
• B2 first eavesdrops on reader Rk to get the states of tags Ti and Tj participating in
the matching protocol. Notice that such an attack cannot be prevented as the channel
between tags and reader Rk is not secure.
• B2 simulates reader Rk for adversary A2 in the real model by computing the bilinear
pairing C(i,j) of ciphertexts stored into tags Ti and Tj, and by sending C(i,j) to adversary
A2.
• B2 sends the set of matching references Ref and the secret share α2 of adversary A2 to
the TTP.
• The TTP returns a bit b to reader Rk in the ideal model.
Although adversary B2 does not have access directly to the value of b, he can still infer
its value by observing the behavior of reader Rk in the ideal model. In fact, if b = 1,
then reader Rk raises an alarm, and so does B2 in the real model when simulating reader
Rk. Otherwise, B2 does nothing.
To conclude, adversary B2 successfully simulates reader Rk to adversary A2 in the real
model, and the distributions RealA¯ and IdealB¯ are indistinguishable when reader Rk is honest.
Consequently, T-Match ensures the privacy of tags against readers Rk and backend
server S in the semi-honest model.
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6.6.2 Privacy against Outsiders
To prove that T-Match ensures tag unlinkability, we first show that BGN is IND-CPA under
re-encryption.
Let OREnc be the oracle that when queried with two BGN ciphertexts c0 and c1 encrypted
using public key pk, flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, re-encrypts cb using pk, and returns the
resulting ciphertext c′b.
Let A be an adversary that selects two BGN ciphertexts c0 and c1 and queries the oracle
OREnc with c0 and c1. OREnc randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, re-encrypts cb to c′b, and returns
c′b to adversary A, who then outputs his guess b′ for bit b.
We say that BGN is IND-CPA under re-encryption, if adversary A has only a negligible
advantage in guessing the correct value of b.
Lemma 6.2. Boneh-Goh-Nissim is IND-CPA under re-encryption under the subgroup deci-
sion assumption in G.
Proof sketch. Let adversary B be an adversary against the IND-CPA property of BGN, see
Section 2.17.
We show now that if there is an adversary A who breaks the IND-CPA property under
re-encryption of BGN with a non-negligible advantage ǫ, then B can use A as a subroutine
to break the IND-CPA property of BGN with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′.
Let OEnc be the oracle that when queried with two messages m0 and m1 in G, flips a
random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts mb using BGN and public key pk, and returns the resulting
ciphertext cb.
When adversary A submits the ciphertexts c0 and c1 to B, the latter simulates the oracle
OREnc as follows.
• He first queries the oracle OEnc with messages m0 = c0 and m1 = c1.
• The oracle OEnc flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts mb to obtain ciphertext
c′b = mbg˜
r
1 = cbg˜
r
1. Note that c
′
b is a re-encryption of cb.
• The oracle OEnc returns the ciphertext c′b to adversary B, who gives it to adversary A.
Adversary A outputs his guess b′ for the bit b. To break the IND-CPA property of BGN,
adversary B outputs the same bit b′.
Since ciphertext c′b is a re-encryption of cb and A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in
breaking the IND-CPA of BGN under re-encryption, it follows that b′ = b and that B is
able to break the IND-CPA of BGN with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ = ǫ, leading to a
contradiction under the subgroup decision assumption.
Theorem 6.4. T-Match ensures tag unlinkability against outsiders under the subgroup
decision assumption in G.
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Proof. Assume there is an adversary A who breaks the tag unlinkability of T-Match with
a non-negligible advantage ǫ. We show that we can build an adversary B who uses A as a
subroutine and breaks the IND-CPA property of the BGN cryptosystem under re-encryption
with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′.
To break the IND-CPA property of BGN, B proceeds as follows:
• Adversary B simulates challenger C and creates a complete T-Match system with l
attributes A = {a1, a2, ..., al}, an issuer I, η readers Rk and a backend server S.
B selects a random MAC key K, a random secret key xI , random shares α1 and −α1,
and a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G. Next, he computes the matching references Ref
that he is going to use to compute the output of the Check function.
Then, he provides issuer I with secret keys K, xI and the hash function H, readers Rk
with secret key K and secret share α1, and backend server S with secret share −α1 and
the set of matching references Ref.
Finally, he simulates issuer I and initializes n tags using as input A, public key pk from
the re-encryption oracle OREnc, hash function H, MAC key K and secret key xI .
At the end of tag initialization phase, each tag Ti stores a state S
0
Ti
= (c0Ti , σ
0
Ti
) =
(EncG(ψ(aTi)),MACK(c
0
Ti
)) such that aTi ∈ A.
• B initializes a database DB where he keeps an entry ETi for each tag Ti such that:
ETi = (aTi , c
0
Ti
, c1Ti , ..., c
j
Ti
, ...), where c0Ti is the ciphertext stored into Ti at initialization,
and cjTi is the ciphertext stored into tag Ti after the j
th interaction of tag Ti with readers
Rk in the supply chain.
Learning phase. In the following, we show how adversary B simulates challenger C in the
learning phase.
• B simulates oracle OTag and provides A with a set of r tags of his choice.
• B simulates the output of the Check function to adversaryA. Without loss of generality,
we assume that adversary A submits two tags Ti and Tj to some reader Rk in the supply
chain.
– First, adversary B reads the states SkiTi = (c
ki
Ti
, σkiTi) and S
kj
Tj
= (c
kj
Tj
, σ
kj
Tj
) of tags Ti
and Tj respectively, verifies the validity of the MACs σ
ki
Ti
and σ
kj
Tj
and writes into
tags Ti and Tj the new states S
ki+1
Ti
= (cki+1Ti , σ
ki+1
Ti
) and S
kj+1
Tj
= (c
kj+1
Tj
, σ
kj+1
Tj
)
respectively.
– Next, he looks up the ciphertexts ckiTi and c
kj
Ti
in his database, retrieves their cor-
responding attributes aTi and aTj , and updates the database entries. Finally, he
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checks whether aTi and aTj match or not. If so, B simulates reader Rk in the
supply chain and outputs 1. Otherwise, he outputs 0.
It is important to note that the simulation presented above of the Check function works
because only issuer I and readers Rk can compute a valid state S
ki
Ti
= (ckiTi , σ
ki
Ti
).
Challenge phase. A submits two challenge tags T0 and T1.
B reads and verifies the states stored into T0 and T1, and retrieves the corresponding
ciphertexts c0 and c1 respectively.
• To simulate OFlip, B queries the oracle OREnc with ciphertexts c0 and c1. OREnc returns
a re-encryption c′b of ciphertext cb, b ∈ {0, 1}.
• Then, B computes σ′b = MACK(c′b) and stores the state STb = (c′b, σ′b) into tag Tb.
• Finally, B returns tag Tb to A.
A outputs his guess b′ for the bit b.
Now, to break the IND-CPA property of BGN under re-encryption, B outputs b′.
Notice that if A outputs b′ = 1, then tag Tb corresponds to tag T1, and therewith c′b is a
re-encryption of c1. Otherwise, tag Tb corresponds to tag T0 and c
′
b is a re-encryption of c0.
Since adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the tag unlinkability of
T-Match, it follows that B will have a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ = ǫ in breaking the IND-
CPA property of BGN under re-encryption. This leads to a contradiction under the subgroup
decision assumption in G.
6.7 Evaluation
T-Match targets storage only tags that do no feature any computational capabilities. A tag
in T-Match is required to store a BGN ciphertext in G (|G| = 1024 bits) and a MAC of size
160 bits, totaling a storage of 1184 bits.
We believe that T-Match can be deployed using current ISO 18000-3 HF tags, such as
UPM RFID HF RaceTrack tags (156) that feature up to 8 Kbits of memory.
In each execution of T-Match, reader Rk reads two tags Ti and Tj and updates their
states as follows: it re-encrypts the BGN ciphertexts cTi and cTj of tags Ti and Tj respectively,
then it computes the MAC of the re-encrypted ciphertexts. This amounts to computing two
exponentiations in G and two keyed hash functions.
To evaluate the Check function, reader Rk computes a bilinear pairing C(i,j) = e(cTi , cTj ) ∈
GT such that |GT | = 2048 bits. Then, reader Rk initiates a two round protocol for plaintext
equality test with backend server S by sending the ciphertext C(i,j).
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Upon receiving ciphertext C(i,j), backend server S performs 2ν exponentiations in GT ,
where ν is the number of matching references in Ref, and obtains ν messages M ′p. Next,
backend server S shuﬄes the messages M ′p and sends them to reader Rk.
Finally, when reader Rk receives the messages M
′
p, it performs ν exponentiations in GT
and outputs the outcome of the Check function.
Table 6.1: Evaluation of memory and computation in T-Match
Tag Reader Rk Backend server S
Memory 1184 bits pk, α1,K pk, α2, Ref
Exponentiation in GT − ν 2ν
|GT | = 2048 bits
Exponentiation in G − 2 −
|G| = 1024 bits
MAC − 2 −
Bilinear pairing − 1 −
Shuﬄe − − 1
6.8 Related Work
T-Match shows similarities to secret handshake and secret matching protocols. Nevertheless,
traditional solutions for secure and privacy preserving secret matching between two parties
as proposed by Ateniese et al. (4), Balfanz et al. (9) cannot be implemented in cheap RFID
tags. These solutions require the computation of bilinear pairings which cannot be performed
by current RFID tags.
Boneh et al. (26) propose a protocol that allows the public evaluation of 2-DNF formula
on boolean variables by relying on the BGN encryption. The protocol proposed in (26) can
be slightly modified to implement tag matching. However in this case, tags are required to
store O(l) ciphertexts of size 1024 bits where l is the number of attributes in the system –
rendering such an approach unrealistic.
Another approach to evaluate the Check function is attribute based encryption see Goyal
et al. (74), Pirretti et al. (132), Sahai andWaters (140). The idea is to associate each attribute
ai in the system with some secret component of some private key sk. When two tags Ti and
Tj that match come together, the secret key sk can be reconstructed. The reconstruction of
a correct secret key sk enables reader Rk to decrypt some ciphertext C for which it knows
the underlying plaintext M . The matching is verified by checking whether Decsk(C) =M or
not. Though, the use of attribute based encryption can allow reader Rk to evaluate the Check
function by itself without a backend server S, it requires either cryptographic operations on
tags or their synchronization.
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6.9 Summary
RFID tag based matching is required by many real-world supply-chain applications. Matching
however, raises new security and privacy concerns. T-Match tackles these challenges and
provides secure and privacy preserving item matching suited for resource restricted tags that
are unable to perform any computation. T-Match evaluates, in a privacy preserving manner,
a function Check that on the input of two tags Ti and Tj outputs a bit b indicating whether
Ti and Tj match or not. T-Match is provably secure and privacy preserving under standard
assumptions: security of MAC and hash functions, and the subgroup decision assumption.
Finally, designed for storage only tags, T-Match requires tags to store only 150 bytes.
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7.1 Summary
Although the proliferation of RFID tags is admitted to be financially beneficial, the deploy-
ment of RFID technologies still comes with a variety of privacy and security threats that range
from denial of service to industrial espionage. While well established cryptographic solutions
can always remedy most of these threats in theory, they remain too expensive in practice for
the constrained devices that are RFID tags. The dilemma of ensuring tag security and privacy
while keeping the computational requirements in tags minimal has given rise to a plethora of
work on RFID authentication and the corresponding security and privacy definitions. How-
ever, the task of designing secure and privacy preserving authentication protocols that meet
the computational constraints of RFID technology was shown to be difficult if not impossible.
Actually, existing formalizations of RFID privacy assume a strong adversary against which
privacy cannot be achieved without sacrificing RFID scalability and cost effectiveness. There-
fore, in this thesis we first focused on bridging this gap between the theoretical formalization
of RFID privacy and the practical aspects of RFID technology by assuming an adversary who
cannot continuously monitor RFID tags: there is at least one interaction between tags and
readers that is unobserved by the adversary. Then, we designed four multi-party protocols
that provide secure and privacy preserving solutions for RFID-enabled supply chains. More
precisely, we targeted the following applications:
7.1.1 Tag Ownership Transfer
In Chapter 4, we presented ROTIV to tackle the privacy and the security issues of tag
ownership transfer in the supply chain. The core idea of ROTIV is to store in each tag in
the supply chain a symmetric key and an Elgamal encryption of a short signature computed
by some trusted issuer. The encrypted signature allows owners to identify tags in constant
time and to verify the identity of their issuer, whereas the symmetric key is used to mutually
authenticate tags and owners. In this manner, ROTIV assures:
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• Constant-time mutual authentication between tags and readers, while tags are only
required to compute a hash function.
• Issuer verification without trusted third party: Every supply chain partner can verify
whether the tags he owns originate from a trusted party or not.
• Provable security: A successful ownership transfer of some tag T implies that T is
a legitimate tag that was issued by a trusted party, and that the owner of tag T
participated in the protocol execution.
• Provable privacy: A new owner of tag T cannot link T to its past interactions, and a
previous owner cannot trace T ’s future protocol executions.
While most of the privacy and the security properties of ROTIV were proven in the
standard model, the security of ROTIV’s short signature8 together with the security of
ROTIV’s issuer verification were demonstrated in the random oracle model. As discussed in
Section 2.2.1.1, security in the random oracle validates the overall design of the protocol, yet
the security of the scheme in the real world depends heavily on the implementation choices
of the underlying hash function. We recall that in Chapter 4, we have suggested the use of
the hashing algorithm proposed by Brier et al. (28) which hashes into ordinary curves and
was shown to be indifferentiable from a random oracle.
7.1.2 Product Tracking
In Chapter 5, we introduced Tracker and Checker that aim at verifying the genuineness of
products by checking the validity of the paths they took in the supply chain. Both protocols
build upon an original combination of polynomial-based path encoding and signatures to
enable each reader in the supply chain to update the states of tags, while supply chain
verifiers check the genuineness of tags by reading the tags’ states.
Both Tracker and Checker check the genuineness of products by verifying their paths
in the supply chain, still, they target different application scenarios: Tracker focuses on
the problem of product traceability by a trusted party, whereas Checker aims at solving the
issue of on-site checking by allowing each partner in the supply chain to verify the genuineness
of products that are present in his site.
We summarize the contributions of Chapter 5 as follows:
• Efficient and compact path encoding that does not depend on the length of the path;
each path is encoded as an element of the finite field Fq, |q| = 160 bits.
8To the best of our knowledge, there is no short signature that is secure in the standard model and relies
on standard assumptions.
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• Both protocols can be implemented in storage only tags that do not perform any com-
putation. A tag T is only required to store an encrypted state that is updated and
re-encrypted at each protocol execution by readers in the supply chain.
• Comprehensive privacy and security definitions that capture the requirements of prod-
uct tracking applications.
• Provable security: Readers in the supply chain cannot forge valid path signatures.
• Provable privacy: A supply chain partner cannot trace or link tags that are not present
in his site.
Since Tracker and Checker rely on storage only tags, it follows that both protocols are
vulnerable to DoS attacks: an adversary can always invalidate the state of a tag by writing
“garbage” into the tag. Such an attack cannot be countered unless tags are able to execute
some sort of reader authentication, increasing thus the computational requirements on the
tags and therewith their prices. This shows that there is a tradeoff between DoS resistance
and the financial cost of tracking applications.
Also, the security of Tracker and Checker was proven in the random oracle model.
Similar to ROTIV, we suggested the use of the hashing algorithm presented in (28), which
we believe to be sufficient in the context of this thesis.
7.1.3 Item Matching
In Chapter 6, we presented T-Match which is a protocol for RFID-based item matching
in the supply chain that aims at the automation of safety inspection when transporting or
storing hazardous goods such as chemicals. The goal of T-Match is to allow each reader in
the supply chain to detect the presence of two dangerously reactive chemicals in its vicinity.
T-Match relies on techniques of secure two-party computation to enable a reader and a
backend server to compute jointly on the input of two tags Ti and Tj the outcome of a
boolean function Check(Ti, Tj). Check(Ti, Tj) = 1 if Ti and Tj match (i.e., they are attached
to barrels that contain dangerously reactive chemicals), and 0 otherwise.
The contributions of T-Match are:
• T-Match targets storage only tags that do not perform any computation. A tag Ti in
T-Match is only required to store a state that is updated at every protocol execution
by readers in the supply chain.
• Original definitions capturing the security and the privacy requirements of RFID-based
item matching in the supply chain.
• T-Match is provably privacy preserving: T-Match relies on techniques of secure two-
party computation to ensure that neither readers nor backend server can disclose the
private content of a tag.
161
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
• T-Match is provably secure: Readers raise an alarm only when they interact with a
pair of matching tags.
Even though tags in T-Match do not perform any computation, the readers and the
backend server have to execute O(ν) computations, where ν is the number of matching
references (i.e., the number of pairs of chemicals that are dangerously reactive). The design
of a privacy preserving RFID-based item matching protocol whose running time do not depend
on the number of matching references is far from being straightforward. We believe however,
that in the real world, the number of matching references will not be large enough to be
computationally prohibitive for the readers and the backend server.
Another limitation ofT-Match is that the item matching can only be performed pairwise.
That is, in the presence of n barrels of chemicals, a reader has to call the protocol
n(n− 1)
2
times to decide whether there are dangerously reactive chemicals in its vicinity or not, which
could be time consuming.
Finally, the cost effectiveness of storage only tags comes at the expense of resistance to
DoS attacks. As explained in Sections 6.3.1.1 and 7.1.2, such attacks cannot be thwarted
unless tags are able to authenticate the readers updating their states.
7.2 Future Work
Here, we give an overview of possible research directions that could be investigated as a
natural continuation of the results presented in this manuscript.
• The formal definitions of tag privacy throughout this thesis were indistinguishability-
based. A direction of future work could consist of redefining privacy using simulator-
based definitions where information leakage is quantified by the ability of an adversary
to distinguish between a real execution of the protocol and a simulated one, in accor-
dance with the work of Vaudenay (159) and Paise and Vaudenay (129).
• Privacy preserving RFID-based grouping proofs: A grouping proof is a proto-
col that convinces a verifier (usually a reader) that a group of tags were read (almost)
simultaneously. Such protocols are useful in industries such as automotive and aeronau-
tics, as they can be employed to prove that the different components of some product
were assembled (almost) at the same time. Most existing protocols (32, 88, 141) rely on
hash functions and timestamps to assure that tags were read/updated simultaneously.
We argue however that such protocols can be implemented using storage only tags and
without timestamps. The idea would be to replace timestamps by random numbers and
secret sharing techniques, in a way that enables the readers in the supply chain to verify
that 1.) tags belong to the same group and that 2.) they were read simultaneously.
162
7.2 Future Work
• Physical tag identification : While physical tag identification could be used to de-
tect cloned products and to verify the genuineness of identification documents, it could
also be viewed as an efficient technique to violate privacy. Fortunately, physical finger-
printing (identification) of RFID tags is still prone to errors in dynamic environment
with high tag mobility (165), thus limiting the scope of tracking attacks using physi-
cal approaches. Still, it is very important to investigate the feasibility and the cost of
accurate physical-layer identification, and to propose appropriate counter-measures to
reduce its impact on tag privacy.
• Efficient distance bounding protocols in RFID tags: Recently a new class of
attacks were brought to the attention of researchers, whereby malicious parties have
the protocol between the tag and the reader run over distances much larger than the
nominal range of the tag using some communication relay. Such attacks could be
prevented if tags were equipped with efficient mechanisms to estimate the distance
separating them from readers. The design of such “distance bounding” mechanisms in
the context of resource-constrained tags raises very challenging research questions.
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Appendix A
Resistance to Forgery of Matching
References
In the following, we demonstrate that it is computationally infeasible for a backend server S
to forge a new matching reference from its set Ref of matching references.
Theorem A.1. T-Match is resistant to forgery of matching references under the BCDH
assumption and the subgroup decision assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof sketch. Assume that there is an adversary A (backend server S) who breaks the re-
sistance to forgery of matching references with a non-negligible advantage ǫ. We show that
there is an adversary B who uses backend server S to break the BCDH assumption in G with
a non-negligible advantage ǫ′.
Let OBCDH be an oracle that selects randomly x, y, z ∈ ZN , and returns g, gx, gy, gz ∈ G.
• Adversary B first queries the oracle OBCDH that returns g, gx, gy , gz ∈ G.
• Then, adversary B simulates a complete T-Match system with l attributes A =
{a1, a2, ..., al}, an issuer I and η readers Rk.
1. He provides issuer I with gz from the BCDH challenge instead of the secret key
xI ;
2. he supplies readers Rk with a secret MAC key K, a BGN public key and the secret
share α1;
3. he provides backend server S with the secret share α2 and the set of matching
references Ref that are computed as described below.
• We note that the goal of adversary B is to convince adversary A that there are two
attributes a1 and a2 such that:
H(a1) = g
xr1 and H(a2) = g
yr2
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where r1 and r2 are random elements of Z
∗
N .
To this end, adversary B simulates a random oracle H to compute the hash function
H.
Simulation of the random oracle H. To respond to the queries of the random
oracle H, adversary B keeps a table TH of tuples (aj , rj ,H(aj)):
On a query ai, 3 ≤ i ≤ l, B replies as follows:
1.) If there is a tuple (ai, ri,H(ai)) that corresponds to ai, then B returns H(ai).
2.) If ai has never been queried before, then adversary B picks a random number
ri ∈ Z∗N , and answers with H(ai) = gri . Finally, adversary B stores the tuple
(ai, ri,H(ai)) in table TH .
On a query H(a1) (H(a2) resp.), B picks a random number r1 ∈ Z∗N (r2 ∈ Z∗N resp.)
and replies with H(a1) = g
xr1 (H(a2) = g
yr2 resp.).
• Now adversary A computes the set of matching references Ref by first selecting ν pairs
of attributes {ai, aj} ⊂ A such that {i, j} 6= {1, 2} and computing their corresponding
matching reference ref(i,j).
Computation of the matching references. On input of a pair of attributes {a1, ai},
adversary B first retrieves the tuples (a1, r1,H(a1) = gxr1) and (ai, ri,H(ai) = gri), then
computes:
ref(1,i) = e(g
x, gz)r1ri = e(gxr1 , gri)z
= e(H(a1),H(ai))
z ∈ GT
Similarly, adversary B computes the matching reference of a pair of attributes {a2, ai}.
ref(2,i) = e(g
y , gz)r2ri = e(gyr2 , gri)z
= e(H(a2),H(ai))
z ∈ GT
On input of a pair of attributes {ai, aj} such that i 6= 1, 2 and j 6= 1, 2, adversary B
first retrieves the tuples (ai, ri,H(ai) = g
ri) and (aj , rj ,H(aj) = g
rj ), then computes
the corresponding matching reference:
ref(i,j) = e(g, g
z)rirj = e(gri , grj )z
= e(H(ai),H(aj))
z ∈ GT
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We recall that according to T-Match, the matching reference of two attributes ai and
aj is computed as:
ref(i,j) = e(ψ(ai), ψ(aj)) = e(H(ai)
xI ,H(aj)
xI )
= e(H(ai),H(aj))
x2I ∈ GT2
It follows that the secret key xI of issuer I looks as if it fulfills the equation: x
2
I = z
10.
• Finally, adversary B supplies adversary A with the set of matching references Ref.
Note that ref(i,j) ∈ GT instead of GT2, nonetheless, A cannot detect this thanks to the
subgroup decision assumption in GT .
• Now, adversary A outputs a new matching reference ref 6∈ Ref, such that there is
(ai, aj) ∈ A× A for which the following equation holds:
ref = e(H(ai),H(aj))
z
Note that if (ai, aj) = (a1, a2), then ref = e(H(ai),H(aj))
z = e(gxr1 , gyr2)z and
e(g, g)xyz = ref
1
r1r2 .
Let p denote the probability that adversary A computes the matching reference of
attributes {a1, a2}.
Accordingly, if adversary A has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in breaking the resistance
to the forgery of matching references, then adversary A can break the BCDH problem
with a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ = pǫ, leading to a contradiction.
10Adversary A cannot tell whether z is a quadratic residue or not.
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Appendix B
Re´sume´
L’identification par radiofre´quence commune´ment connue sous le nom de RFID est une tech-
nologie d’auto-identification comme les codes a` barre, la biome´trie, les cartes a` puce ... etc.
Un tag RFID est un dispositif sans fil e´quipe´ d’un identifiant unique de 96 bits, qui contraire-
ment aux codes a` barre permet l’identification des objets sans intervention humaine.
Dans un premier temps, la technologie RFID e´tait envisage´e pour remplacer les codes
a` barres, dans le but d’automatiser les processus de collection de donne´es et de traitement
d’information concernant les produits dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. Or aujourd’hui, la
technologie RFID est de´ja` inte´gre´e dans les passeports biome´triques et dans les applications
de controˆle d’acce`s.
Ce qui rend la technologie RFID inte´ressante est son couˆt qui est relativement faible. Un
tag RFID peut eˆtre vendu pour 0.15 U.S.$ sans remise sur le volume. Bien que le prix actuel
des tags RFID soit encore prohibitif pour les applications de chaˆınes d’approvisionnement,
on s’attend que le couˆt d’un tag baisse pour atteindre des niveaux commercialement viables
permettant une adoption de la technologie RFID a` grande e´chelle, non seulement dans les
chaˆınes d’approvisionnement mais aussi dans d’autres applications.
Ne´anmoins, la rentabilite´ des tags RFID a un prix qui est la vie prive´e des parties ayant
des tags RFID et aussi la vie prive´e des partenaires dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. C’est
tre`s important de noter que la technologie RFID n’est pas conc¸ue pour prote´ger la vie prive´e
de ses utilisateurs, en effet, le but original de cette technologie est de permettre l’identification
et le suivi des objets dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. De ce fait, les tags RFID envoient
ses identifiants chaque fois interroge´s par un lecteur RFID sans le consentement de ses pro-
prie´taires. Cela implique que les attaques sur la vie prive´e telles que le suivi des personnes et
l’espionnage industriel peuvent eˆtre monte´es facilement par la simple interrogation des tags
RFID.
Pour re´pondre a` ces proble`mes lie´s a` la protection de la vie prive´e, deux approches ont vu
le jour. La premie`re repose sur des mesures physiques pour limiter la porte´e de ces attaques,
par exemple: des cages de Faraday sont utilise´es pour empeˆcher la lecture non-autorise´e des
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passeports RFID. La deuxie`me approche qui nous inte´resse dans ce manuscrit vise a` prote´ger
la vie prive´e des tags RFID en se basant sur des solutions cryptographiques.
La conception de protocoles cryptographiques pour RFID s’est ave´re´e une taˆche difficile
pour deux raisons principales: D’abord, maintenir le couˆt faible de RFID est d’une importance
primordiale pour favoriser un de´ploiement a` grande e´chelle des tags RFID. Par conse´quent,
toute solution cryptographique pour RFID doit correspondre aux ressources strictes des tags.
Deuxie`mement, il est crucial de concevoir des protocoles efficaces pour les chaˆınes d’appro-
visionnement pour ne pas ralentir les performances de ces dernie`res.
Ces de´fis souleve´s par les approches cryptographiques utilise´es pour prote´ger la vie prive´e
des syste`mes RFID ont stimule´ un travail de recherche tre`s actif qui portait principalement sur
la conception de protocoles d’authentification qui pre´servent la vie prive´e et qui conviennent
aux capacite´s de calcul des tags RFID. L’objectif de ces protocoles est de permettre aux
lecteurs RFID le´gitimes d’authentifier et d’identifier les tags RFID, alors que les lecteurs non-
le´gitimes ne doivent pas eˆtre en mesure d’identifier un tag en e´coutant ses communications
ou en l’interrogeant. Les protocoles d’authentification pour les syste`mes RFID propose´s dans
la litte´rature peuvent eˆtre classe´s en trois cate´gories, comme suit:
• Authentification le´ge`re: Elle se repose sur des ope´rations binaires comme ”et”, ”xor”
(18, 66, 91). Pourtant efficace, ce type de protocoles est sujet aux attaques de re´cupe´ra-
tion de cle´s (14, 64, 128).
• Authentification syme´trique: Les protocoles dans cette cate´gorie utilisent les prim-
itives cryptographiques syme´triques (48, 50, 58, 122, 153) qui peuvent eˆtre mises en
oeuvre dans les tags RFID. Cependant, Damg˚ard and Pedersen (42) ont montre´ qu’il
y a un compromis entre la se´curite´ de protocoles d’authentification syme´triques et leur
e´volutivite´. En effet, pour assurer la se´curite´ et la protection de la vie prive´e des tags
RFID, un protocole syme´trique doit s’exe´cuter dans un temps line´aire dans le nombre
de tags.
• Authentification asyme´trique: Contrairement a` l’authentification syme´trique, les
solutions base´es sur les techniques asyme´triques (103, 113, 126) offrent la possibilite´ de
concevoir de protocoles d’authentification qui s’exe´cutent dans un temps constant et
qui prote`gent en meˆme temps la vie prive´e des tags.
La diversite´ et l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ des protocoles d’authentification pour les syste`mes RFID
ont suscite´ un inte´reˆt dans la formalisation des de´finitions de protection de la vie prive´e
(5, 92, 129, 159) adapte´es au contexte RFID. Ces de´finitions visent premie`rement a` capturer
les capacite´s d’un adversaire contre les tags RFID, deuxie`mement a` mesurer l’information
qu’un adversaire peut apprendre en e´coutant le canal sans fil entre les tags et les lecteurs
RFID. Ces de´finitions formelles ont ouvert la voie a` une analyse plus approfondie des proto-
coles existants. Cette analyse nous a permis d’identifier ce qui peut eˆtre re´ellement atteint
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en termes de se´curite´ et protection de la vie prive´e des tags RFID.
En effet, il e´tait de´montre´ que la plupart des protocoles actuels n’arrivent pas a` prote´ger
la vie prive´e des tags contre un adversaire actif qui e´coute toutes les communications des tags:
Vaudenay (159) a montre´ le re´sultat intuitif qui stipule que la protection de la vie prive´e ne
peut pas eˆtre assure´e contre un tel adversaire. Aussi, un re´sultat plus positif indique que
pour assurer la protection de la vie prive´e contre un adversaire plus faible, les tags doivent
imple´menter les protocoles d’accord des cle´s, ce qui impose l’utilisation de la cryptographie a`
cle´ publique dans les tags. Or, la cryptographie a` cle´ publique est impraticable dans des puces
aussi contraintes que les tags RFID. De ce fait, on a conclu que les protocoles cryptographiques
pour les syste`mes RFID 1.) peuvent au mieux se baser sur des fonctions syme´triques, et que
2.) les formalisations de la protection de la vie prive´e doivent eˆtre relaˆche´es afin de combler le
fosse´ entre ce qui est souhaitable et ce qui est effectivement re´alisable dans un environnement
RFID.
Pour ces raisons la`, dans ce manuscrit on a vise´ a`:
• Formaliser des de´finitions approprie´es de protection de la vie prive´e et de se´curite´ qui
tiennent en compte les limitations des puces aussi contraintes que les tags RFID et les
actions potentielles qu’un adversaire peut effectuer pour compromettre la se´curite´ et la
vie prive´e des tags. D’ailleurs, on rappelle que les capacite´s de calcul restreintes des
tags RFID ne permettent pas l’imple´mentation de fonctions asyme´triques dans les tags.
• Proposer des solutions cryptographiques pour les applications de chaˆıne d’approvision-
nement qui prennent en conside´ration les limitations des tags RFID en termes de ca-
pacite´ de calcul et qui comptent ame´liorer la collaboration entre les partenaires de la
chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. En particulier, on s’est inte´resse´ a` trois applications: le
transfert de proprie´te´ des tags, la ve´rification d’authenticite´, et l’appariement des objets
dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Il est important de noter que les solutions cryptographiques pour les applications de
chaˆınes d’approvisionnement doivent eˆtre financie`rement rentables et efficaces pour as-
surer leurs de´ploiements a` grande e´chelle.
Dans cette optique, on a conside´re´ dans cette the`se un mode`le de protection de la vie
prive´e ou` un adversaire peut modifier l’e´tat interne des tags, par contre il ne peut pas e´couter
toutes leurs communications.
Par ailleurs, on estime que l’hypothe`se ci-dessus est re´aliste dans le contexte des chaˆınes
d’approvisionnement pour deux raisons: 1.) Les tags RFID n’imple´mentent pas des me´can-
ismes de protection physique. Cela signifie que n’importe quel adversaire ayant acce`s aux
tags peut facilement lire et parfois re´e´crire leurs contenus. 2.) Les tags RFID dans la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement changent re´gulie`rement d’endroit, il est donc difficile pour un adversaire
d’observer toutes leurs interactions.
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Sous cette hypothe`se, on a d’abord formalise´ des de´finitions de se´curite´ et de protection de
la vie prive´e qui correspondent bien aux exigences des chaˆınes d’approvisionnement. Ensuite,
on a propose´ des protocoles cryptographiques multipartites pour les applications de chaˆınes
d’approvisionnement, dont certains peuvent eˆtre imple´mente´s dans les tags sans capacite´ de
calcul, voir II.
B.1 Se´curite´ et la Vie Prive´e des Syste`mes RFID
La RFID est une technologie qui permet l’identification et la trac¸abilite´ des objets sans ligne
de vue directe ou intervention humaine. Un tag RFID est un dispositif sans fil a` faible couˆt
qui e´tiquette l’objet auquel il est attache´ en ayant un identifiant unique et non-re´utilisable.
L’identifiant unique du tag agit comme un pointeur vers une entre´e de base de donne´es
contenant toute l’historique de l’objet e´tiquete´. En conse´quence, la technologie RFID a e´te´
envisage´e pour remplacer les codes a` barres dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement, car il favorise
une identification rapide et automatise´e du produit, ainsi que la possibilite´ d’enregistrer et
de tracer l’historique des produits e´tiquete´s dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Or, la prolife´ration des tags RFID vient avec de nouvelles menaces pour la se´curite´ et
la vie prive´e des entreprises/individus qui posse`dent les tags. Ces menaces potentielles ont
donne´ naissance a` un domaine de recherche tre`s actif qui a` la fois vise la formalisation des
mode`les de se´curite´ et de la vie prive´e, et la conception des protocoles d’authentification
qui prote`gent la vie prive´e des tags RFID. Les principaux de´fis a` relever dans ce domaine
de recherche sont la de´finition de mode`les formels qui de´crivent globalement les capacite´s
d’un adversaire contre les syste`mes RFID dans le monde re´el, et la conception des protocoles
d’authentification 1.) qui assurent la se´curite´ et la confidentialite´ des donne´es des tags, et
2.) qui peuvent eˆtre imple´mente´s dans les tags RFID.
B.1.1 Syste`mes RFID
Un syste`me RFID comprend plus de composantes que les tags RFID de´ja` mentionne´s, en
effet, il se compose de:
• Tags;
• lecteurs;
• syste`me backend.
Les tags et les lecteurs communiquent sur un canal sans fil non-se´curise´, alors que le canal
entre les lecteurs et le syste`me back-end est ge´ne´ralement se´curise´.
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B.1.1.1 Tags RFID
Un tag RFID comprend une micro puce qui abrite une me´moire, des fonctionnalite´s logiques
limite´es, et une antenne. Les tags peuvent eˆtre classe´s en fonction de leurs fre´quences. Tags
de haute fre´quence HF fonctionnent a` 13, 56MHz et leur porte´e de lecture maximale est de 1m.
Tags de ultra-haute fre´quence UHF ope`rent entre 858 et 930 MHz et la porte´e moyenne de
lecture est de 3m. Les tags UHF repre´sentent la technologie dominante pour les applications
de chaˆınes d’approvisionnement, tandis que les tags HF sont plus approprie´s pour les applica-
tions a` proximite´ comme par exemple la billetterie e´lectronique. Outre la fre´quence, les tags
peuvent eˆtre classe´s en fonctions de leurs modes d’alimentation (135). Un tag passif est un
tag qui n’est e´quipe´ d’aucune batterie, et s’appuie donc sur des me´canismes de backscattering
pour re´pondre aux requeˆtes envoye´es par les lecteurs a` proximite´. Un tag actif par contre a
sa propre batterie et peut initier la communication avec les lecteurs. Un tag semi-actif est un
tag hybride qui posse`de sa propre alimentation mais n’initie jamais la communication avec
les lecteurs.
Il suit que les tags passifs sont beaucoup moins chers que les tags actifs, et par conse´quent,
ils sont plus approprie´s a` remplacer les codes a` barres dans les chaˆınes d’approvisionnement.
Les avantages des tags passifs sont bien e´videmment leur faible couˆt, leur petite taille et leur
dure´e de vie qui n’est pas limite´e par la dure´e de vie de la batterie. Cependant, les tags
passifs ont peu de ressources et peu de capacite´s de calcul, ce qui transforme la conception
des applications base´es sur les tags RFID a` un ve´ritable de´fi.
Donc, dans cette the`se on s’est concentre´ uniquement sur les tags passifs.
B.1.1.2 Lecteurs RFID et Syste`mes Backend
Les lecteurs RFID sont des e´metteurs-re´cepteurs qui sont capables de communiquer avec les
tags RFID sur un canal radiofre´quence. Un lecteur peut eˆtre en mesure de lire ou d’e´crire le
contenu des tags. Il est ge´ne´ralement dote´ d’une antenne, d’un microprocesseur, d’une source
d’alimentation e´lectrique, et e´ventuellement d’une interface qui lui permet de transmettre les
donne´es rec¸ues des tags au syste`me backend.
Le syste`me backend comprend habituellement une base de donne´es qui recueille les infor-
mations transmises par les lecteurs pour des fins diverses qui de´pendent de l’application pour
laquelle la technologie RFID est utilise´e.
Il existe deux cate´gories de lecteurs (59):
• Lecteurs fixes: Les lecteurs sont place´s dans un endroit fixe et ils sont toujours connecte´s
a` un re´seau qui les lie avec le syste`me backend. Par exemple: dans les applications de
controˆle d’acce`s ou` les lecteurs sont situe´s a` l’entre´e d’une zone se´curise´e.
• Lecteurs mobiles: Les lecteurs peuvent eˆtre portables et ils ne sont pas oblige´s a` com-
muniquer en permanence avec le syste`me backend. Ils sont principalement employe´s
pour interroger les prix des produits dans un supermarche´ ou pour l’ inventaire.
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B.1.2 Applications RFID
La technologie RFID peut eˆtre inte´gre´e dans plusieurs applications qui varient selon le but
d’identification. Parmi les applications de la technologie RFID, on trouve le paiement au-
tomatise´, le controˆle d’acce`s, et la gestion des chaˆınes d’approvisionnement.
L’ une des applications e´minentes des tags RFID est la gestion des chaˆınes d’approvision-
nement, dans laquelle les tags stockent en plus de leurs identifiants uniques, des informations
supple´mentaires qui sont utilise´es pour automatiser et re´guler les processus de production et
de distribution dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement, tout en minimisant les erreurs dues a`
l’intervention humaine. En attachant des tags RFID aux produits circulant dans la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement, le manager de la chaˆıne peut automatiquement identifier les contre-
fac¸ons, les goulots d’e´tranglement de production, la pe´nurie de stocks et l’origine des pro-
duits de´fectueux. Ce type d’applications est d’une grande valeur ajoute´e, car elle re´duit le
temps et les erreurs lors de la gestion des produits, tout en diminuant le nombre de personnes
implique´es dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Parfois, un tag doit non seulement s’identifier, mais aussi prouver qu’il est le´gitime en
s’authentifiant. Une telle fonctionnalite´ est ne´cessaire dans certaines applications telles que
le paiement automatique, la de´tection des contrefac¸ons, le controˆle d’acce`s... etc.
Un autre domaine d’applications des tags RFID est la trac¸abilite´ des objets e´tiquete´s.
E´tant donne´ que les lecteurs sont place´s a` des endroits fixes et connus, un objet e´tiquete´ peut
eˆtre facilement localise´ avec une certaine pre´cision. Une telle application peut eˆtre utilise´e
afin de de´tecter la pre´sence de certains produits dans une usine ou un entrepoˆt, ou de localiser
des personnes a` l’inte´rieur d’un baˆtiment.
Par ailleurs, les partisans de la technologie RFID croient que la prolife´ration potentielle
des tags RFID de´bouchera sur des applications qui peuvent assister les gens dans leurs taˆches
quotidiennes. Une de ces applications est les “maisons intelligentes” avec des appareils intel-
ligents tels que les machines a` laver qui se´lectionnent automatiquement les cycles de lavage
approprie´es pour ne pas endommager les habits de´licats, ou des re´frige´rateurs qui de´tectent
l’expiration de produits alimentaires (89). Dans le meˆme esprit, la technologie RFID pourrait
eˆtre utilise´e pour faciliter la navigation des personnes aˆge´es dans la maison ou pour ve´rifier
si un patient se conforme a` ses prise de me´dicament ou non (89).
B.1.3 Menaces de Se´curite´ et de la Vie Prive´e
Dans cette section, on discute quelques menaces contre la se´curite´ et la vie prive´e lie´es au
de´ploiement de la technologie RFID.
B.1.3.1 Menaces de Se´curite´
La technologie RFID fait face a` des menaces de se´curite´ diverses telles que le de´ni de service,
les attaques de relais, et le clonage.
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• De´ni de service: Une telle attaque est exe´cute´e en envoyant des signaux dans la meˆme
bande de fre´quence que les lecteurs le´gitimes pour causer un brouillage e´lectromagne´-
tique qui empeˆche les tags le´gitimes de communiquer avec les lecteurs le´gitimes.
• Attaques de relai: Ces attaques sont mises en oeuvre en plac¸ant un dispositif entre un
tag RFID et un lecteur. Ce dispositif relaie les informations e´change´es entre les deux
parties le´gitimes qui croient qu’ils sont physiquement proches l’un de l’autre.
• Clonage: Cette attaque est re´alise´e en e´coutant les communications des tags pour
re´cupe´rer leurs identifiants uniques, puis en e´crivant ces identifiants dans de nouveaux
tags reprogrammables. Le clonage pourrait eˆtre utilise´ pour remplacer le contenu des
tags attache´s a` des produits chers avec le contenu des tags attache´s aux produits moins
chers dans un super marche´ par exemple.
En vue de prote´ger les syste`mes RFID contre les attaques de´crites ci-dessus, Karygiannis
et al. (95) sugge`rent certaines contre-mesures de se´curite´ qui peuvent eˆtre imple´mente´es. Par
exemple, le clonage peut eˆtre re´duit par les protocoles d’authentification entre le tag et le
lecteur. Toutefois, la rarete´ des ressources de calcul dans les tags RFID rend la conception
de protocoles d’authentification re´sistant aux diffe´rentes attaques tre`s difficile.
D’ailleurs, les protocoles de distance bounding (8, 27, 77, 99) ont e´te´ propose´es pour
prote´ger contre les attaques de relai. L’ide´e derrie`re ces protocoles est tout simplement
d’estimer la distance physique se´parant les lecteurs et les tags lors d’une communication.
Finalement, les attaques de brouillage e´lectromagne´tique peuvent eˆtre empeˆche´es en aug-
mentant la se´curite´ physique pre`s des lecteurs RFID a` travers des gardes, des barrie`res, des
came´ras, et des murs blinde´s pour bloquer les signaux e´lectromagne´tiques externes, dans le
but de limiter les interfe´rences radio qu’elles soient accidentelles ou malveillantes (95).
B.1.3.2 Menaces de la Vie Prive´e
Vu que les tags RFID re´pondent a` toutes les requeˆtes sans le consentement de leurs pro-
prie´taires ou de´tenteurs, la prolife´ration de la technologie RFID fait apparaˆıtre de nouveaux
risques qui peuvent entrainer des violations de la vie prive´e des tags et de leurs de´tenteurs,
telles que l’espionnage industriel, le profilage des consommateurs et la trac¸abilite´ des indi-
vidus.
• L’espionnage industriel: En e´coutant les communication des objets e´tiquete´s pre´sents
sur la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement, une entreprise peut recueillir des informations confi-
dentielles et sensibles sur les processus ope´rationnels internes d’un concurrent industriel.
Ces informations pourraient servir a` de´terminer les programmes de distribution, le taux
quotidien de production, la disponibilite´ ou la rupture de stock, ainsi que l’identite´ des
fournisseurs et des partenaires.
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• Le profilage des consommateurs: Toute personne portant un objet e´tiquete´s par un tag
RFID est sujette a` l’inventaire clandestin. Un caissier dans un magasin peut facilement
apprendre les produits qui inte´ressent un certain client en lisant les tags attache´s aux
produits achete´s par ce client.
• Trac¸abilite´: Les interactions d’un tag peut eˆtre facilement trace´es, vu que les tags RFID
envoient leurs identifiants uniques en clair chaque fois interroge´s.
Dans ce qui suit, on de´crit brie`vement certaines approches qui ont e´te´ propose´es pour
limiter la porte´e de ces menaces contre la vie prive´e des tags RFID.
• De´sactivation des tags: Les tags RFID peuvent eˆtre de´sactive´s en utilisant une com-
mande “KILL” envoye´e par les lecteurs. Quand un tag rec¸oit la commande KILL, il
devient hors service. Maintenant, pour e´viter le de´ni de service via la de´sactivation des
tags, la commande KILL est prote´ge´e par un code PIN connu seulement par les lecteurs
autorise´s. Meˆme si la de´sactivation de´finitive des tags est une mesure tre`s efficace pour
prote´ger la vie prive´e des individus, cette technique empeˆche l’imple´mentation de tout
service apre`s-vente qui se base sur la technologie RFID.
• Proxying: Cette approche vise a` prote´ger la vie prive´e des tags en utilisant des dispositifs
qui agissent comme des pare-feux RFID (94, 136). Ces dispositifs transmettent aux
tags RFID uniquement les requeˆtes qui re´pondent aux politiques de se´curite´ de´finies au
pre´alable par les de´tenteurs des tags.
• Blocage: Cette approche prote`ge la vie prive´e des tags en s’appuyant sur des mesures
physiques. Par exemple, une cage de Faraday peut eˆtre utilise´e pour prote´ger con-
tre la lecture non autorise´e. Il est e´galement possible d’empeˆcher une lecture non
autorise´e via les tags bloqueurs (93). Un tag bloqueur exploite les proprie´te´s de pro-
tocoles d’anticollision pour interrompre toute interaction entre les tags et les lecteurs
non-autorise´s.
• Pseudonymes: Au lieu d’avoir un identifiant unique permanent, les tags utilisent des
pseudonymes qui changent au fil du temps pour e´viter les attaques de trac¸abilite´ (voir
(82)). Un lecteur est donc tenu de re´gulie`rement re´e´crire les pseudonymes (i.e., les
identifiants) des tags qu’il est en train de lire, en gardant tout de meˆme un historique
des anciens pseudonymes.
• Rechiffrement: Alors que le chiffrement de l’identifiant d’un tag prote`ge la confidential-
ite´ de ce tag, il n’empeˆche pas la trac¸abilite´ de ce dernier. En effet, a` chaque requeˆte,
le tag envoie le chiffrement de son identifiant. Or, ce chiffrement peut servir de nouvel
identifiant permettant la trac¸abilite´ du tag. Pour reme´dier a` cette limitation, Ateniese
et al. (3), Golle et al. (73), Juels and Pappu (90) sugge`rent l’utilisation des techniques
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de rechiffrement. Un tag dans ce cas la` stocke un chiffrement IND-CPA (cf. de´finition
2.17) de son identifiant. Maintenant, quand un lecteur lit le chiffrement c stocke´ dans
un tag T , il rechiffre c pour obtenir un nouveau chiffrement c′ que le lecteur stocke dans
tag T . Ainsi, l’adversaire ne peut pas tracer un tag sur une longue pe´riode de temps.
Il faut noter que graˆce a` la proprie´te´ IND-CPA, c et c′ chiffre le meˆme identifiant.
• Authentification prote´geant la vie prive´e: Ce type d’authentification permet aux tags de
s’identifier aupre`s des lecteurs le´gitimes dans un syste`me RFID d’une fac¸on qui pre´serve
la vie prive´e. C’est a` dire qu’apre`s une authentification d’un tag T aupre`s d’un lecteur
le´gitime R, un adversaire peut seulement apprendre si l’authentification a re´ussi ou non,
alors que R peut bien authentifier et identifier T .
La plupart des travaux ante´rieurs sur la se´curite´ et la vie prive´e des syste`mes RFID a e´te´
axe´e sur:
• Les protocoles d’authentification qui prote`gent la vie prive´e des tags et qui convien-
nent aux capacite´s limite´es de calcul des tags RFID. Ces protocoles vont de proto-
coles d’authentification le´ge`res qui reposent uniquement sur des ope´rations binaires
(18, 66, 91), aux protocoles d’authentification syme´triques (48, 50, 58, 122, 153), en
arrivant aux protocoles d’authentification a` cle´ publique (103, 113, 126).
• Les mode`les formels de se´curite´ et de la vie prive´e qui de´crivent d’une manie`re comple`te
et compre´hensive les attaques possibles contre les syste`mes RFID (5, 92, 129, 159).
B.1.4 Limitations de la Se´curite´ et de la Vie Prive´e des Syste`mes RFID
La plupart des protocoles propose´s dans la litte´rature pour les syste`mes RFID visent a` pro-
te´ger la vie prive´e des tags au niveau applicatif, cependant Avoine and Oechslin (7) ont
souligne´ que la non-trac¸abilite´ des tags ne peut eˆtre jamais assure´e en s’appuyant unique-
ment sur les protocoles cryptographiques. A` savoir, un protocole cryptographique prote´geant
la vie prive´e des tags au niveau applicatif n’empeˆche pas un adversaire de tracer les tags
via leurs caracte´ristiques et proprie´te´s physiques. Par exemple, Danev et al. (43) et Zanetti
et al. (164) ont exploite´ les caracte´ristiques spectrales des re´ponses e´mises par les tags pour
extraire des empreintes physiques qui permettent l’identification correcte des tags individuels
du meˆme fabricant et du meˆme mode`le. De ce fait, les auteurs ont propose´ d’utiliser ces
empreintes physiques pour de´tecter les produits clone´s dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement,
et pour ve´rifier l’authenticite´ des documents d’identite´ qui inte`grent les tags RFID. Il est
manifeste qu’une identification pre´cise des tags RFID par les empreintes physiques compro-
met la vie prive´e des tags inde´pendamment des contre-mesures “cryptographiques” propose´es
pour prote´ger la vie prive´e au niveau applicatif. Ne´anmoins, une identification pre´cise des
tags RFID qui s’appuie sur les empreintes physiques ne´cessite un environnement controˆle´ ou`
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les tags sont a` proximite´ et a` une position fixe par rapport au lecteur (43), ce qui n’est pas
toujours le cas surtout dans un contexte ou` l’adversaire vise a` tracer un tag/individu. Ainsi,
la conception des protocoles cryptographiques pour les syste`mes RFID demeure une solution
viable qui peut prote´ger relativement la vie prive´e des tags.
Pourtant, prote´ger la vie prive´e des tags RFID au niveau applicatif s’est ave´re´ eˆtre une
taˆche tre`s difficile. Le proble`me re´side dans le fait que les formalisations existantes de la vie
prive´e des tags supposent ge´ne´ralement un adversaire fort contre lequel la vie prive´e ne peut
jamais eˆtre assure´e en respectant les limitations en termes de calcul et de puissance des tags
RFID. Ce qui nous ame`ne a` conclure que la conception de protocoles RFID pre´servant la vie
prive´e appelle a` la formalisation d’un mode`le plus faible mais re´aliste qui capte les capacite´s
d’un adversaire du monde re´el et qui re´pond aux capacite´s limite´es de la technologie RFID.
Dans ce manuscrit donc, on a conside´re´ d’abord un adversaire qui peut interagir et mod-
ifier le contenu des tags, mais qui ne peut pas surveiller la totalite´ de leurs interactions.
Cette hypothe`se peut e´galement eˆtre formule´e comme suit: il y a au moins une exe´cution du
protocole entre les tags RFID dans le syste`me et les lecteurs le´gitimes qui n’est pas observe´e
par l’adversaire. Ceci est en fait compatible avec le travail de Ateniese et al. (3), Dimitriou
(51), Lim and Kwon (111) et Sadeghi et al. (139). On croit que cette hypothe`se est re´aliste
vu la nature mobile des tags RFID.
Ensuite, on s’est adresse´ aux protocoles multipartites qui impliquent plusieurs lecteurs,
e´tendant ainsi notre recherche au-dela` des simples protocoles d’authentification entre tag
et lecteur pour mettre en oeuvre des applications pour la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement qui
assurent la protection de la vie prive´e des tags, cf. II.
B.2 Protocoles Cryptographiques pour les Chaˆınes d’Appro-
visionnement E´quipe´es de Tags RFID
Une chaˆıne d’approvisionnement se de´finit comme un re´seau de partenaires, qui peuvent
comprendre des distributeurs, des transporteurs, des fournisseurs qui tous participent a` la
production, la vente, et finalement la livraison d’un produit donne´ (1). Tandis que la ges-
tion de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement est de´finie comme e´tant la gestion et le controˆle de
tous les mate´riaux et de toute information pendant tous les processus de production et de
distribution (i.e., de l’acquisition des matie`res premie`res jusqu’a` la livraison du produit aux
utilisateurs finaux) (115). Ainsi, la gestion de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement vise principale-
ment a` retracer les mouvements de produits pour e´viter les bottlenecks de production, re´duire
les pertes de produits et ame´liorer la re´activite´ de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement aux rappels
de produits.
Toutefois, lorsque les produits ne sont e´quipe´s que de codes a` barres optiques, la taˆche la
plus simple comme l’inventaire demandera beaucoup de main d’oeuvre et deviendra par la
suite sujette aux erreurs humaines. Par conse´quent, les distributeurs comme Wal-Mart et le
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US DoD (115, 152) ont approuve´ l’adoption de la technologie RFID au niveau des palettes
pour ame´liorer les performances de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. L’avantage principal de
la technologie RFID est la possibilite´ d’identifier les produits individuels sans ligne de vue
directe. Cette proprie´te´ permet aux partenaires de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement de suivre
les diffe´rents produits et de tracer leurs historiques de fac¸on opportune sans intervention
humaine. En conse´quence, il est admis que l’utilisation de tags RFID dans la chaˆıne d’appro-
visionnement est d’une valeur commerciale importante car elle augmente la visibilite´ de la
chaˆıne, ce qui favorise la re´gulation du taux de production, la de´tection de la contrefac¸on, la
mise en application des re`gles de se´curite´... etc.
Pourtant, l’omnipre´sence de la technologie RFID facilite le de´ni de service et l’espionnage
industriel, comme explique´ dans la Section 3.1.4. Bien que le de´ni de service puisse eˆtre
adresse´ par une augmentation de la se´curite´ physique pre`s de tags RFID, les proble`mes lie´s a`
la vie prive´e des tags sont plus difficiles a` traiter. En effet, la vie prive´e des tags ne doit pas
seulement eˆtre assure´e contre les intrus, mais aussi contre les partenaires de la chaˆıne d’appro-
visionnement. Autrement dit, un partenaire de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement ne doit pas
eˆtre capable de suivre les tags RFID qui ne sont pas sur son site. Cette contrainte la` appelle
a` des solutions innovantes qui s’appuient sur la cryptographie, tout en tenant en compte les
ressources limite´es des tags. A` savoir, une solution cryptographique pour les applications de
chaˆıne d’approvisionnement doit eˆtre 1.) efficace, afin de ne pas influencer les performances
globales de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement, et 2.) re´alisable dans les tags passifs (ide´alement,
les tags sans capacite´ de calcul), afin de ne pas imposer un couˆt supple´mentaire a` la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement.
Maintenant, pour concevoir des applications de chaˆınes d’approvisionnement qui sont a`
la fois pas chers, efficaces et prote`gent la vie prive´e, on a relaˆche´ les mode`les formels de
la vie prive´e des syste`mes RFID, en supposant qu’ un adversaire ne peut pas surveiller en
permanence les tags dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement, comme discute´ ci-dessus et dans la
Section 3.4.
En supposant un tel adversaire, on e´tait en mesure de concevoir 1.) un protocole de
transfert de proprie´te´ qui s’exe´cute dans un temps constant alors que les tags ne calculent
que des fonctions de hachage (cf. Chapitre 4), 2.) deux protocoles qui se basent sur des
tags sans capacite´ de calcul et qui s’attaquent au proble`me de la ve´rification d’authenticite´
des produits circulant dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement (voir Chapitre 5), et enfin 3.) un
protocole d’appariement d’objets qui met en application les re`gles de se´curite´ dans la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement en utilisant uniquement des tags sans capacite´ de calcul (cf, Chapitre
6).
B.2.1 Transfert de Proprie´te´ avec Ve´rification d’Authenticite´
Tant qu’ un produit/tag circule dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement entre de diffe´rents parte-
naires, sa proprie´te´ e´ventuellement sera transfe´re´e. Dans ce contexte, la proprie´te´ d’un tag
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est la capacite´ qui permet a` un partenaire dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement d’authentifier
le tag et de transfe´rer la proprie´te´ de ce dernier. D’autre part, le transfert de proprie´te´ cor-
respond a` l’action de transmettre les informations ne´cessaires pour authentifier et identifier
un tag d’un partenaire a` l’autre.
En vue de prote´ger la se´curite´ et la vie prive´e des tags et des partenaires dans la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement, un protocole de transfert de proprie´te´ des tags RFID doit s’assurer des
points suivants:
• Authentification mutuelle suˆre entre les tags RFID et leurs proprie´taires (i.e., les parte-
naires de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement).
• Proprie´te´ exclusive: Les parties non-autorise´es ne doivent pas eˆtre en mesure de trans-
fe´rer la proprie´te´ d’un tag donne´ sans le consentement de son proprie´taire.
• Backward unlinkability: Un ancien proprie´taire d’un tag RFID ne doit pas eˆtre capable
de tracer un tag une fois la proprie´te´ de ce dernier est transfe´re´e.
• Forward unlinkability: Le nouveau proprie´taire d’un tag RFID ne doit pas eˆtre capable
de relier un tag a` ses interactions ante´rieures.
En outre, les protocoles de transfert de proprie´te´ des tags RFID sont tenus d’eˆtre ef-
ficaces pour ne pas ralentir les performances globales de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Ainsi, un protocole de transfert de proprie´te´ des tags RFID doit reposer sur un protocole
d’authentification efficace qui prend en compte les ressources de calcul limite´es des tags RFID:
Comme indique´ pre´ce´demment, on pre´sume que les tags RFID peuvent au mieux mettre en
oeuvre des primitives syme´triques telles que les fonctions de hachage. On rappelle cependant
que les protocoles d’authentification syme´triques de´ja` propose´s dans la litte´rature sont conc¸us
pour prote´ger la vie prive´e contre un adversaire fort qui peut en permanence intercepter les
communications des tags, et par la suite, ils ne´cessitent une recherche line´aire dans le nom-
bre de tags dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement pour authentifier un tag. De ce fait, il faut
relaˆcher les mode`les de la vie prive´e pour concevoir des protocoles d’authentification efficaces,
en supposant qu’il y ait au moins une interaction entre un tag donne´ et son proprie´taire qui
n’est pas intercepte´e par l’adversaire.
Pour re´pondre aux exigences de la vie prive´e et de se´curite´ de´crites ci-dessus, on a introduit
ROTIV (voir Chapitre 4), qui en sus de fonctions de base lie´es au transfert de proprie´te´
offre une nouvelle fonctionnalite´ qui est la ve´rification d’authenticite´. Autrement dit, un
partenaire dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement peut ve´rifier l’origine des tags RFID dont
il est proprie´taire. Cette fonctionnalite´ empeˆche les partenaires malveillants d’injecter des
produits de contrefac¸on dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
L’ide´e principale de ROTIV est de stocker dans chaque tag dans la chaˆıne d’approvision-
nement une cle´ syme´trique et un chiffrement Elgamal de son identifiant qui est signe´ par un
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e´metteur de confiance. Le chiffrement a` cle´ publique permet au proprie´taire d’identifier les
tags en temps constant, tandis que la cle´ syme´trique permet l’authentification mutuelle des
tags et de leurs proprie´taires. En plus, chaque tag dans ROTIV est associe´ a` un ensemble
de re´fe´rences de proprie´te´ qui permettent a` un proprie´taire d’un tag T d’authentifier et de
transfe´rer la proprie´te du tag T . Apre`s chaque authentification mutuelle re´ussie du tag T ,
son e´tat et ses re´fe´rences de proprie´te´ sont mis a` jour afin d’assurer a` la fois sa se´curite´ et
sa vie prive´e. Finalement, le controˆle d’authenticite´ d’un tag T est exe´cute´ en ve´rifiant si la
signature chiffre´e stocke´e dans T est une signature valide par l’e´metteur de confiance ou non.
B.2.1.1 Aperc¸u de ROTIV
Dans ROTIV, un tag T stocke l’e´tat SjT = (K
j
T , c
j
T ), ou` K
j
T est une cle´ partage´e entre le tag
T et son proprie´taire, et cjT est un chiffrement Elgamal de l’identifiant du tag T signe´ par
l’e´metteur de confiance I.
Quand un proprie´taire O(T,k) de´marre une authentification mutuelle avec un tag T , le tag
re´pond avec le chiffrement cjT et un MAC calcule´ en utilisant la cle´ secre`te K
j
T . A la re´ception
de la re´ponse du tag T , le proprie´taire O(T,k) utilise sa cle´ secre`te pour de´chiffrer c
j
T , et ve´rifie
par la suite si le texte en clair re´sultant du de´chiffrement de cjT correspond a` une entre´e dans
sa base de donne´es DBk. Si c’est le cas, O(T,k) ve´rifie le MAC envoye´ par T en utilisant la
cle´ secre`te KjT stocke´e dans sa base de donne´es. Ainsi, ROTIV permet l’authentification
mutuelle en temps constant, alors que les tags ne calculent que des primitives syme´triques
(i.e., MAC).
Pour assurer la backward et la forward unlinkability, les tags sont tenus a` mettre a` jour
leurs e´tats apre`s chaque authentification mutuelle re´ussie, en utilisant des me´canismes de
mise a` jour de cle´s syme´triques et des techniques de rechiffrement.
Maintenant, pour transfe´rer la proprie´te´ d’un tag T , le proprie´taire O(T,k) du tag T
fournit les re´fe´rences de proprie´te´ correspondant au tag T au futur proprie´taire O(T,k+1). Ces
re´fe´rences permettent au proprie´taire O(T,k+1) de controˆler d’abord l’authenticite´ (l’origine)
du tag T en ve´rifiant que cjT chiffre une signature valide de l’identifiant du tag T par l’e´metteur
I, puis de s’authentifier a` T et mettre a` jour le chiffrement cjT .
B.2.1.2 Contributions
En re´sume´, les contributions de ROTIV sont les suivantes:
• Authentification mutuelle en temps constant alors que les tags ne calculent que des
fonctions de hachage.
• Ve´rification d’authenticite´ qui permet aux proprie´taires potentiels d’un tag T de ve´rifier
l’identite´ de son e´metteur.
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• Contrairement aux travaux ante´rieurs (60, 101, 117, 142), le transfert de proprie´te´ dans
ROTIV ne ne´cessite pas une tierce partie de confiance.
• Formalisations des exigences de se´curite´ et de la vie prive´e lie´es au transfert de proprie´te´
dans les chaˆınes d’approvisionnement.
• Preuves formelles de la se´curite´ et de la protection de la vie prive´e de ROTIV.
B.2.2 Ve´rification d’Authenticite´ de Produits dans la Chaˆıne d’Appro-
visionnement
La trac¸abilite´ des produits est l’une des applications majeures des chaˆınes d’approvisionne-
ment e´quipe´es de tags RFID, car elle permet de ve´rifier l’authenticite´ de produits en temps
re´el et sans intervention humaine (56, 83, 118, 151, 160). L’ide´e est de tracer le chemin que
les produits ont pris dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement en lisant leurs tags RFID: Si un tag
a pris un chemin valide dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement, on peut en de´duire que ce tag
est un tag le´gitime. Toutefois, l’utilisation de tags RFID pour la ve´rification d’authenticite´
vient avec de nouvelles menaces pour la se´curite´ et la vie prive´e des tags et des partenaires
dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
En ce qui concerne la se´curite´, il doit eˆtre ve´rifiable si un produit est authentique en lisant
le tag attache´ au produit. A` cette fin, la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement posse`de un ensemble de
ve´rificateurs qui ve´rifient le chemin que les tags prennent dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Entre temps, les lecteurs au long de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement mettent a` jour les e´tats
internes des tags qui sont a` leur proximite´. Maintenant, le de´fi principal est de permettre
aux lecteurs de mettre a` jour les e´tats des tags tout en les empeˆchant d’injecter des produits
contrefaits.
Le deuxie`me de´fi concerne la protection de la vie prive´e des tags. En re`gle ge´ne´rale, les
partenaires de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement ne veulent divulguer aucune information sur
leurs processus internes ou sur leurs relations strate´giques ni a` leurs concurrents ou a` leurs
clients. Alors, un adversaire dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement ne doit pas eˆtre en mesure
de retrouver ou reconnaˆıtre les tags qu’il a lus auparavant.
Il est aussi important de noter que les solutions re´pondant a` ces exigences de se´curite´
et de la vie prive´e doivent eˆtre le´ge`res en termes de calcul coˆte´ tags pour permettre un de´-
ploiement a` grande e´chelle. Ide´alement, elles devraient eˆtre re´alisables dans les tags RFID
les moins chers, a` savoir, les tags sans capacite´ de calcul. Par conse´quent, tout calcul cryp-
tographique requis par le protocole doit eˆtre effectue´ par les lecteurs. En plus, la ve´rification
d’authenticite´ (i.e., ve´rification des chemins emprunte´s par les tags) par les lecteurs ne doit
pas eˆtre che`re en termes de calcul pour e´viter toute surcharge des lecteurs, et donc toute
entrave des performances de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Dans cette optique, on a pre´sente´ deux protocoles appele´s Tracker et Checker (cf.
Chapitre 5) qui permettent la ve´rification d’authenticite´ de produits dans la chaˆıne d’appro-
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visionnement d’une fac¸on suˆre et respectant la vie prive´e des tags. L’ide´e principale derrie`re
ces deux protocoles est d’encoder les chemins dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement par des
polynoˆmes, puis employer l’encodage obtenu pour signer les identifiants des tags. Tracker
cible le sce´nario de la trac¸abilite´ des produits ou` la ve´rification d’authenticite´ est effectue´e par
une partie de confiance appele´e manager, alors que Checker aborde le proble`me du controˆle-
sur-site qui permet a` chaque lecteur dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement d’agir comme ve´rifi-
cateur qui peut parfois eˆtre “malveillant”.
B.2.2.1 Aperc¸u de Tracker
Tracker repose sur une partie de confiance appele´e manager M pour ve´rifier l’authenticite´
des produits/tags dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. En utilisant les notations de la section
5.2, cela signifie que V = {M}. On rappelle que le controˆle d’authenticite´ des tags est
effectue´e en ve´rifiant la se´quence des e´tapes dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement que les tags
ont visite´es. D’ou` un tag T dans Tracker stocke un e´tat interne SjT encodant le chemin
que le tag T a pris dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. L’ide´e qui sous-tend Tracker est
d’encoder les diffe´rents chemins dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement par des polynoˆmes. Plus
pre´cise´ment, un chemin P dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement est repre´sente´ par l’e´valuation
d’un polynoˆme QP ∈ Fq[X] en un point fixe x0, offrant ainsi un codage compact et efficace
des chemins.
Maintenant, Tracker s’appuie sur la proprie´te´ que pour deux chemins diffe´rents P 6= P ′,
valide ou non, l’e´quationQP(x0) = QP ′(x0) ne tient qu’avec une probabilite´ ne´gligeable quand
q est assez grand et x0 est un ge´ne´rateur de F
∗
q. Donc, deux chemins diffe´rents produiront
deux valeurs diffe´rentes, et ainsi deux encodages diffe´rents. Par conse´quent, l’e´tat d’un tag
T va eˆtre uniquement associe´ a` un seul chemin (valide) dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Toutefois, la repre´sentation du chemin telle que pre´sente´e ci-dessus n’empeˆche pas le clon-
age des chemins: En effet, un adversaire peut copier le chemin d’un tag valide dans un tag
contrefait et injecter ce dernier dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. Pour re´soudre ce prob-
le`me, les tags dans Tracker stockent une signature σP(ID) de leurs chemins de´finie comme
σP(ID) = H(ID)
QP (x0) au lieu de QP(x0), ou` H est une fonction de hachage cryptographique.
La signature de chemin correspond donc a` l’identifiant du tag signe´ par l’encodage polyno-
miale du chemin pris par le tag. Par construction, les signatures de chemin valides prouvent
que les tags sont e´mis par une autorite´ le´gitime, et qu’ils ont emprunte´ des chemins valides
dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Tracker peut eˆtre structure´ en trois parties: 1.) L’e´metteur I e´crit un e´tat initial S0T
dans un nouveau tag T . 2.) Les lecteurs Rk au long de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement mettent
a` jour la signature de chemin stocke´e dans T en appliquant des ope´rations arithme´tiques
simples repre´sente´es par une fonction de mise a` jour note´e fRk de l’e´tat actuel S
j
T du tag T
(cf. e´quation 5.2). Cela se traduit a` la fin par l’e´valuation de σPvalidi = H(ID)
QPvalidi
(x0)
. 3.)
Enfin, le manager M ve´rifie si l’e´tat SjT stocke´ dans T correspond a` l’un des chemins valides
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dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. Si c’est le cas, le manager M accepte le tag T comme
tag le´gitime et identifie le chemin valide que T a pris dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Se´curite´ et vie prive´e de Tracker. D’une part, pour prote´ger la vie prive´e des tags
dans Tracker, chaque tag stocke un chiffrement IND-CPA (plus pre´cise´ment, un chiffrement
Elgamal sur les courbes elliptiques) de son e´tat ST = (ID,H(ID), σP (ID)), alors que les
lecteurs utilisent les proprie´te´s homomorphiques d’Elgamal pour mettre a` jour les signatures
de chemin stocke´es dans les tags sans de´chiffrement. A` la fin de la chaˆıne d’approvisionne-
ment, le manager M de´chiffre et ve´rifie la validite´ des chemins et par la suite la validite´ des
tags.
D’autre part, la se´curite´ de Tracker repose sur la difficulte´ du proble`me CDH (cf.
de´finition 2.26). En fait, on montre que s’il existe un adversaire qui est capable de calculer un
chiffrement Elgamal d’un e´tat valide ST = (ID,H(ID), σPvalidi (ID)), alors ce meˆme adversaire
sera en mesure de re´soudre le proble`me CDH.
B.2.2.2 Aperc¸u de Checker
Bien que Tracker permette une ve´rification efficace, suˆre et prote´geant la vie prive´e des tags
dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement, cette solution souffre de deux inconve´nients majeurs. 1.)
Elle ne´cessite une partie de confiance qui est le manager pour ve´rifier les chemins des tags. 2.)
La ve´rification ne peut eˆtre effectue´e qu’une fois les tags arrivent au manager, mais pas avant.
Cela limite le de´ploiement a` grande e´chelle d’une telle solution, surtout dans un contexte ou`
les partenaires demandent d’eˆtre en mesure de ve´rifier l’authenticite´ des produits en temps
re´el et sur leurs “sites”.
Par conse´quent, dans cette the`se, on a propose´ une deuxie`me solution pour la trac¸abilite´ de
produits dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement appele´e Checker. En effet, Checker s’adresse
au proble`me de ve´rification d’authenticite´ sur site en permettant a` chaque lecteur Rk dans
la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement de ve´rifier la validite´ des chemins emprunte´s par les tags, au
lieu d’une ve´rification effectue´e par une partie de confiance et qui n’a lieu qu’a` la fin de la
chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. En utilisant les notations de la section 5.2, ceci correspond a` un
syste`me de ve´rification d’authenticite´, ou` chaque e´tape de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement est
un check point, et chaque lecteur dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement est un ve´rificateur.
De ce fait, un tag T dans Checker passant par un chemin valide Pvalidi stocke un e´tat
chiffre´ SjT = (Enc(ID),Enc(σPvalidi (ID))), ou` ID est l’identifiant de T et σPvalidi (ID) est la
signature de chemin de´finie comme suit: σPvalidi (ID) = H(ID)
φ(Pvalidi).
Lors de l’initialisation, l’e´metteur I e´crit dans un tag T un e´tat initial chiffre´ S0T =
(Encpk1(ID),Encpk1(σv0(ID))), ou` pk1 est la cle´ publique de la prochaine e´tape du tag T dans
la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Sans perte de ge´ne´ralite´, on suppose que chaque fois le tag T visite un lecteur Rk, celui-ci
lit l’e´tat chiffre´ SjT stocke´ dans T et le de´chiffre en utilisant sa propre cle´ secre`te skk pour
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obtenir le pair (ID, σP(ID)). Ensuite, lecteur Rk ve´rifie si T est passe´ par un chemin valide
dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement menant a` Rk ou non. Apre`s la ve´rification du chemin,
lecteur Rk calcule la fonction fRk pour mettre a` jour l’e´tat stocke´ dans T comme de´crit dans
l’e´quation 5.2. Enfin, il chiffre le nouvel e´tat du tag T en utilisant la cle´ publique de l’e´tape
suivante que le tag T va visiter.
Se´curite´ et vie prive´e de Checker. La se´curite´ de Checker est assure´e par l’utilisation
d’une signature qui utilise le codage polynomial des chemins dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement
comme cle´ secre`te. La diffe´rence entreChecker etTracker re´side dans le fait queChecker
emploie les groupes biline´aires, qui permettent de calculer la cle´ de ve´rification comme une
cle´ publique. Cette proprie´te´ offre aux lecteurs dans Checker la possibilite´ de ve´rifier
l’authenticite´ des produits en utilisant des signatures qui sont relativement courtes sans met-
tre en pe´ril la se´curite´ de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. En fait, on montre qu’un adversaire
ne peut pas forger un e´tat valide, sinon il sera capable de casser BCDH (cf. de´finition 2.32).
Pour prote´ger la vie prive´e des tags contre les lecteurs dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement,
les tags stockent un chiffrement IND-CCA de leurs e´tats. Vu que Checker utilise les sous-
groupes de courbes elliptiques qui acceptent la construction des couplages biline´aires, on
note que tout chiffrement IND-CCA qui prend place dans les groupes ou` le proble`me de
DDH est difficile peut eˆtre utilise´ pour chiffrer les e´tats internes des tags. Pour faciliter la
pre´sentation, on utilise le she´ma de Cramer-Shoup (41). En plus, chaque lecteur Rk dans la
chaˆıne d’approvisionnement est dote´ d’une paire de cle´s publique et secre`te (skk, pkk).
B.2.2.3 Contributions
Les contributions majeures de Tracker et Checker sont les suivantes:
• Ils permettent de de´terminer le chemin exact que chaque tag a emprunte´ dans la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement.
• Ils garantissent la vie prive´e et la se´curite´ des tags dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
• Contrairement aux travaux pre´ce´dents sur la ve´rification d’authenticite´ des produits
dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement tels que Ouafi and Vaudenay (127) ou Li and Ding
(110), nos protocoles peuvent eˆtre imple´mente´s dans des tags sans capacite´ de calcul.
B.2.3 Appariement de Produits dans la Chaˆıne d’Approvisionnement
L’une des applications importantes de la technologie RFID est l’automatisation des controˆles
de se´curite´ lors du transport de marchandises dangereuses – telles que les produits chimiques
hautement re´actifs – dans les chaˆınes d’approvisionnement. En effet, il est dangereux de
placer certains produits chimiques proches les uns des autres, parce que meˆme les petites
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fuites de ces produits peuvent entraˆıner une vraie menace pour la vie des travailleurs dans la
chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Certaines solutions re´cemment propose´es visant a` assurer les re`gles de se´curite´ lors du
transport de produits chimiques dans les chaˆınes d’approvisionnement e´quipent chaque pro-
duit chimique d’un tag RFID qui stocke des informations qui l’identifient (voir Cobis (40)).
Avant que deux produits chimiques soient place´s coˆte a` coˆte, leurs tags sont scanne´s par un
lecteur RFID, et chaque tag envoie son contenu en clair au lecteur. Le lecteur de son coˆte´
envoie les donne´es lues a` un serveur qui effectue l’appariement des produits en se basant sur
un ensemble des re´fe´rences d’appariement note´ Ref qui identifient les pairs de produits chim-
iques re´actifs. Maintenant, lorsque deux produits chimiques re´actifs sont de´tecte´s, le serveur
de´clenche une alarme.
Cependant, la solution pre´sente´e ci-dessus souffre de plusieurs incove´nients qui entraˆınent
des menaces a` la se´curite´ et la vie prive´e. Le fait que les tags transmettent leurs contenus en
clair permet a` toute partie malveillante e´coutant le canal entre tags et lecteur de de´duire des
informations sur les produits chimiques re´actifs circulant dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement
et de de´terminer leurs emplacements. Il suit donc que les protocoles d’appariement a` base
de tag RFID ne´cessitent une conception minutieuse qui assure la se´curite´ et la vie prive´e des
tags RFID dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement.
Un protocole d’appariement des tags RFID prote´geant la vie prive´e doit s’assurer que
l’appariement est effectue´ sans divulguer le contenu des tags. Autrement dit, la seule infor-
mation re´ve´le´e apre`s l’exe´cution du protocole aux lecteurs de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement
est un bit b, tel que b = 1 si les tags sont attache´s a` des produits re´actifs, sinon b = 0.
Ide´alement aussi, un adversaire ne doit pas eˆtre en mesure de faire la distinction entre les
tags en e´coutant le canal sans fil entre les tags et les lecteurs.
En ce qui concerne la se´curite´, il est obligatoire de s’assurer qu’un protocole d’appariement
est correct (presque) tout le temps. Plus pre´cise´ment, il est ne´cessaire de de´tecter tous les
e´le´ments incompatibles (produits chimiques re´actifs). Cela correspond a` la comple´tude du
protocole: Le protocole doit toujours de´clencher une alarme lorsque deux produits chimiques
re´actifs sont mis l’un a` coˆte´ de l’autre. En outre, le protocole doit eˆtre efficace: Une alarme
se de´clenche uniquement quand c’est ne´cessaire, lorsqu’un appariement est de´tecte´ par le pro-
tocole, on peut conclure que les tags implique´s dans le protocole sont des produits chimiques
re´actifs. Cette deuxie`me contrainte correspond a` la validite´ du protocole.
Notez que les solutions adressant les proble`mes de se´curite´ et de la vie prive´e de´crits
ci-dessus sont fortement contraintes par les capacite´s de calcul restreintes des tags RFID.
Alors que la vie prive´e des tags contre les intrus peut eˆtre assure´e en utilisant des techniques
de rechiffrement, la protection de la vie prive´e des tags contre les lecteurs dans la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement est beaucoup plus difficile a` assurer, en particulier, lors de l’utilisation
des tags RFID sans capacite´ de calcul. En effet, les solutions traditionnelles qui garantissent
la se´curite´ et la vie prive´e dans les protocoles d’appariement (cf. Ateniese et al. (4), Balfanz
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et al. (9)) sont en ge´ne´ral base´es sur les protocoles de poigne´es de mains secre`tes entre deux
parties, qui peuvent pas eˆtre mis en oeuvre dans un environnement RFID.
Ainsi, on conc¸oit T-Match (voir Chapitre 6), un nouveau protocole pour l’appariement
de tags impliquant deux tags Ti et Tj attache´s a` deux produits chimiques circulant dans la
chaˆıne d’approvisionnement, plusieurs lecteurs Rk et un serveur backend S. T-Match cible
les tags sans capacite´ de calcul afin de permettre son de´ploiement a` un couˆt raisonnable.
B.2.3.1 Aperc¸u de T-MATCH
Dans T-Match, un lecteur Rk dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement lit le contenu d’un pair
de tags Ti et Tj , coope`re avec le serveur backend S pour effectuer l’appariement des deux
tags, et de´livre finalement le re´sultat d’appariement tout en assurant la vie prive´e des tags
Ti et Tj face a` des lecteurs Rk curieux et un serveur backend S curieux.
Chaque lecteur Rk dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement est tenu d’e´valuer une fonction
boole´enne Check pour tout pair de tags Ti et Tj en coope´rant avec le serveur backend, telle
que Check envoie b = 1, si Ti et Tj sont attache´s a` deux produits chimiques re´actifs. A cet
effet, chaque tag Ti dans T-Match stocke un chiffrement IND-CPA homomorphique Enc de
son attribut aTi (i.e., type de produit chimique). Lorsque deux tags Ti et Tj sont lus par le
lecteur Rk, ce dernier re´cupe`re les chiffrements Enc(aTi) et Enc(aTj ) des attributs de tags Ti
et Tj respectivement. Afin de prote´ger la vie prive´e des tags RFID, le lecteur Rk rechiffre
les chiffrements stocke´s dans les tags Ti et Tj . Maintenant, pour e´valuer la fonction Check,
Rk utilise la proprie´te´ homomorphique de Enc pour calculer un chiffrement Enc(f(aTi , aTj ))
d’une fonction f des attributs aTi et aTj . Ensuite, le lecteur Rk et le serveur backend S
s’engagent dans un protocole de test d’e´galite´ (84) pour ve´rifier si f(aTi , aTj ) ∈ Ref, ou` Ref
est l’ensemble des re´fe´rences d’appariement stocke´es dans le serveur S. Si c’est le cas, la
fonction Check renvoie b = 1; sinon, Check renvoie b = 0.
Se´curite´ et vie prive´e de T-Match. Pour prote´ger la vie prive´e et la se´curite´ des tags
RFID, chaque tag Ti dans T-Match stocke un chiffrement BGN (26) de son attribut aTi et un
code d’authentification de message (MAC) de ce chiffrement. A` chaque exe´cution du proto-
cole, le chiffrement BGN est rechiffre´ par un lecteur Rk dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement
et le MAC est recalcule´. Maintenant, en vue de prote´ger la vie prive´e des tags contre le
lecteur Rk la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement et le serveur backend S, T-Match s’appuie sur un
protocole de test d’e´galite´ de texte pre´servant la vie prive´e et qui est exe´cute´ conjointement
par le lecteur Rk et le serveur backend S. Aussi, T-Match utilise les permutations pour
s’assurer que la seule information divulgue´e a` la fin d’une exe´cution du protocole est le bit b
indiquant si le pair de tags participant a` l’exe´cution du protocole sont attache´s a` des produits
chimiques re´actifs ou non.
De plus, pour empeˆcher le serveur backend S de forger de nouvelles re´fe´rences d’apparie-
ment, les attributs des tags dansT-Match sont encode´s comme des“signatures”par l’e´metteur
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I qui est de confiance, et les re´fe´rences d’appariement sont calcule´es comme des couplages
biline´aires. Finalement, T-Match repose sur les MACs pour assurer l’inte´grite´ des donne´es
stocke´es dans les tags.
B.2.3.2 Contributions
Pour re´sumer, les contributions majeures de T-Match sont les suivantes:
• T-Match propose une nouvelle solution pour l’appariement d’objets dans la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement qui cible uniquement les tags sans capacite´ de calcul. Les tags
dans T-Match n’effectuent aucun calcul, par contre, ils doivent stocker seulement un
e´tat qui est mis a` jour a` chaque exe´cution du protocole par les lecteurs Rk de la chaˆıne
d’approvisionnement.
• T-Match prote`ge la vie prive´e des tags: T-Match repose sur des techniques du calcul
multipartites suˆres pour garantir que ni les lecteurs Rk ni le serveur backend S peuvent
divulguer le contenu d’un tag.
• T-Match est suˆr: Les lecteurs Rk ne de´clenchent une alarme sauf quand ils interagis-
sent avec un pair de tags attache´s a` des produits chimiques re´actifs.
B.3 Conclusion
Alors que la prolife´ration des tags RFID est admise a` eˆtre financie`rement avantageuse, le
de´ploiement de cette technologie vient toujours avec une varie´te´ de menaces de la vie prive´e
et de se´curite´ qui vont du de´ni de service a` l’espionnage industriel. Bien que la cryptogra-
phie offre de´ja` des solutions qui peuvent reme´dier a` la plupart de ces menaces en the´orie,
elle reste trop couˆteuse dans la pratique, pour des dispositifs aussi contraints que les tags
RFID. Le dilemme d’assurer la se´curite´ et la vie prive´e des syste`mes RFID tout en gardant
les exigences de calcul dans les tags minimales, a donne´ lieu a` une multitude de travaux sur
l’authentification RFID et sur les formalisations de se´curite´ et de la vie prive´e. Cependant, la
taˆche de concevoir des protocoles d’authentification qui prote`gent la vie prive´e et qui re´pon-
dent aux limitations de calcul de la technologie RFID s’e´tait ave´re´e difficile, voire impossible.
En re´alite´, les formalisations existantes de la vie prive´e de syste`mes RFID supposent un
adversaire fort contre lequel la vie prive´e ne peut eˆtre assure´e sans pour autant sacrifier la
scalabilite´ et la rentabilite´ de la technologie RFID.
En conse´quence, dans cette the`se, on s’est concentre´ d’abord a` combler cet e´cart entre la
formalisation the´orique de la vie prive´e et les aspects pratiques de la technologie RFID, en
supposant un adversaire qui ne peut pas surveiller en permanence les tags: il y a au moins une
interaction entre les tags et les lecteurs qui n’est pas observe´e par l’adversaire. Ensuite, on a
conc¸u quatre protocoles multipartites qui se basent sur la technologie RFID et qui fournissent
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des solutions efficaces et suˆres pour les applications de la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement. Plus
pre´cise´ment, on a introduit:
• Un protocole de transfert de proprie´te´ avec ve´rification d’origine;
• deux protocoles de ve´rification d’authenticite´ de produits qui peuvent eˆtre imple´mente´s
dans les tags sans capacite´ de calcul;
• un protocole d’appariement d’objets qui facilite la mise en application des re`gles de
se´curite´ dans la chaˆıne d’approvisionnement en utilisant des tags sans capacite´ de calcul.
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